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‘The most profound distinction in psychic life seems to be that between what is 
meaningful and allows empathy and what in its particular way is ununderstandable, 
‘mad’ in the literal sense, schizophrenic psychic life’ 
    Karl Jaspers, General Psychopathology (Jaspers, 1966) 
The experience of psychosis, with its distortion of reality, beliefs, perception and behaviour 
has historically confounded ordinary empathetic attempts to understand it. Early accounts 
invoked a possession of the sufferer by malign spirits. Kraepelin considered psychosis as sign 
an early deteriorating brain illness, dementia praecox. Bleuler, influenced by Freud, 
conceived of schizophrenia, a splitting of basic psychic functions.  Jaspers followed, and his 
distinction between affective illness and psychosis held popular and professional sway for the 
greater part of last century, and reflected wider views of ‘madness’ as categorically different 
to ordinary human experience; fascinating and frightening. However an appreciation of the 
spectrum of psychotic-like experiences in non-clinical populations (van Os, Hanssen, Bijl, & 
Ravelli, 2000) and new cognitive models of understanding the development of psychotic 
symptoms are beginning to bridge this ununderstandable divide. 
Alongside these is considerable progress in cataloguing the biological changes accompanying 








functioning of the human brain. The framework that links such understanding with cognitive 
models of normal and diseased brain states is provided by Cognitive Neuropsychiatry (David, 
1993). Such an approach is distinguished by an insistence on understanding clinical 
symptoms (rather than diagnoses) in terms of damage to normal information processing 
systems (such as memory, perception, attention, emotion), and their underlying neural 
substrates (including lesions, neurochemical changes and network disturbances). It attempts to 
stride the explanatory gap between ‘brain-level’ biological findings and abnormal ‘mind-
level’ phenomena by first being firmly grounded in both (David & Halligan, 2000). These 
will be considered in turn.   
1.1.2 Phenomenological,characteristics,of,early,psychosis,
Early descriptions of the development of psychotic symptoms come from retrospective 
interviews of patients and caregivers - this method was used by phenomenologists such as 
Kraepelin (1919), Bleuler (1950),  Conrad (1958), Meares (1959) and  Bowers (Bowers & 
Freedman, 1966). Klaus Conrad’s main contribution focused on the earliest experiences of 
psychosis, prior to and during the formation of delusional beliefs and hallucinations (Bush & 
Luu, 2000; Mishara, 2010).  His descriptions predated the recent upsurge of prospective 
research in prodromal psychosis by some 40 years, but resonate well with such recent 
accounts. In the first of Conrad’s 3 stages, delusional mood or ‘Trema” precedes the onset of 
delusions by a period of days, months or even years. The feeling at this time is of expectancy, 
that something is about to happen, alongside a “marked change in motivational and emotional 
state” (Mishara, 2010). He describes this as first associated with the most salient experiences, 
but eventually spreading to pervade the patient’s entire experiential field. This becomes 








quality that is accompanied by affective tension. Such descriptions chime with other first- 
hand accounts of this early period of psychosis (Stanton, 2000), such as those recorded by 
Bowers (1966): 
“I was in a higher and higher state of exhilaration and awareness. Things people 
said had hidden meaning. They said things that applied to life. Everything that was 
real seemed to make sense. … My senses were sharpened. I became fascinated by 
the little insignificant things around me… 
“Thoughts spun around in my head and everything—objects, sound, events—took on 
special meaning for me. .. 
…my senses were sharpened, sounds were more intense and I could see with greater 
clarity, everything seemed very clear to me. Even my sense of taste seemed more 
acute....” (Bowers & Freedman, 1966)  
“Every single thing "means" something…”(Brundage, 1983) 
There is also often a misplaced sense of recognition, and familiarity: 
“..a patient with incipient schizophrenia is placed temporarily in a guardhouse 
before transport. Being a former carpenter, the patient finds that the door, windows, 
floorboards, and bed frame in the cell have a ‘‘familiar’’ quality.” (Mishara, 2010) 
The 2nd stage, apophany (revelation), comes as an Aha-experience whereby delusions appear 
as a relieving explanation for what had been a series of perplexing and disturbing experiences, 
and often involve the self as a central reference point of the universe (anastrophe). 
“..He sees all at once that he himself is the carpenter of these objects. They look so 
familiar. They were removed from his old workshop. The windowsill has scratches 








“I felt like I was putting the pieces of a puzzle together…I increasingly began to feel 
that I was experiencing something like mystical revelations… 
“..Things began to fall together and make sense…” (Mishara, 2010) 
In emphasizing the altered perceptual field Conrad’s account is distinct from two-stage 
models where abnormal meaning is inexplicably attached to an otherwise normal perception, 
such as described by Jaspers or Schneider (Uhlhaas & Mishara, 2007). It also resonates with 
historical descriptions of late prodromal states for psychosis (Yung & McGorry, 1996a) that 
led to formalized criteria for clinical ‘high risk’ states  (Yung & McGorry, 1996b) 
1.1.3 The,context,of,psychosis,,
Psychosis often occurs in the context of schizophrenia - a relatively common, markedly 
disabling and costly condition which has positive psychotic symptoms as its hallmark: chiefly 
hallucinations (aberrant perceptions), delusions (fixed, false beliefs) and thought disorder (van 
Os & Kapur, 2009). Schizophrenia also often presents with negative symptoms (such as 
problems with volition and affect) and cognitive symptoms (e.g. memory and executive 
dysfunction), that can be particularly disabling and enduring. Psychosis also occurs in the 
context of other mental illnesses, particular bipolar affective disorder, and also in physical 
illness, and remains difficult to diagnose and treat. By the onset of the first psychotic episode 
there have already been substantial decreases in social and occupational function 
accompanied by significant structural and functional brain changes (Velakoulis et al., 2006). 










Key to this enterprise is the identification of high-risk samples, such as those characterized by 
genetic loading and attenuated psychotic symptoms (Yung & McGorry, 1996a). In the 1990s 
in Melbourne Yung et al developed criteria that permit sampling of a clinical ‘Ultra-High 
Risk’ (UHR) population with an untreated transition rate to psychosis of between 35-54% 
over a 1-2 year period (Yung et al., 2003; 2005). Several other sets of criteria have evolved 
since (Olsen & Rosenbaum, 2006a) and the validity of the construct has now been established 
in a number of independent prospective cohorts (Olsen & Rosenbaum, 2006b) with psychosis 
prodrome clinics and research services world wide (Liu et al., 2010). 
This At Risk Mental State (ARMS) for psychosis is phenomenologically characterized by 
attenuated positive psychotic symptoms such as hallucinations and delusions, non-specific 
psychiatric symptoms such as depression and anxiety and a range of detectable 
neurocognitive deficits (Seidman et al., 2010; Yung & McGorry, 1996b).  Later states in the 
prodrome are characterized by a perplexingly altered sense of novelty, emotion and personal 
significance, just prior to the onset of frank psychosis, that recall descriptions by 
phenomenologists such as Conrad’s ‘Trema’ (in 1.1.2).  
However, predicting transition to psychosis is difficult on the basis of clinical features alone, 
and research towards this end has grown steadily. Prospective studies exploring vulnerability 
to psychosis are powerful in this regard as many of the detectable changes in brain structure 
and function occur before the onset of the first episode and subjects are usually free of the 








As well as understanding ‘mind-level’ phenomenological characteristics of psychosis, an 
effective CNP model also requires an understanding of the ‘brain-level’ findings that 
accompany it. 
1.1.5 Overview,of,brain,changes,in,psychosis,
Brain changes in psychosis have been posited since Kraepelin and Alzheimer’s  first 
neuropathological investigations (Harrison, 1999; 1919). Following the CT demonstration in 
1976 of enlarged lateral ventricles in chronic schizophrenia (Johnstone EC, 1976) there has 
been an upsurge in in vivo imaging studies showing such brain changes (Bora et al., 2011). 
These include samples in first episode psychosis and high risk samples  that minimize the 
effects of illness chronicity and medication. Most consistently demonstrated are enlarged 
ventricles and reductions in medial and superior temporal lobes (Honea, Crow, Passingham, 
& Mackay, 2005)and there have been several demonstrations of dynamic progressions in 
these changes prior to (Pantelis et al., 2003) and following disease onset (Kempton, Stahl, 
Williams, & Delisi, 2010). 
Functional brain studies, mostly employing cross sectional fMRI designs, demonstrate 
differences in those with psychosis from controls in a range of general cognitive tasks 
spanning learning, memory, perception, emotion, and executive function and implicate areas 
such as the prefrontal and anterior cingulated cortex, the basal ganglia, medial temporal lobes 
and cerebellum (Fusar-poli et al., 2007). Such altered function is proposed to reflect basic 
mechanisms of disease. Deficits in working memory and prefrontal cortex (PFC) inefficiency 
for example have been proposed as intermediate phenotypes for psychosis (reviewed in 








ARMS share qualitatively similar deficits of a lesser extent (Broome et al., 2009). Despite 
these there have been relatively few findings with consistent associations with either a risk 
state or a first episode of illness, reflecting inconsistencies in scanning protocols, sample and 
illness definitions, low sample size and also the tasks used which usually employ well 
validated cognitive paradigms rather than tasks specifically tailored towards testing specific 
cognitive models of psychotic symptoms (Fusar-Poli, Allen, & McGuire, 2008),. 
Neurochemical brain imaging techniques such as Positron Emission Tomography (PET) and 
Magnetic Resonance Spectroscopy (MRS) allow exploration of alterations in neurotransmitter 
systems in psychosis. Evidence for the long standing dopamine hypothesis of psychosis 
(recently reviewed in Howes & Kapur, 2009) comes first from studies of the function of early 
antipsychotics, reserpine,  amphetamine,  and the relationship between antipsychotic efficacy 
and D2 receptor blockade . Further evidence from PET and SPECT studies has shown 
increased striatal dopamine synthesis and  release (via increased ligand displacement 
following amphetamine challenge), increased occupancy of D2 receptors (via a dopamine 
depletion technique ) and a possible modest elevation in striatal D2/3 receptor density (Howes 
et al., 2012; reviewed in McGuire et al., 2007).  There is also some support for the proposal 
that prefrontal hypodopaminergia underlies the cognitive symptoms in schizophrenia  
although this less consistent (Abi-Dargham & Moore, 2003). Increased pre-synaptic 
dopamine synthesis has also been demonstrated in subjects with prodromal signs of psychosis 
(Howes et al., 2009). These findings will be reviewed in further detail below. 
Opponents of an exclusively dopamine oriented hypothesis of psychosis point to inadequacies 
of dopamine blocking medication in fully treating psychosis, the failure of dopamine based 








candidate genes for schizophrenia that affect alternative neurotransmitter systems (reviewed 
in Stone, Morrison, & Pilowsky, 2007).  Instead models derived from the effects of ketamine 
and phencyclidine (PCP) and based on NMDA and GABA receptor dysfunction are proposed: 
hypofunction of receptors on GABA interneurons lead to a loss of tonic inhibition on 
glutamatergic axonal projections and result in excitatory neurotoxicity and the structural 
changes seen on imaging and post mortem (Olney, Newcomer, & Farber, 1999). Support for 
this model comes from in vivo MRS studies demonstrating for example elevated glutamine in 
the anterior cingulate cortex in healthy subjects following ketamine administration and in first 
episode psychosis, and from SPET studies using 123I-CNS-1261 demonstrating reduced 
NMDA receptor availability (Olney et al., 1999). Also relevant are MRS studies 
demonstrating differences in anterior cingulate and thalamic glutamate/ glutamine levels in 
genetic and clinical high risk samples, the latter also relating to changes in grey matter 
volume (Stone et al., 2009). Such evidence suggests that whilst dopamine dysfunction may be 
the ‘final common pathway’ for psychosis (Howes & Kapur, 2009) GABA or glutamate 
dysfunction may be lie pathophysiologically ‘upstream’. Possibilities for new directions in 
pharmaceutical development that proceed from this model are thus promising but are as yet 
unfulfilled (Stone & Pilowsky, 2007).  
Aside from imaging, neurophysiological studies have demonstrated abnormalities suggesting 
problems with to sensory filtering, such as impaired prepulse and latent inhibition (Swerdlow 
et al., 2006) and reduced P50 and  P300 cortical evoked potentials (Bramon, Rabe-Hesketh, 
Sham, Murray, & Frangou, 2004), and reduced gamma-band synchrony, suggestive of brain 








While there have been significant advances in the understanding of the neurobiology of 
psychosis, many mysteries remain; we do not yet understand how a change in dopamine 
signaling can lead to paranoid and bizarre beliefs. Key to this is the link between ‘brain-level’ 
neuroscience findings, such as those described above, and ‘mind-level’ explanations of 
patients’ experiences. Research within a CNP framework, that applies theoretically driven 
models of cognitive function and their neural basis to the understanding of symptoms, can 




Cognitive models of psychosis share an emphasis on pre-existing beliefs and ongoing 
appraisal of experiences in generating symptoms. In an individual with biopsychosocial 
vulnerability, stress for example may trigger emotional and cognitive changes that lead to 
anomalous experiences. Hemsley and colleagues suggest that such anomalous intrusions into 
conscious awareness arise from deficits in moment-by-moment integration of new input with 
stored memories (Gray, Feldon, Rawlins, Hemsley, & Smith, 1991; Hemsley, 1993), while 
Frith, who focuses on anomalies of the awareness of self-generated thoughts or actions, 
relates these to deficits in self-monitoring (Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000). Following 
this, Garety and colleagues suggest that specific reasoning and information processing biases, 
pre-existing schematic beliefs about the self and others, emotional disturbance and social 








mental states as external. This results in the abnormal beliefs and hallucinations becoming 
symptomatic (Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman, & Bebbington, 2001). 
 
Figure 1.1 Cognitive models of psycohsis emphasise the importance of prior 
vulnerabilities, emotional changes and appraisal of anomalous experiences in 
generating and maintaining psychotic symptoms (adapted from Garety et al., 2001) 
 
However such cognitive models rarely incorporate neurobiological findings into how the 
occurrence of anomalous experiences and the development of psychotic symptoms is 
instantiated in the brain. 
 
1.2.2 Aberrant,salience,and,the,onset,of,psychosis,
One influential account along these lines proposes that the aberrant assigning of “salience” to 
otherwise innocuous stimuli is fundamental to the development of psychosis, and reflects the 
dysregulation of striatal dopamine function associated with the disorder. According to this 








prodromal phase of the disorder to attach meaning to what would normally be bland or 
undetected external and internal sensory events, such that they seem new and significant and 
form the basis of delusional beliefs and hallucinations (Kapur, Mizrahi, & Li, 2005a).  
 
 
Figure 1.2  - Model 1: Aberrant Salience Hypothesis (from Kapur, Mizrahi, & Li, 2005a). 
Individuals in the prodromal stages of psychosis (circled) experience distressing and aberrant 
prominently salient experiences, which can lead to odd beliefs. 
 
The  “aberrant salience hypothesis” (figure 1.2) evolved from prior work on the normal 
function of dopamine and its role in addictive behaviours, in particular reward anticipation, 
sensitization and reward dependent learning and motivation, and also from earlier cognitive 
accounts of the formation of psychotic symptoms emphasising failure of integration of past 
memories and current sensory inputs (Gray et al., 1991). This model resonates with both 
patient and physician accounts of early psychosis previously described above and has become 








reflected in the increased number of studies involving salience or related concepts in recent 
years. A PubMed search of the term ‘salience’ reveals greatly increased returns year on year, 
including when limited to the fields of medicine, psychology or neuroscience (figure 1.4) 
 
Figure 1.3 - Year on year pubmed searches of ‘Salience’ overall (blue) and constrained by 
research fields Medicine Psychiatry, or Neuroscience (red) 
 
For specialised psychosis researchers it is also worth noting that ‘salience’ is also invoked in 
research related to other major psychiatric illness, particularly addictive and mood disorders. 
Figure 1.4 displays year on year PubMed searches of the term ‘salience’ in combination with 
terms related to addictive, affective and psychotic disorders. 
 
 























What is unspecified by this aberrant salience model of psychosis however, and what is 
confounded in subsequent empiric investigations of salience processing in psychosis, is what 
precisely is meant by ‘salience’. While this model broadly conforms to a CNP framework - 
linking abnormal symptoms of the mind to biological changes in the brain via dysfunction in 
a known cognitive system - it leaves out exactly which aspects of this system - salience 
processing - are altered, and how. In this critical sense function must be understood prior to 
dysfunction. 
1.2.3 What,is,Salience?,Perceptual,salience,,attention,and,goal,directed,behaviour,,
The broad challenge for any organism negotiating a sensorially cluttered and complex world 
is how to efficiently and effectively choose and respond to relevant stimuli, whether predator 
prey or potential mate. The world is complex and the demands of limitless perceptual inputs 
compete for limited cognitive resources, which must be allocated according to some priority. 
This allocation involves the processes of attention: filtering, sensory and behavioural 
orientation, active searching, and the processes of response: selection, command, execution 
and monitoring. The ‘spotlight’ of attention extracts and processes more information from 
attended stimuli while others fade into the background (Crick 1984). Stimuli are prioritised 
according to their ‘saliency’- their features compared to their context.  
For vision certain physical features tend to be reliably salient (Nothdurft, 2000); movement, 
colour, contrast, and orientation combine in a topographic ‘saliency map’ of perceptual 









Figure 1.5 Visual scene (left) and example corresponding saliency map (from 
http://www.scholarpedia.org/ )  
Analogous features exist in other senses and highly salient stimuli, such as a loud bang or a 
flash of light, are attended to largely independent of the organism state. Mostly however, such 
physical stimulus driven processing interacts with internal factors of the organism- goals, 
beliefs, history and so on to determine the most salient stimulus at a given point in time and 
place for a given organism. A hungry animal will mostly ignore everything that is not the 
sight, sound or smell of prey unless an unexpected, novel and potentially dangerous event 
such as the sound or shadow of a bird of prey overhead overrides the search. 
Two interacting processes of stimulus-driven and goal-directed attentional control are thought 
to relate in part to different neural networks centred on the dorsal posterior parietal - superior 
frontal cortex, and the ventral temporo-parietal and inferior frontal cortex, respectively 
(Corbetta and Shulman 2002). Disruptions in either such as in parietal stroke can lead to 
unilateral spatial neglect. 
Salient stimuli in humans are ones therefore that grasp and alter attention, thought and 








1.2.4 ,Motivational, salience:, reward, prediction,, threat, prediction,, prediction, error, and,
learning,,
A key influence on goal-directed behaviour is the active pursuit of reward and the avoidance 
of punishment. ‘Reward’ here refers to the positive value given to an object, a behavioural act 
or an internal state; rewards reinforce the behaviour that led to them. The role of dopamine 
has received particular attention in this context: drugs of addiction are thought to function by 
increasing or prolonging the action of dopamine in its main projection targets. Animals with 
electrodes planted in these areas will repeatedly choose to self- stimulate these over food and 
sex, sometimes until death (Olds, 1958). While initial studies focused on the role of dopamine 
in the actual experience of pleasure (Wise & Rompre, 1989), Berridge and Robinson (1998) 
subsequently separated reward into ‘wanting’ (incentive salience), ‘liking’ (hedonic impact) 
and ‘learning’ (reward learning). In a series of influential experiments in dopamine depleted 
rats they argued that dopamine is necessary only for the former, i.e. that dopamine systems 
mediate the motivational significance of rewards – the willingness to work for them - rather 
than the pleasure they provide or the learning that results (see also Flagel 2011). 
A further insight came from Schultz and colleagues (1997), recording individual dopamine 
neuron output in primates, who highlighted the intimacy of prediction and reward in driving 
instrumental learning. While phasic dopamine responses do occur to unpredicted rewards they 
are absent when predicted by a conditioned stimulus for that reward and instead transfer to the 
predictor, signaling the anticipation of reward, as opposed to the reward itself. The 
explanation is that when an expected reward fails to occur, dopamine neurons are inhibited. 
Learning is driven by the mismatch between prediction and outcome, or prediction error, 








uncertainty, magnitude and timing of rewarding outcomes (Schultz 1997).  Large prediction 
errors, represented by large phasic dopamine signals, are highly salient, leading the organism 
to adjust behaviour and cognition at ascending hierarchical scales (Fletcher, Friston 2009).  
The extent to which dopamine responses are restricted to reward is the subject of ongoing 
debate (e.g. Ungless 2004, Redgrave 1997, Schultz 2010). In human fMRI studies 
dopaminergic regions also appear to be activated in response to aversive stimuli and their 
anticipation (Carter 2009), and cell recordings in rodents and primates have demonstrated 
increased phasic output from dopaminergic regions to aversive stimuli (Mantz 1989) as well 
as a slower output component that responds to aversion and risk (Thierry 1976). This leads to 
a broader consideration of non-reward aspects of salience (Horvitz 2000). 
1.2.5 NonLreward,aspects,of,salience:,novelty,and,emotion,,
While the role of dopamine in reward prediction error based associative learning has broad 
support (Schultz," 1997;" 2010), the timing of phasic dopamine output following a sensory 
event (50-100ms) precedes the attentive sensory processing, including gaze-shifting, required 
to make an accurate reward prediction, which therefore remains unknown at the time of 
dopamine signaling (Redgrave 2006). Redgrave and colleagues suggest that the function of 
dopamine output is instead to reinforce behaviours associated with salient sensory input, 
promoting a sense of agency and guiding the discovery of new actions (Redgrave & Gurney, 
2006; Redgrave, Vautrelle, & Reynolds, 2011). Dopamine neurons indeed respond to a range 
of novel stimuli regardless of their appetitive or aversive consequences (Heinz," Grace," &"Beck,"2009), and novel stimuli elicit reliable orienting and approach/avoidance responses in 








In humans there is considerable evidence for the role of novelty in salience. Novelty may be 
itself intrinsically rewarding, or provide a ‘bonus’ in the search for rewards (Kakade & 
Dayan, 2002). Novelty boosts reward representations in the midbrain and enhances memory 
formation directly (Schott et al., 2004) and with anticipation (Wittmann, Bunzeck, Dolan, & 
D uzel, 2007), via recurrent dopaminergic hippocampal-VTA loops (Lisman & Grace, 2005). 
In the absence of reward, novel stimuli activate the human dopaminergic midbrain more than 
other candidate forms of salience such as ‘rareness’ or ‘targetness’ (Bunzeck & Duzel, 2006). 
Similarly the experience and recognition of emotion in humans is highly salient, and 
experiences of salient stimuli are usually affectively valenced. A capacity for both emotional 
experience and emotional recognition is evident in humans throughout the lifespan and is 
central to intra- and interpersonal human experience (Carstensen & Turk-Charles, 1994). Like 
novelty, emotion captures attention and behaviour, enhances memory and interacts neutrally 
with the processing of reward in dopaminergic areas (Wittmann, Schiltz, Boehler, & D uzel, 
2008). At a neural level, presynaptic dopamine activity both in the amygdala (Kienast et al., 
2008) and in the midbrain (Jabbi et al., 2012) modulates the processing of emotional stimuli 
in the amygdala and its connection with the anterior cingulate cortex (Kienast et al., 2008). 
From both ‘brain-level’ and ‘mind-level’ perspectives, the experience of salience, and 
therefore of aberrant salience, incorporates dimensions other than just reward, in particular 
novelty and emotion.  
1.2.6 Salience,Integration,
So what exactly is ‘salience’, and how do you measure it? Salient stimuli are those that pull 








push behaviour – response selection, motor planning monitoring and execution. A mechanism 
for choosing which stimuli to notice and respond to would have to involve all these elements 
and be able to compare different types of stimuli inputs to coordinate central output processes 
from attention through to action. Such a mechanism would be phylogenetically old, widely 
cortically and subcortically connected, and modulated by signals relevant to learning and 
context. Redgrave and colleagues consider this sorting and prioritising of a vast number of 
environmental perceptual inputs to restricted cognitive resources a ‘Selection Problem’ (Prescott," Montes" González," Gurney," Humphries," &" Redgrave," 2006), and locate the 
mechanism for its solution in the multiply connected basal ganglia (Redgrave, Prescott, & 
Gurney, 1999), operating within functionally segregated, parallel, re-entrant cortico-striato-
nigro-thalamo-cortical loops (Alexander," DeLong," &" Strick," 1986). Such loops are 
topographically represented according to inputs, outputs and function which include 
emotional, cognitive and sensorimotor domains (figure 5.2B). 
            
           A        B 
Figure 1.6A A simple instance of a selection problem in a rodent: basal ganglia compute 
competing inputs to allocate motor resources to ensure survival, dependent on context.(Figure"from"Prescott"et"al.,"2006). B. Functionally segregated parallel loops maintain cortical 









According to this model, competition occurs between stimuli represented through such loops 
to facilitate allocation of attentional and behavioural resources, in a ‘winner takes all’ 
computation. Competition is on the basis of their relative saliency to the organism in the 
context; salience is therefore the common currency used in this competition, the selection 
criteria for determining which stimuli ‘win’ (Redgrave"et"al.,"1999). This process may also 
therefore best fit with what is termed broadly thought as ‘salience processing’. 
How to best measure this behaviourally and neurally in humans is not easily established. In 
most experimental tasks a contrast is made on a single dimension between salient and non-
salient variants, be they reward predicting, aversion, emotional, reward prediction error, on 
fMRI activation in a region of interest. 
 
1.2.7 Studies,of,Aberrant,salience,in,psychosis,
Investigations of salience processing in subjects with psychosis have largely focussed on 
reward related dimensions of salience, reflecting the known role of dopamine in reward 
related processing. Many of these studies have utilised paradigms based on classical 
conditioning such as the Monetary Incentive Delay (MID) task  (table 1.1). In these 
paradigms, subjects with psychosis demonstrate relatively reduced behavioural and Blood 
Oxygenation Level Dependent (BOLD) activation responses to unexpected rewards, reward 
predicting stimuli or reward prediction errors, and/or  relatively increased responses to neutral 
stimuli. These alterations in neural response can be interpreted as reflecting aberrant salience 








Studies of salience processing and related concepts are summarised in table 1.1. Surprisingly, 
given the particular link between the aberrant salience model and delusions and 
hallucinations, abnormalities on these tasks in patients have often been found to correlate with 
negative rather than positive psychotic symptoms. Most of these studies neither focus on nor 
differentiate perceptual, novelty or emotional salience from reward salience.  
A recent paradigm, the Salience Attribution Task is notable in that it sets out to differentiate 
adaptive from aberrant salience, using a probabilistic reward learning game (Roiser et al., 
2009). Participants’ ratings of reward-relevant and reward-irrelevant stimulus dimensions are 
linked to adaptive and aberrant salience, respectively. Using fMRI these were differentiated in 
controls by activation in the DLPFC and middle temporal gyrus (Roiser, Stephan, Ouden, 
Friston, & Joyce, 2010). Amongst participants with schizophrenia, those with delusions 
showed reduced adaptive salience and increased aberrant salience to controls (Roiser et al., 
2009), in line with the aberrant salience model. The task is currently being applied using 
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In this thesis, “novelty salience” means salience relating to detecting whether a stimulus 
stands out from the background because it seems new; “emotional salience” relates to 
stimulus prominence related to the detection and experience of emotional arousal and valence; 
“reward salience” is related to a stimulus’ appetitive motivational properties. 
There is good evidence to suggest that novelty processing may be awry in psychosis, which 
often begins with ‘an altered sense of novelty and an aberrant assignment of salience…’ 
(Kapur, Mizrahi, & Li, 2005b) and a misplaced sense of recognition and familiarity (Mishara, 
2010). Like reward, the processing of novelty is associated with activation of the substantia 
nigra/ventral tegmental area (SN/VTA), the origin of dopaminergic neurons that project to the 
striatum. Their engagement by novelty is evident in dopamine cell recording studies in 
primates (Schultz, 1998), and in human fMRI studies directly (Bunzeck & Duzel, 2006) and 
with anticipation (Wittmann et al., 2007) and the interaction of novelty and reward has been 
demonstrated in healthy subjects  (Bunzeck, Doeller, Dolan, & Duzel, 2012). To my 
knowledge neuroimaging has not yet been used to examine the neural substrate of novelty 
processing in subjects with psychosis. Thus, there are no studies of novelty salience in Table 
1.1. 
Abnormalities in emotional perception, experience and expression have been considered core 
to psychosis since Bleuler (reviewed in Kohler & Martin, 2006). More recently subjects with 
schizophrenia and those at high risk have shown behavioural and fMRI abnormalities in 
detecting and processing emotional salience (Holt et al., 2006; L. K. Phillips & Seidman, 
2008; Taylor, Phan, Britton, & Liberzon, 2005), and the interaction of reward and emotion 
processing has also  been demonstrated in healthy subjects (Wittmann et al., 2008). Emotional 








processing (Kienast et al., 2008), where dysfunction has been proposed as central to 
schizophrenia pathophysiology  (Aleman & Kahn, 2005), and emotional aspects of psychotic 
symptoms may be critical in the distress, impairment and help-seeking that results (Freeman 
& Garety, 2003). 
To date, the salience paradigms that have been used to study subjects with psychosis have all 
focused on a single dimension of salience in isolation, such as reward (Table 1.1). However, 
the experience of salient stimuli, pulling attention and thought towards them, and pushing 
behaviour, is unified yet multifaceted, and usually motivationally and affectively loaded. 
Analogous to a physical ‘saliency map’ (Z. Li, 2002), higher elements such as reward, novelty 
and emotion may interact to help determine the most salient stimuli for the organism in its 
current state and context. It is therefore be useful to consider how the different elements of 
salience interact with each other. 
1.2.8 The(Salience(Integration(Task((
The Salience Integration Task is a novel task designed as part of the present thesis, and is 
described in detail in chapter 2. It permits experimental manipulation of three elements of 
salience processing - reward, novelty and emotion – in a visual context, whilst holding basic 
elements – size, colour, luminance, pixel count - as constant as possible. By using a balanced 
factorial design it facilitates examination of behavioural and neural responses to each element 
in isolation, as well as in interaction. Reaction time is used to index altered motor responses to 
salient elements; a delayed recognition task examines the impact of these on memory. The 
task is performed whilst fMRI scanning is performed in order to visualise the neurofunctional 











Figure1.5 Dopaminergic mesolimbic (red) and nigrostriatal (purple) pathways project from the 
midbrain to a range of limbic, striatal and prefrontal targets. NAcc: Nucleus Accumbens, PFC 
Prefrontal Cortex, ACC Anterior cingulate cortex, HC Hippocampus, VTA Ventral Tegmental 
Area. Figure adapted from (Perogamvros & Schwartz, 2012) 
 
Dopamine neurons, relatively few in number, originate in a small area of the ventral 
mesencephalon and innervate basal ganglia (particularly the striatum), limbic regions 
(amygdala and hippocampus) and forebrain (particularly orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate). 
These dopamine neurons function in motor control, executive, motivational and emotional 
processes, and when impaired lead to a range of neurological and psychiatric disorders. 
1.3.2 Studies(of(Dopamine(in(psychosis(!
Several lines of evidence support the role of dopamine in psychosis, which originated from 
the discovery of the mechanisms of antipsychotics in altering dopamine metabolism (Carlsson 








blocks dopamine uptake into presynaptic vesicles, could relieve psychotic symptoms 
(Schroeder & Perry, 1955). Subsequent work has demonstrated other psychotogenic 
compounds such as amphetamine are dopamimetic, and all effective antipsychotics are 
dompamine blockers (Kapur & Mamo, 2003). Direct evidence comes from insights of 
neurochemical brain imaging. 
There have now been over fifty studies using in vivo molecular imaging techniques to probe 
pre-synaptic and post-synaptic aspects of striatal dopamine neurotransmission in patients with 
psychotic disorders. These cover presynaptic synthesis capacity, dopamine receptor 
availability, baseline occupancy and dopamine release (Howes et al., 2007). 
The first step, dopamine synthesis capacity, can be measured using radiolabelled-3,4-l-
dihydroxyphenylalanine (L-DOPA). Studies using this technique have found elevated 
dopamine synthesis capacity in schizophrenia; recent meta-analyses indicate the overall 
elevation is around 14% and large in effect size (Fusar-poli & Meyer-Lindenberg, 2012a; 
Howes et al., 2012).  
The next step is the release of dopamine into the synapse, indexed by measuring the change in 
radiotracer binding following a challenge known to alter dopamine neurotransmission 
(Laruelle et al., 1997). In such studies in subjects with schizophrenia radiotracer displacement 
following amphetamine has consistently been found to be greater than that in controls, and 
related to the worsening of psychotic symptoms induced by amphetamine (Abi-Dargham et 
al., 1998; Laruelle, Abi-Dargham, Gil, Kegeles, & Innis, 1999). This is also evident in similar 
studies using a psychosocial stress challenge (Mizrahi, Addington, Rusjan, & Suridjan, 2011). 
Interestingly this elevation appears to be a psychotic state phenomenon, and much less 








is assessed by depleting presynaptic dopamine stores using a drug such as alpha-methyl-para-
tyrosine, which blocks dopamine synthesis and reduces extracellular dopamine levels. Studies 
using this technique have found that baseline occupancy of D2/3 receptors by dopamine is 
elevated in schizophrenia, which suggests that extracellular dopamine concentrations are 
elevated at baseline (Abi-Dargham et al., 2000).  
In contrast findings on D2/3 receptor availability have been less consistent. Meta-analysis of 
the studies to date indicates that D2/3 receptor availability is elevated in schizophrenia, but 
the effect size is small (Howes et al., 2012). Dopaminergic transmission in the striatum is 
predominantly terminated reuptake into the nerve terminals by dopamine transporters. As 
meta-analyses of the studies of dopamine transporter availability indicates that this is 
unaltered in schizophrenia, there does not seem to be a compensatory increase in the capacity 
of the dopamine system to ‘buffer’ the effects of disordered dopamine neurotransmission in 
schizophrenia (Fusar-poli & Meyer-Lindenberg, 2012b). 
Studies to date have focussed on striatal dopaminergic neurotransmission (Howes et al., 
2007). Consequently it remains to be determined how this reflects dopamine function in other 
regions, although meta-analysis of findings on D2/3 receptor availability outside of the 
striatum indicates that this aspect of dopamine neurotransmission is unaltered in 
schizophrenia (Kambeitz & Howes, 2012). Nevertheless, taken together, molecular imaging 
studies provide compelling evidence that striatal dopaminergic neurotransmission is altered in 









Elevated dopamine synthesis capacity and stress induced dopamine release has also been 
found in high risk subjects experiencing prodromal symptoms, prior to the onset of the full-
blown illness (Howes et al., 2009). Such elevations appear to be particularly marked in the 
subgroup that go on to transition to psychosis (Howes, Bose, Turkheimer, Valli, Egerton, 
Valmaggia, et al., 2011a), and longitudinal PET studies in these subjects indicate that 
dopamine synthesis capacity increases further with the onset of psychosis (Howes, Bose, 




While there is increasing evidence of altered dopamine function in psychosis, the cause of this 
is not well understood. Early accounts focussed on those dopamine neurons that innervated 
subcortical regions, which were overstimulated by excessive dopamine transmission, and 
blocked by antipsychotics (Seeman & Lee, 1975). Dopamine projections to the cortex were 
then discovered, and shown to have reciprocal regulation to that of striatal dopamine (Pycock, 
Kerwin, & Carter, 1980). It was suggested that reduced prefrontal dopamine may underlie 
negative symptoms in schizophrenia, and causally relate to exaggerated striatal dopamine 
(Davis:1991tk Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2002).  However direct human evidence of frontal 
hypodopaminergia was limited, and beyond simple ‘hyper’ or ‘hypo’ dopaminergia there was 








related to symptoms. Advancing this position entails a more detailed understanding of the 
regulation of dopamine firing but studying brain circuitry in detail in humans in vivo is 
difficult.  
1.4.2 Animal(Models(of(Schizophrenia(
Reliable animal models are therefore valuable preclinical tools with which to develop such an 
understanding (Jones 2011). However modelling and assessing the often uniquely human 
traits of psychiatric disorders is difficult. Models of disorders such as schizophrenia fall into 
four main categories of induction - developmental, drug-induced, lesion or genetic 
manipulation (table 1.2). Most display some aspects of the behavioural and physical 
phenotype of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia, but a limited number, including the 
developmental methylazoxymethanol (MAM) and neonatal hippocampal lesion models, also 
show behavioural and neurobiological aspects related to negative and cognitive symptom 
domains (Jones 2011).   
Animal models provide a neurofunctional context to test human models of disease. The 
characteristics of several major animal models of psychosis against key features are 





























































































































































































Of all of the animal models of schizophrenia illustrated in Table 1.2, the one that has perhaps 
the most features consistent with those of human schizophrenia is the Gestational MAM 
model. Methylazoxymethanol (MAM) is a naturally occurring anti-mitotic DNA methylating 
agent that targets neuroblast proliferation in the CNS (Moore, Jentsch, Ghajarnia, & Geyer, 
2006). Administration of MAM to pregnant rat dams therefore affects brain structures in the 
developing foetus that are developing most rapidly, and are highly timing dependent 
(Balduini, Lombardelli, Peruzzi, & Cattabeni, 1991). Administration at Gestational Day (GD) 
15 leads to gross morphological brain changes, including microcephaly and profound cortical 
dysplasias. At GD17 however, MAM administration leads to a restricted and preferential size 
reduction in PFC and limbic structures, especially a specific reduction in neuronal number in 
the CA2 subfield of the hippocampus, and reduced soma size and neuropil in other 
hippocampal subfields. There are specific cortical thickness reductions in the hippocampus, 
thalamus and several other regions, and a reduction in total brain weight of around 11% 
(reviewed in Lodge & Grace, 2009). Many of the behavioural changes seen in GD17 MAM 
rats emerge during puberty, as in schizophrenia (Le Pen, Gourevitch, Hazane, Hoareau, & 
Jay, 2006). These include reductions in spontaneous and social activity, increased locomotor 
activity to a novel arena and enhanced locomotor responses to amphetamine. Alongside this 
are increased dopamine release to amphetamine challenge in the nucleus accumbens, but not 
in the frontal cortex (Flagstad et al., 2004) and enhanced sensitivity to the NMDA antagonist 
MK-801 which causes greater hyperactivity in MAM rats than in controls (Le Pen, Jay, & 
Krebs, 2011). Deficits in sensory gating, which indexes pre-attentive sensory filtering, also 








Electrophysiological work in MAM rats has demonstrated increases in the number of 
spontaneously active dopaminergic neurons in the Ventral Tegmental Area (VTA) of the 
midbrain. This work relates to the distinction between between tonic and phasic regulation of 
dopamine outflow (Grace, 1991).  Dopamine neuron activity states are regulated in the rodent 
by the ventral subiculum of the hippocampus and the pedunculopontine tegmentum. Stimuli 
that are behaviorally salient activate the pedunculopontine tegmentum (PPTg) causing 
glutamate release onto mesolimbic dopamine neurons and leading them to burst fire. The total 
amplitude of this phasic dopamine signal is dependent on the number of dopamine neurons 
that the PPTg can activate, since it can only cause burst firing in those dopamine neurons that 
are already spontaneously firing - inactive neurons’ glutamatergic NMDA receptors are 
blocked by Mg2+. By controlling the population activity (i.e., proportion of dopamine neurons 
firing spontaneously), the ventral subiculum regulates the ‘gain’ of the phasic signal, which in 
health facilitates adaptation of total dopamine output according to context. In a safe and well-
known environment this gain is set at a low level (figure 1.6A).  Novel salient stimuli activate 
the PPTg but the total response amplitude is low, garnering little attention or behavioural 
activation. In a novel, dangerous or potentially rewarding environment the gain is set to high 
(figure 1.6B), and lower level salient inputs lead to larger amplitude dopamine output and 
greater attentional and behavioural activation. Grace hypothesises that in the context of states 
such as schizophrenia, chronic stress or with psychostimulant use the ventral subiculum is 
overactive and maintaining nearly all of the dopamine neurons in an active state. In this 
situation, minimally salient or even non-salient stimuli lead to large dopamine outputs, 
causing the experience of heightened vividness, alertness and significance experienced by 












Figure 1.6  Contextual information provided by the hippocampus regulates gain of phasic 
dopamine responses to salient stimuli. In dangerous novel or rewarding  contexts smaller simuli 




In this model contextual information is provided by descending inputs from the ventral 
subiculum. This hippocampal outflow area generates novelty signals based on perceptual 
inputs against predictions arising from stored information (figure 1.7, Lisman and Grace 
2005). This signal passes through the accumbens to incorporate information about 
motivational relevance of a context, such as reward status or goal relevance. Emotional 
information from limbic areas such as the amygdala and other relevant aspects of salient 
stimuli within this context input on the PPTg leading to glutamatergic activation of dopamine 
neurons (figure 1.7). Dopamine output is to main projection areas such as the striatum and 
prefrontal cortex and also recurrent pathways to the hippocampus where it is thought that 








formation for salient stimuli and contexts (Grace, Floresco, Goto, & Lodge, 2007; Lisman & 
Grace, 2005) . 
This elegant model provides a clear anatomical framework for the integrated processing of 
Reward Novelty and Emotional dimensions of salience, with key regions including the 
hippocampus, striatum, amygdala and midbrain. 
 
 
     Figure  1.7 VTA output is driven by ventral hippocampal outflow and  
    other limbic and PFC inputs. Figure  from Lisman and Grace 2005 
 
VTA dopamine neuron hyperactivity recorded in MAM rats can be reversed by inactivation 
of the ventral hippocampus (Lodge and Grace 2007). This is true also of amphetamine 
induced hyperlocomotion. Grace and colleagues suggest therefore that in MAM rats, and by 
extension in schizophrenia, overactivity in the ventral hippocampus drives hyperactivity of 








dopamine output, resulting in positive psychotic symptoms. They suggest that this 
hippocampal overactivity is particularly located in the ventral subiculum, or outflow area, of 
the hippocampus (figure 1.7), and may be the consequence of MAM causing a loss of 
parvalbumin-containing GABAergic interneurons in this area (Penschuck, Flagstad, 
Didriksen, Leist, & Michael-Titus, 2006). This is consistent with models of interneuron 
dysfunction (Olney et al., 1999) and multiple lines of evidence of hippocampal dysfunction in 
schizophrenia (Tamminga, Stan, & Wagner, 2010). In both MAM treated rats, and possibly 
also in human subjects with schizophrenia, loss of parvalbumin-GABAergic regulation of 
hippocampal activity leads to hyper-responsivity of the DA system and loss of control over 
appropriate responses to stimuli. 
1.4.4 The(Hippocampus(in(psychosis(
Grace and colleagues’ proposal of hippocampal overactivity underlying dopamine 
dysregulation chimes with converging evidence implicating of alterations in hippocampal 
structure and function in psychosis (Small, Schobel, Buxton, Witter, & Barnes, 2011; 
Tamminga et al., 2010). It a also site of action of environmental factors related to the onset 
and relapse of psychosis, including psychoactive substances such as cannabis (Arseneault, 
Cannon, Witton, & Murray, 2004; Yücel et al., 2008), and psychosocial stress (L. J. Phillips 
et al., 2006). Failure of the prefrontal cortex and ACC to regulate amygdalar responses may 
render the hippocampus vulnerable to sustained stress (Lodge & Grace, 2011). Both structural 
and functional changes in the hippocampus have been demonstrated in schizophrenia and in 
subjects with an ARMS (Palaniyappan, Balain, & Liddle, 2012; Tamminga et al., 2010; 
Wood, Kennedy, Phillips, & Seal, 2010).  There is also recent direct evidence of hippocampal 








demonstrate increased blood flow in the CA1 subfield in subjects with schizophrenia, and also 
in those with prodromal signs of psychosis, that predicted subsequent transition to psychosis 
(Schobel 2009). 
While the dorsal hippocampus (analogous to the posterior hippocampus in humans) has a 
known role in spatial context, more ventral (anterior) portions connect more extensively 
limbic structure and add ‘affective layering’ to location - signifying the ‘emotional 
significance’ of place (Grace 2011). Thus the ventral hippocampus is involved in context 




In the sections above I have described two key models informing a CNP based account of the 
development of psychotic symptoms. The first stages of the aberrant salience model of 
psychosis (figure1.1 Kapur, 2003) predict that dopamine dysfunction leads to altered salience 
processing and the phenomena of delusional mood, or ‘Trema’ (Mishara, 2010) preceding the 
formation of clear psychotic symptoms. Healthy salience processing includes dimensions of 
novelty, reward and emotion that are integrated to scale context-appropriate dopaminergic 
signals to behaviourally salient stimuli. In MAM treated animals, ventral hippocampal 
overdrive dysregulates the context dependent control of dopamine gain.  However, the extent 










The aberrant salience model of psychosis, whilst providing good face and construct validity, 
does not specify which dimensions of salience processing are altered. This follows an absence 
of a clear framework for understanding the contribution and interaction of various elements of 
healthy salience processing. Thus, to date, research on altered salience processing in 
psychosis has largely been limited to reward based tasks. As described, there is reason from 
both neurobiological and phenomenological perspectives to consider additional features of 
salience, in particular the role of novelty and emotion. Developing such a framework using 
behavioural and functional brain imaging data will be the focus of the first part of this study. 
1.5.2 Dimensions(of(altered(salience(processing(in(subjects(at(Ultra(High(Risk(for(psychosis(
Applying such a framework for salience processing to subjects with attenuated symptoms of 
psychosis is the second major focus of this study. According to the aberrant salience model, 
individuals in the prodrome of psychosis experience alterations in the salience processing, 
leading to the formation of psychotic symptoms. This group are also particularly suitable for 
studies in this area as they are usually medication naïve, and thus free from the confounding 
effects of antipsychotic treatment, which may be critical given the key role of dopamine in 
salience processing. Understanding altered salience processing in these subjects may thus help 
to reveal the mechanisms driving the initial formation of psychotic symptoms. 
1.5.3 The(neurochemical(basis(of(normal(and(abnormal(salience(
The final focus of this work will be to understand the neurochemical basis of normal and 








hippocampal output regulates context dependent midbrain dopamine responses to salient 
stimuli. I will employ PET scanning in combination with functional MRI to test the 
relationship of hippocampal activation to salient stimuli with dopamine synthesis capacity 
measured in the striatum. Insights gained will be related to the search for new avenues for 
















Models of alterations in ‘salience’ processing in psychosis and other psychiatric illness (Dunlop(&(Nemeroff,(2007;(Heinz,(2002;(Kapur,(2003) do not often agree on the cognitive 
processes involved in normal salience processing, or which elements of salient stimuli are 
critical; empiric testing of such models tends to rely on a single dimension of salience. For 
aberrant salience models of psychosis this has largely been that of reward, extending from the 
customary association of dopamine with reward processing (Dunlop( &( Nemeroff,( 2007;(Heinz,( 2002;(Kapur,( 2003;( Schultz,( 1997), and the known role of dopamine in psychosis (FusarCPoli,(Howes,(T,(Ungless,(&(Kapur,(n.d.;(Heinz(&(Schlagenhauf,(2010). 
In contrast the experience of salience is multifaceted, as are salient stimuli. In addition to 
basic ‘physical’ elements such as colour contrast and movement (Nothdurft,( 2000;(Wolfe,(Wolfe,(Horowitz,(&(Horowitz,(2004), salient stimuli can have elements of novelty, reward or 
threat and affective valence and arousal (Schultz,( 2010). The experiential phenomenon of 
‘salience’, that draws attention, orientation and behaviour, may emerge from interactions 
between such stimulus dimensions (e.g.( 'saliency(maps'( in(vision(Li,(2002) with both state 
and trait aspects of the organism. In testing disease models invoking an alteration in salience 
processing it is important to have a clear reference framework of normal processing that 
addresses such multidimensionality and its integration. This chapter describes the application 






The Salience Integration Task (SIT) is a novel modification of a standard Monetary Incentive 
Delay task (Knutson,( Adams,( Fong,( &( Hommer,( 2001;( Krebs,( Schott,( &( Duzel,( 2009a;(Wittmann,( Schiltz,( Boehler,(&(D(uzel,( 2008) and was designed to study novelty, emotion 
and reward salience and their interaction. ‘Salience’ was defined as the extent of behavioural 
and neurofunctional modification a stimulus provoked. Behaviour was measured in terms of 
reaction time and delayed recognition. Neural function was measured in terms of BOLD 
related fMRI activation in a predefined network of brain structures of interest taken from a 
key animal model (see section 1.4.1). 
All three salience dimensions were inherent to the picture cue. At the beginning of each trial, 
the indoor-outdoor setting of visual picture cues indicated whether the current trial held the 
chance for a 20-pence reward (reward-predicting cues, 80% of indoor scenes), or had no 
incentive relevance (neutral cues, 80% of outdoor scenes). Having the reward relevant 
dimension (indoor-outdoor) implicit in the cue, rather than preceding it or remaining separate, 
distinguished the from some other variations of the MID (e.g.(Wittmann(et(al.,(2008). Half 
of the cues were indoor scenes and half were outdoor. 
To generate the novelty dimension, 50% of both reward-predicting and neutral cues were also 
familiarized beforehand (see pre-familiarization procedure section 2.2.2), leaving 50% as 
novel images. Furthermore 50% of all of the pictures (indoor and outdoor, familiar and novel) 
were also emotionally arousing pictures taken from the International Affective Picture System (Lang(&(Bradley,(1998). The IAPS is a standardised set of pictures with reference valence 
and arousal data for a wide range of reference participants' emotional responses. Indexing 
emotional responses along dual bipolar dimensions generates a simple circumplex model of 





Figure 2.1 Dimensions of arousal and valence used in IAPS pictures. Scenes for the SIT were 
negatively valenced with a minimum arousal level of 3 (normal range 0-8) - top left quadrant (Lang & 
Bradley, 1998) . 
As positively valenced pictures may generate a rewarding ‘liking’ responses (Berridge,(1998), in order to keep emotional and reward dimensions orthogonal I used negative 
valenced pictures only,  with a minimum arousal level of 3.0 (mean((SD)(arousal=(5.6((0.86)(Lang(&(Bradley,( 1998). There were no significant differences in arousal levels across SIT 
categories or new distractor pictures used in the recognition tasks (figure 2.2).  
 
Figure 2.2 - IAPS Arousal levels for each Emotional SIT category and New 
distractor pictures in recognition tasks. SITcat: SIT category; Recall: new distractor 
pictures, NorFamEmo: Non-rewarding, familiar, emotional pictures; NorNovEmo: 
Non-rewarding, novel, emotional pictures; RewFamEmo: Rewarding Familiar, 




All pictures were carefully prepared in order to minimise response differences due to 
physically salient visual characteristics. All pictures were converted to greyscale and 
normalised to a mean grey level of 125 (SD 70), resized to 500 x 300 pixels and presented on 
a grey background. Following processing all pictures were checked to ensure they remained 
easily identifiable as indoor or outdoor, and in the case of the IAPS pictures remained readily 
evocative. Participants also rated the emotional arousal level of each picture after scanning. 
Trials were presented in a randomised order. 
This resulted in a 2x2x2 factorial event-related design, in which the cue variables novelty, 
negative-emotionality and reward-prediction were manipulated separately, yielding 8 
experimental conditions that were used to form contrasts in the subsequent behavioural and 
fMRI analyses of main effects and interactions (figure 2.3). Except where specified, the SIT 
category of Reward refers to the category of reward-predicting pictures (Indoor scenes), and 
the SIT category of Emotion refers to negative-emotion evocation by IAPS scenes. 
 
The Salience Integration Task 
 
Figure 2.3 - SIT task : Visual picture cues varied along 3 dimensions: Reward prediction (Indoor-outdoor), 
Novelty and Emotion. Following each cue participants pressed a button, followed by a fixation cross and 
then either a money reward or no reward outcome. 2 ‘NoGo’ trials served as an attentional control, where 





Following presentation of the picture cue for 1500ms, participants were instructed to press a 
button with their dominant hand index finger, regardless of cue type, aside from 2 pre-
assigned and randomly inserted ‘No-Go’ pictures (1 indoor, 1 outdoor).  
These ‘No-Go’ pictures served as attentional controls and encouraged processing of scene 
detail and incidental memory encoding; participants were not informed that there would be a 
later memory test. After the picture cue, a black fixation cross on a grey background followed 
for 1000ms-2500ms, followed in rewarded trials by picture of a 20p coin with ‘WIN!’ in 
green text underneath, or in unrewarded trials a similar shaped blank icon with the words ‘No 
Money Available’ in red text for 750ms, followed by a further fixation cross for 150ms-
1650ms (figure 2.3). Participants were told to respond quickly and accurately for each trial, 
although reward contingencies were predetermined for each trial to provide a fixed 
reinforcement ratio (0.8). There were 35 trials in each of the 8 response categories and 35 No-
Go trials giving a total of 315 trials. The inter-trial interval was 4.9s giving a total paradigm 
length of 25min 43.5s. 
After performing the SIT in the scanner, participants performed two recognition tasks for the 
picture cues, at 1hr and 24hrs. This was in order to test both encoding and consolidation of 
recognition, which may require different physiological processes (Frey(&(Morris,(1997), the 
latter being more dopamine dependent (Lisman,( Grace,( &( Duzel,( 2011). During this test 
participants also judged the confidence of their recognition memory according to the 
Remember/Know procedure (Duzel,( Tulving,( Yonelinas,( Mangun,( &( Heinze,( 1997;(Wheeler,(Stuss,(&(Tulving,(1997) and rated each picture according to its emotional arousal 





1. Reward prediction, novelty and aversive emotion would each be salient dimensions of 
visual stimuli, and evoke significant modifications in behaviour (measured by reaction time 
and delayed recognition memory) and in neurofunction (measured by the BOLD response) in 
a predefined subcortical network consisting of the midbrain, hippocampal formation, 
amygdala and ventral striatum/pallidum. 
2. There would be significant behavioural and neurofunctional interactions between the 
effects of each salience dimension. 
2.4 Experimental-Procedure-
2.4.1 Phase*1*+*Practice*task*
Before the task was performed, participants were given identical verbal and visual aided 
instructions for the task and told the reward contingencies. They were then given a practice 
run of the task outside the scanner where comprehension of the instructions and performance 
was ensured. The practice task was terminated when 10 continuous perfect trials were 
completed; all participants achieved this level of performance within 3 minutes. Directly 
following the practice task participants were given the money earned in cash (up to £1). This 
practice session minimized learning effects during functional data acquisition and was 
intended to lead to a switching of reward responses from the moment of reward receipt to the 
time of reward predicting cue. Participants were then shown the money they could win in cash 
(£40) prior to entering the scanner. 
2.4.2 Phase*2*+*Prefamiliarisation*task*
Following the practice task, participants were familiarised with half of the 280 different 




across Emotional and Reward categories.  The IAPS emotional rating of each picture was 
balanced across other categories (figure 2.2). Each picture was presented 3 times for 1000ms 
on a grey background in a randomised order. To reinforce reward contingencies and ensure 
category validity participants were instructed to attend to whether each picture was indoor or 
outdoor. 
2.4.3 Phase*3*+*Online*task*
Following the familiarisation task participants performed the full SIT task whilst functional 
MRI data was acquired. Online button presses and reaction times were recorded along with 
heart rate and estimated oxygen saturation using a finger probe pulse oximetry monitor.  
2.4.4 Phase*4*+*Recognition*task*1hr*delay*
One hour following the conclusion of the online task participants were shown 140 of the 
picture cues (balanced across all 8 categories) randomly mixed with 68 new distractor 
pictures (17 indoor-neutral, 17outdoor-neutral, 17 indoor-emotional, 17 outdoor-emotional). 
The average IAPS emotional rating of the new emotional distractor pictures was matched to 
the ratings of the studied pictures (figure 2.2). Participants received identical verbal and visual 
instructions for the recognition task, which consisted of 3 judgments cued by text underneath 
each picture. Participants were asked to indicate with a button press first if they recognised 
the pictures (‘Old’ or ‘New’) and if they did then rate their confidence in their memory (Duzel( et( al.,( 1997). For pictures judged as ‘New’ they were asked to specify their 
confidence in that judgment (‘Sure’ or ‘Guess’). Finally they were asked to rate how 
distressing they found the picture when first viewed by moving a slider along a Visual 
Analogue Scale from ‘Not Distressing’ to ‘Very Distressing’ (figure 2.4).  This was to ensure 




The time limits for the 3 steps in the recognition task were 3000ms, 4000ms and 5000ms 
respectively. 
 
   ,, 
               
        3000ms                                      4000ms                                                  5000ms 
Figure 2.4 - Recognition procedure performed at 1hr and 24hr. Participants judged whether scenes were 
new or old, then rated their confidence in that judgement and how emotionally distressing they found 
the pictures when first seen. 
 
2.4.5 Phase*5*+*Recognition*task*24hr*delay*
24 hours after the conclusion of the online task participants were asked to perform the 
recognition task with the remaining 140 pictures, again randomly mixed with 68 category-
balanced and emotional arousal- matched distractors. 
2.5 Methods-
2.5.1 Participants*
Twenty-nine healthy adults were recruited, mostly by word of mouth from other healthy and 
disease participants, and where this was not possible, by local advertisement. The target age, 
gender, education and geography were determined by the demographic features of the ARMS 
participants (chapter 3). Participants were excluded if they had a personal or family history of 
neurological or psychiatric disorder or met criteria for a current or past substance use disorder 




written consent to participate in the study which was approved by the Hammersmith Hospital 
Research Ethics Committee.  
On the morning of the MRI scan, participants provided a urine sample for drug screening 
(Triage UDS kit, Alere Ltd. UK) and pregnancy testing (Clearview HCG, Alere Ltd. UK), 
and performed an alcohol breath test (Lion Alcometer SD400, Lion Laboratories Ltd, UK). 
Height, weight, lying blood pressure and resting heart rate were recorded, and participants 
completed an MRI safety questionnaire conducted by the research radiographer. Left/right 
hand dominance was determined using the Handedness Inventory (L. J. Chapman & 
Chapman, 1987). Participant demographics are provided in table 2.1 






  Table 2.1 Demographic data for healthy participants 
2.5.2 Clinical*data*
Prior to scanning, I assessed all participants using a clinical psychiatric interview covering 
current and past psychiatric and medical history, development, occupational and social 
history, medication, family history, and current mental state examination. Clinician scales 
were administered as follows: Hamilton Anxiety and Depression rating scales, 
Comprehensive Assessment of At Risk Mental States  
2.5.3 Behavioural*analyses*





In order to compare reaction time, averages for each of 8 trial types (2[Reward] x2[Novelty] 
x2[Emotion]) were calculated for each participant. These were then entered into a repeated 
measures ANOVA in SPSS v19 (IBM) with Reward, Novelty and Emotion as within 
participant factors. The main effect of each factor was examined, as well as the 2-way 
interactions between factors. To aid interpretation I did not examine 3 way interactions. 
Analyses of recognition rates were conducted for the 1hr and 24hr sessions separately, and 
utilized measures of both hit rate and discrimination accuracy, correcting for false alarms 
(‘new’ pictures recognised falsely as old) according to the following formulae from Signal 
Detection Theory (Corwin,(1994): 
Hit Rate (HR) = (Hits +0.5)/(Total Old +1) 
False Alarm Rate (FAR) = (False Alarms + 0.5)/(Total New + 1) 
Discrimination Accuracy (DA) = HR - FAR 
These were then entered into repeated measures ANOVAs in SPSS with Reward, Novelty and 
Emotion as within participant factors. 
2.5.4 fMRI*analyses*
MR images were acquired on a 3T Siemens Tim Trio (Siemens Healthcare, Erlangen, 
Germany) using the 32-channel phased array head coil.  Anatomical reference images were 
acquired using a dual-contrast B1-homogeneity correcting modification of the Magnetization 
Prepared Rapid Acquisition of Gradient Echo (MPRAGE) sequence [1] known as MP2RAGE 
[2].  1mm isotropic resolution was acquired using TR=5s, TE=2.96ms, 256x240x176mm 
FOV, a 4 degree flip angle, inversion times of 700 and 2500ms, and a parallel imaging factor 




T2*-weighted echo-planar (EPI) images were acquired for both functional tasks and the 
resting-state scan, using 3.5x3.5x3mm resolution in a 225mm in-plane FOV, TR=2s, two 
echo times of 13 and 31 ms, 80 degree flip angle, 36 slices in each TR, and a parallel imaging 
factor of 2.  These volumes covered the hippocampus, amygdala, brainstem (including 
diencephalon, mesencephalon, pons, and medulla oblongata), and neocortex excluding the 
vertex. 788 volumes were acquired per session. 
The fMRI data were preprocessed and statistically analyzed using a general linear model 
(GLM) approach (Friston,(Holmes,(&(Worsley,(1994) as implemented in SPM8 (Wellcome 
Department of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College, London, UK) within MATLAB 
7.1 (The Mathwork Inc.). Prior to preprocessing all scans with scan-to-scan movement greater 
than 1mm translation or 1.50 rotation were automatically detected and checked for artefact. 
Following this all acquired scans were further manually checked for significant susceptibility 
by motion stripe or other type artefacts. Artefactual scans were removed and replaced by 
time-averaging adjacent scans, and a ‘dummy’ regressor of no interest was created for each 
participant which corresponded to the removed artefactual  scans ensuring these scans were 
excluded from analysis. 
All functional images were then further corrected for motion artefacts by realignment to the 
first volume using the realignment procedure in SPM8. Spatial normalization was performed 
by first coregistering the T1 scan to the first volume of the realigned EPI sequence and 
segmenting the T1 scan into grey matter, white matter and CSF compartments. These 3 
compartments were then warped to their respective Tissue Probability Maps (TPMs) in 
SPM8. The EPI normalization was realized by then applying the T1 warping parameters to 
the functional images. The images were resampled to 2 x 2 x 2 mm and smoothed with an 
isotropic 8 mm full-width half-maximum Gaussian kernel. The time-series fMRI data were 




A statistical model for each participant was computed by applying a canonical Hemodynamic 
Response Function (HRF Friston et al., 1998) to each of the 8 regressors of interest generated 
by the SIT corresponding to the timepoint of picture cue presentation (2[Reward] x 2 
[Novelty] x 2[Emotion]). To capture residual task related brain activity we also included 
regressors corresponding to No-Go cues and at reward and non-reward outcomes. To capture 
movement-related artefacts, six covariates per session were included (the three rigid-body 
translations and three rotations determined from initial realignment) as was an individual 
participant error covariate corresponding to trials where participants failed to press the button 
to ‘Go’ trials (Omission Errors), or pressed the button to ‘NoGo’ trials (Commission Errors).  
Regionally specific condition effects were tested by employing linear contrasts for each 
participant. The resulting contrast images were submitted to a second level random-effects 
analysis. Here, one-sample t tests were used on images obtained for each participants’ volume 
set and different conditions. In order to more accurately visualize activation patterns a study 
specific brain image template was created by applying warping parameters obtained during 
the segmentation procedure to the individual T1 scans and time-averaging across all included 
participants (figure 2.5).  
 
Figure 2.5: Illustrative midbrain slices on MP2RAGE T1 sequence with visible Substantia Nigra/VTA 
regions circled in red 
 
I defined four primary regions of interest derived from the Grace model relevant to my 
hypotheses (section 1.5.1): the midbrain, hippocampus/parahippocampal gyrus, amygdala and 




interest we used anatomical masks from the automated anatomical labeling toolbox 
implemented in SPM 8 (TzourioCMazoyer(et(al.,(2002).  For the midbrain region of interest I 
visualized the substantia nigra/VTA as bilateral dark stripes in midbrain slices on the acquired 
mp2rage T1 sequence (figure 2.5, z=-20 to z= -10) and created a study specific mask using 
Mricron software (figure 2.6B http://www.mccauslandcenter.sc.edu/ mricro/mricron/) based 
on the landmarks in Bunzeck et al (2006). The ventral striatum/pallidum region of interest 
(figure 2.6C) comprised the ventral anterior portion of the head and body of caudate, nucleus 
accumbens, ventral putamen and pallidum.  Other regions known to be involved in processing 
rewarding/novel/emotional stimuli include the orbitofrontal and inferior frontal cortex (Schultz,(O'Neill,(Tobler,(&(Kobayashi,(2011) anterior cingulate cortex and insula (Fiddick,(2011)(and precuneus (Dörfel,(Werner,(Schaefer,(Kummer,(&(Karl,(2009) were not included 
in the ROI analysis but explored in a whole brain analysis. Given the limited anatomical a 
priori hypotheses I thresholded the analysis at p<0.005, with a minimum cluster size of 3 
voxels. Following the relevant ROI small volume correction results were thresholded at 
p<0.05 Family Wise Error (FWE) corrected.  
     
       A                                           B                                           C 
Figure 2.6 Average T1 for healthy control participants with masks superimposed A. Hippocampus/PHG 







All participants complied well with the practice SIT, online SIT, and delayed recognition 
tasks demonstrating good comprehension of task instructions and the sustained attention 
required to perform the tasks. Table 2.2 presents rates of Omission Errors (failure to press the 
button during Go trials) and Commission trials (pressing the button during NoGo trials), and 
rates of no response trials during Recognition tasks. In subsequent behavioural and fMRI 
analyses, error trials (both omission and commission errors) were excluded. 






       Table 2.2 SIT and Recognition task performance in healthy control participants 
 
2.6.1.2 Reaction-time-
I examined the effects of the task on time to button press, although outcome was not 
contingent upon reaction time. Reaction time reflects several relevant cognitive processes 
including attention, orientation, response selection and motor action; I considered both 
speeding and slowing of reaction time away from the mean as possible surrogate markers of 




There was no main effect of reward on reaction time (F(28,1)=0.198, p>0.1). There was an 
effect of novelty on reaction time (F(28,1)=4.443, p=0.044), with participants responding 
faster to familiar than to novel trials (novel trials mean(SD)=608.5(17.5)ms, familiar trials 
603(17.6)ms). There was also an effect of emotion (F(28,1)=6.338, p=0.017), with 
participants responding slower to emotional than to neutral trials (emotional trials 
mean(SD)=612.8(19.1)ms, neutral trials mean(SD) = 598.7 (16.3) ms, figure 2.7).  
Reaction Time 
 
 Figure 2.7 Mean (SD) Reaction time for main effects of Reward Novelty and Emotion. 
‘Salient’ category refers to Reward predicting, Novel or Emotional stimuli, * p<0.05. 
 
The effect of emotion in slowing reaction times was enhanced in the presence of both reward 
and familiarity; there were significant interactions on RT between Reward and Emotion 
(F(28,1)=15.536  p<0.0001, figure 2.8a), and between Novelty and Emotion (F(28,1)=-5.67, 
p=0.024, figure 2.8b). In non-reward trials emotion had little effect, but in reward trials 
emotion had a large effect in further slowing reaction time. Reactions were generally faster to 
familiar trials, but not in emotional trials. There was no significant interaction between 
Reward and Novelty (F(28,1)=0.037, p>0.1, figure 2.8c). 






Reaction Time Interactions 
 
Figure 2.8  Mean (SD) Reaction times for 2way interactions. A Reward x Emotion, B Novelty x 
Emotion, C Reward x Novelty . *p<0.05  **p<0.01 
 
Given these interactions, I re-examined the main effects of reward and novelty in neutral cues 
alone, excluding emotional trials. There was a trend for faster responding to reward-predicting 
than non-reward-predicting cues (F(28,1)=4.01, p=0.055, reward-predicting cues 
mean(SD)=594.2(16.6)ms, non-reward predicting cues 603.2(16.4)ms), and a significant 
effect of novelty (F(28,1)=9.81, p=0.004, novel trials mean(SD)=605(16.3)ms, familiar trials 
592.4(16.6)ms - figure 2.9). 
Reaction Time in Neutral trials 
 
Figure 2.9 Mean (SD) Reaction time for main effects of 
reward and novelty in neutral  (non-emotional) trials  
*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ^p<0.1. Salient category refers to Reward 






I analysed each of the main effects of reward novelty and emotion and their 2-way 
interactions at 1hr, more reflecting memory encoding processes, and at 24hr, more reflecting 
consolidation processes (Lisman et al., 2011). 
Main*Effects**
At 1hr the overall average recognition correct hit rate (HR: % old cues correctly recognised as 
old) was 66.7% (dotted line, figure 2.10A). There were significant effects of each of the cue 
factors reward, novelty and emotion (figure 2.10A). Reward-predicting cues were 
significantly better recognised than non-reward predicting cues (+9.8%, F(28,1)=34.7, 
p<0.001), novel cues were less recognised than familiar cues (-15.4%, F(28,1)=83.7, 













Figure 2.10  
Mean (SD) A) recognition hit rate 
(HR) B) discrimination accuracy 
(DA) and C) False Alarms (FA) for 
at 1hr and at 24hr. Dotted lines 
represent overall session mean rate, 
the slope of the line away from the 
mean reflects the influence of that 
factor on the specified outcome. Hit 
rate refers to % old cues correctly 
recognised as old, false alarms 
refers to % new cues falsely 
recognised as old, discrimination 
accuracy refers to hit rate adjusted 






At 24hr the overall mean hit rate was 53.1%. Effects were similar for reward (+10.0% F(28,1) 
=26.6 p<0.0001) and novelty (-16.9% f(28,1)=73.4 p<0.0001), but there was no longer a 
significant benefit of emotion (+2.0% F(28,1)=0.524 p=0.475). 
However when hit rates were corrected for false alarms (new cues recognised as old, figure 
2.11) to give discrimination accuracy (DA) rates (figure 2.10b) there was a reversal of the 
effects of reward at 1hr (overall 1hr mean DA = 29.6%, reward related difference -14.9%, 
F(28,1)=29.8 p<0.0001, Figure 2.10b). This reflected a large significant increase in false 
alarm (FA) rate at 1hr to Reward predicting cues (overall 1hr mean FA = 37.2%, reward 
related difference +24.7%, F(28,1)=87.6, p<0.0001, figure 2.10c). By 24hr this effect was 
reduced, and this revealed a trend towards increased discrimination accuracy for rewarding 
cues relative to non rewarding cues (overall 24hr mean DA = 21.2%, reward related 
difference +4.6 % F(28,1)=3.55 p=0.07, figure 2.10b). In contrast there was a decrease in 
false alarms at 1hr to emotional cues (mean difference -6.5%, F(28,1)=8.2, p=0.008, figure 
2.10c), leading to improved discrimination accuracy for emotional cues (mean difference 
+26%, F(28,1)=66.9 p<0.0001). By 24hr this effect was increased, so that although there was 
no effect of emotion on hit rate during this session, there was increased discrimination 
accuracy for emotional cues at 24hr (mean difference +15.9%, F(28,1)=28.2, p<0.0001) . 
Interactions*
As with reaction time, there were significant interactions between emotion and both reward 
and novelty on recognition during both sessions, but no interactions between reward and 
novelty (figure 2.12). At 1hr the hit rate recognition boosting effects of reward were reduced 
in emotional trials compared to neutral trials (F(28,1)=6.85 p=0.014); in contrast the 
recognition boosting effects of familiarity were enhanced in emotional trials, at trend level 
significance (F(28,1)=3.49 p=0.072). At 24hr both of these interactions were further 






Figure 2.11 - Mean (SD) recognition hit rate and discrimination accuracy interactions. R: Reward, N: Novelty, 
E: Emotion. n.s. not significant, * p<0.05 **p<0.01 . Dotted lines represent means. 
 
 
Figure 2.12 - Mean (SD) recognition hit rate and discrimination accuracy interactions. R: Reward, N: Novelty, 





For discrimination accuracy, interactions were similar, and also accentuated at 24hr relative to 
1hr (figure 2.12). There were no interactions between Reward and Emotion on False Alarm 
Rate (figure 2.13), and false alarms cannot be examined for the effects of novelty. 
 
  
Figure 2.11 - Mean (SD) recognition hit rate and discrimination accuracy interactions. 













Within the primary ROI network (midbrain, hippocampus, amygdala, ventral striatum) there 
was significant activation to reward prediction (all reward predicting cues greater than non-
reward predicting cues) in the midbrain (table 2.3, figure 2.12).  
 
Figure 2.12. fMRI activations to Reward within the primary ROI network. Z coordinates are displayed in blue. 
Images are thresholded for visualisation at whole brain uncorrected p<0.005 
 
Outside these ROIs there was also activation in the middle frontal gyri bilaterally, and in large 
bilateral clusters in the secondary visual areas including lateral occipital cortices extending to 
bilateral lingual and fusiform gyri (table 2.3 figure 2.13). 
 
Figure 2.13. fMRI activations to Reward outside the primary ROI network. Z coordinates are displayed in blue. 
Images are thresholded for visualisation at whole brain uncorrected p<0.005 
 
For the reverse contrast (i.e. non-reward predicting cues greater than reward predicting cues) 




occipital areas around the calcarine sulcus, and in insulae and superior temporal gyri 
bilaterally (table 2.3, figure 2.13). 
 
Figure 2.13. fMRI activations to Reward predicting cues<Non-reward predicting cues within the whole brain. 
Z coordinates are displayed in blue. Images are displayed for visualisation at whole brain uncorrected p<0.005 
 
2.6.2.2 Novelty-
For the main contrast of cue novelty (all novel cues greater than familiar cues) there was 
significant activation within primary ROIs in bilateral hippocampal clusters including 
posterior and mid-hippocampal and parahippocampal regions, and in the anterior 
hippocampus (entorhinal cortex) -amygdala complex bilaterally (table 2.3 figure 2.14).  
 
Figure 2.14. fMRI activations to Novelty within the primary ROI network. Z coordinates are displayed in blue. 





Table 2.3 List of fMRI BOLD associated activations to main effects and interactions in healthy controls within 
the primary ROI network  
 
Abbreviations: Subic: subiculum, Amyg: Amygdala, Hipp: Hippocampus, EC: Entorhinal cortex, LB: Laterobasal, SF: 
superficial group, CA: Cornu Ammonis, Ling g: Lingual gyrus, FWE: Family Wise Error, WB: Whole Brain, PHG: 
Parahippocampal gyrus ROI: Region of interest, unc: uncorrected 
  
, ,, size, peak, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,,
Contrast, +/O, k, p(FWE,WB), p(FWE,ROI), T, Z, p(unc), x,y,z,(MNI), Location,
Reward, Pos, 19, 0.739, 0.014, 3.95, 3.49, <0.001, ,6,O28,O17,, R,midbrain,
,, , 3, 0.998, 0.119, 3.12, 2.86, 0.002, O6,O7,O11, L,midbrain,
,, , 3, 1, 0.149, 2.89, 2.68, 0.004, ,0,O10,O11,, L,midbrain,
,, Neg, NIL, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,,
Novelty, Pos, 73, 0.315, 0.02, 4.51, 3.88, <0.001, ,24,O43,O11,, R,PHG,
,, , ,, 0.045, 0.043, 4.13, 3.62, <0.001, ,27,O37,O11,, R,Hipp,(Subic),
,, , ,, 0.675, 0.063, 3.98, 3.51, <0.001, ,24,O28,O17,, R,Hipp,(Subic),
,, , 69, 0.411, 0.035, 4.35, 3.77, <0.001, O21,O37,O14, L,PHG,
,, , ,, 0.528, 0.041, 4.18, 3.65, <0.001, O27,O31,O17, L,Hipp,(Subic),
,, , ,, 0.563, 0.045, 4.13, 3.62, <0.001, O18,O28,O17, L,Hipp,(Subic),
,, , 13, 0.991, 0.058, 3.2, 2.93, 0.002, O27,,O4,O20, L,Amyg,OHipp,(EC),
,, , 13, 0.994, 0.068, 3.15, 2.89, 0.002, ,24,,,5,O26,, R,AmygOHipp,(EC),
,, Neg, NIL, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,,
Emotion, Pos, 166, 0.002, <0.001, 6.93, 5.24, <0.001, ,21,,O4,O17,, R,Amyg,(SF),
,, , ,, 0.006, <0.001, 6.5, 5.03, <0.001, ,27,,O7,O35,, R,Hipp,(EC),
,, , 16, 0.006, <0.001, 6.49, 5.03, <0.001, ,18,O34,,,1,, R,Hipp,(CA),
,, , 237, 0.023, <0.001, 5.86, 4.69, <0.001, O18,O34,,O2, L,Hipp,(Subic),
,, , ,, 0.028, <0.001, 5.76, 4.64, <0.001, O24,,O4,O20, L,Amyg,(LB),
,, , ,, 0.107, <0.001, 5.14, 4.28, <0.001, O27,,O4,O32, L,Amyg,,(LB),
,, Neg, 21, 0.019, <0.001, 5.93, 4.74, <0.001, ,27,O43,,O8,, R,Ling,g/Hipp,(Subic),
,, , 10, 0.049, 0.005, 5.51, 4.49, <0.001, O30,O43,,O5, L,Hipp,(CA),
,, ,, 14, 0.276, 0.01, 4.65, 3.97, <0.001, ,12,,17,O11,, R,N,Acc,
RxE, , 15, 0.998, 0.07, 3.16, 2.9, 0.002, 24,O04,O17, R,Amygdala,(LB),
,, , 9, 0.531, 0.039, 4.28, 3.72, <0.001, ,27,O43,,O8,, R,PHG,
,, ,, 5, 0.999, 0.349, 3.13, 2.87, 0.002, O24,O43,,O5, L,PHG,
NxE, , 14, 0.977, ,0.164, 3.17, 2.91, 0.002, ,12,,17,O11,, R,Caudate,
,, , 18, 0.987, ,0.191, 3.08, 2.84, 0.002, O18,,17,,O5,, L,Putamen,
RxN, , 3,, 0.998, 0.07, 3.19, 2.92, 0.002, 9,O25,O20, R,Midbrain,
, , 39, 0.702, 0.018, 4.01, 3.54, <0.001, ,21,,,5,O20,, R,Hipp,(EC)/Amyg,,




Table 2.4 List of fMRI BOLD associated activations to main effects and interactions in healthy controls 
outside the primary ROI network.  
,, ,, cluster,size, peak, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,,
Contrast, +/O, k, p(FWE,WB), T, Z, p(unc), x,y,z,(MNI), Location,
Reward, Pos, 563, 0.002, 6.95, 5.25, <0.001, O39,O85,O8, R,Occip,(V4)/Fusiform,g,
,, ,, 583, 0.021, 5.88, 4.71, <0.001, ,36,O85,,10,, R,MOg/IOg/ITG,
,, ,, 35, 0.69, 4.02, 3.54, <0.001, ,51,,29,,,7,, R,IFG,P.,Triangularis,
,, ,, 73, 0.939, 3.56, 3.21, 0.001, ,24,O58,,43,, R,IPL/SPL,
,, ,, 100, 0.943, 3.55, 3.2, 0.001, O39,,32,,O5,, L,IFG,P.,Orbitalis/Insula,
,, ,, 41, 0.986, 3.33, 3.03, 0.001, O24,O70,,34,, L,SOg,/SPL,
,, Neg, 91, 0.07, 5.33, 4.39, <0.001, ,O9,,O94,,,4,, L,SOg,,
,, ,, 40, 0.547, 4.21, 3.67, <0.001, O54,O7,O8, L,STG,
,, ,, 10, 0.946, 3.54, 3.19, 0.001, ,57,,,O7,O11,, R,STG,
,, ,, 48, 0.961, 3.48, 3.15, 0.001, ,12,,O94,,,7,, R,Calcarine,g,
Novelty, Pos, 267, 0.057, 5.37, 4.41, <0.001, ,24,O46,O14,, R,Occip,(V4)/Fusiform,g/ITg,
,, ,, 332, 0.216, 4.72, 4.01, <0.001, O24,O40,O14, L,Occip,(V4)/Fusiform,g,
,, ,, 121, 0.355, 4.44, 3.83, <0.001, ,39,O85,,10,, R,MOg,
,, ,, 14, 0.933, 3.52, 3.17, 0.001, ,24,,11,O23,, R,Parahippocampal,g,
,, ,, 35, 0.933, 3.52, 3.17, 0.001, ,42,,14,O17,, R,Temporal,Pole,
,, ,, 31, 0.951, 3.46, 3.13, 0.001, ,57,O16,,34,, R,PCG,
,, Neg, 94, 0.755, 3.86, 3.43, <0.001, ,,9,O64,37,, R,Precuneus,
,, ,, 22, 0.941, 3.49, 3.15, 0.001, ,O9,O67,28,, L,Precuneus,
Emotion, Pos, 2152, <0.001, 11.29, 6.88, <0.001, ,45,,O76,,O5,, R,Occip,(V4)/Fusiform,g,
,, ,, ,, <0.001, 8.83, 6.06, <0.001, ,42,,O64,,16,, R,MTG,
,, ,, 2326, <0.001, 10.65, 6.68, <0.001, O36,,O43,O23, L,Occip,(V4)/Fusiform,g,
,, ,, 45, <0.001, 9.27, 6.22, <0.001, ,33,,,O7,O38,, R,Fusiform,g,
,, ,, 1184, 0.002, 6.9, 5.23, <0.001, O39,,,29,O14,, L,IFG,P.,Oritalis,
,, ,, 890, 0.004, 6.71, 5.14, <0.001, ,39,,,11,,25,, R,IFG,P.,Opercularis,
,, ,, 428, 0.011, 6.2, 4.88, <0.001, ,O6,,,50,,28,, L,SMg,
,, ,, 62, 0.011, 6.17, 4.86, <0.001, ,18,,O31,,,1,, R,Thalamus,O,temporal,
,, ,, 129, 0.118, 5.09, 4.25, <0.001, O24,,O55,,49,, L,SPL,
,, ,, 60, 0.418, 4.41, 3.81, <0.001, ,51,,,O7,O17,, R,MTG,
,, ,, 34, 0.461, 4.34, 3.77, <0.001, ,O3,,,41,O17,, L,Rectal/Mid,Orbital,g,
,, ,, 14, 0.512, 4.27, 3.72, <0.001, ,24,,,,5,O23,, R,Parahippocampal,g,
,, ,, 32, 0.852, 3.78, 3.37, <0.001, O51,,,O7,O17, L,MTG,
,, Neg, 475, 0.008, 6.35, 4.96, <0.001, O27,O46,,O5, L,Lingual,g,
,, ,, 76, 0.017, 6, 4.77, <0.001, ,27,O46,,O8,, R,Lingual/Fusiform,g,
,, ,, 128, 0.075, 5.31, 4.38, <0.001, ,36,,29,,40,, R,MFg/SFg,
,, ,, 73, 0.222, 4.77, 4.05, <0.001, ,60,O16,,,4,, R,STG,
,, ,, 461, 0.244, 4.72, 4.01, <0.001, ,27,,50,,,4,, R,MTG/Mid,Oribtal,g,
,, ,, 148, 0.613, 4.13, 3.62, <0.001, ,48,O55,,49,, R,IPL/SMg,
,, ,, 47, 0.701, 4.02, 3.54, <0.001, O57,O10,,,4,, L,STG,






,, ,, cluster,size, peak, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,,
Contrast, +/O, k,
p(FWE,
WB), T, Z, p(unc), x,y,z,(MNI), Location,
RxE, ,, 290, 0.131, 5.07, 4.23, <0.001, O30,,O88,,O8, L,IOg/Fusiform,g/V4,
,, ,, 240, 0.357, 4.54, 3.89, <0.001, ,27,,O94,,O2,, R,IOg/Fusiform,g/V4,
,, ,, 27, 0.548, 4.25, 3.7, <0.001, O36,,,O1,,37,, L,PCC,
,, ,, 15, 0.992, 3.3, 3.01, 0.001, O51,,O64,,,7,, L,MTG,
,, ,, 56, 0.331, 4.58, 3.92, <0.001, O24,O46,,O5, L,lingual,/Calcarine,g,
,, ,, 21, 0.562, 4.23, 3.69, <0.001, ,30,O46,,O8,, R,Lingual,g,
NxE, ,, 571, 0.043, 5.37, 4.41, <0.001, ,O9,,O97,,10,, L/R,SOg/occip,pole,,
,, ,, 170, 0.168, 4.71, 4.01, <0.001, O27,,,50,,10,, L,MFG,
,, ,, 107, 0.592, 3.95, 3.49, <0.001, ,45,,O49,,52,, R,IPL,
,, ,, 98, 0.66, 3.85, 3.42, <0.001, ,,0,,O22,,25,, L,MCC/PCC,
,, ,, 38, 0.772, 3.69, 3.3, <0.001, O42,,O64,O20, L,Fusiform,g/V4,
,, ,, 129, 0.78, 3.68, 3.29, <0.001, ,33,,,47,,,4,, R,MFG,
,, ,, 213, 0.83, 3.59, 3.23, 0.001, ,,9,,O70,,37,, R/L,,Precuneus,
,, ,, 182, 0.877, 3.5, 3.16, 0.001, ,24,,,32,,40,, R,MFG,
RxN, ,, 27, 0.119, 5.09, 4.25, <0.001, ,24,,,8,O20,, R,temporal,pole,
,, ,, 374, 0.28, 4.65, 3.97, <0.001, ,39,O79,,O2,, R,IOG,(V4)/R,ITG,
,, ,, 58, 0.418, 4.41, 3.81, <0.001, O33,,26,O14,, L,IFG,(p.,Orbitalis)/POr,g,
,, ,, 262, 0.505, 4.28, 3.72, <0.001, O36,O46,O20, L,Fusiform,g/MOg,,
,, ,, 53, 0.515, 4.27, 3.71, <0.001, O57,O10,,,7,, L,STG,
,, ,, 31, 0.833, 3.81, 3.39, <0.001, O57,O31,,,7,, L,MTG,
,, ,, 33, 0.92, 3.63, 3.26, 0.001, ,18,O58,O26,, R,Cerebellum,
,, ,, 82, 0.933, 3.6, 3.23, 0.001, ,42,,O7,,28,, R,PCg,/BA,3a,
,, ,, 7, 0.966, 3.47, 3.14, 0.001, ,18,O31,,,4,, R,Thalamus,(temporal),
,, ,, 9, 0.975, 3.43, 3.11, 0.001, ,,9,,44,O17,, R,Orbital/Rectal,g,
,, ,, 10, 0.989, 3.31, 3.01, 0.001, ,57,O55,,19,, R,MTG,
,, ,, 4, 0.99, 3.3, 3.01, 0.001, ,57,,,8,,16,, R,IFG,(P.,Operularis),
Abbreviations: Occ: Occipital, g: gyrus, MOg: Middle Occipital gyrus, IOg: Inferior Occipital gyrus, ITG: Inferior 
Temporal gyrus, IFG Inferior Frontal gyrus P. Triangularis: Pars triangularis, IPL: Inferior Parietal Lobule, SPL: 
Superior Parietal Lobule, P. Orbitalis: Pars Orbitalis, POr g: posterior orbital gyrus, SOg: Superior Occipital gyrus, 
PCg: Post Central gyrus, STG: Superior Temporal Gyrus, MTG Medial Temporal Gyurs, MOg: Middle Occipital 
Gyrus, SMG Supra Marginal gyrus, ACC: Anterior Cingulate cortex, IOg: Inferior Occipital gyrus, PCC: posterior 




Beyond these regions there was activation in the fusiform and lingual gyri bilaterally, in the 
right post central gyrus, and in the right perirhinal cortex bordering anteriorly on the 
parahippocampal gyrus. 
 
Figure 2.13. fMRI activations to Novelty outside the primary ROI network. Z coordinates are displayed in blue. Images are 
thresholded for visualisation at whole brain uncorrected p<0.005 
 
For the reverse contrast, corresponding to cue familiarity, there was bilateral activation in the 
precuneus (table 2.3 figure 2.14). 
 
Figure 2.14. fMRI activations to Novelty<Familiarity in the whole brain. Z coordinates are displayed in blue. Images are 
thresholded for visualisation at whole brain uncorrected p<0.005 
 
2.6.2.3 Emotion-
For the main contrast of emotion (all emotional cues greater than neutral cues) within the 
primary ROI network there were large activations in the amygdalae bilaterally extending to 
anterior hippocampal regions, and in posterior hippocampal regions (table2.3 figure 2.15). 




mask and dorsally approximating the location of the periaqueductal grey and superior 
colliculi. 
 
Figure 2.15. fMRI activations to Emotion within the primary ROI network. Z coordinates are displayed in blue. Images are 
thresholded for visualisation at whole brain uncorrected p<0.005 
 
Outside the primary ROI network there was activation in the inferior frontal gyri bilaterally, 
extending to the dorsolateral prefrontal and medial superior frontal cortex, ventromedial 
cortex, and in large lateral occipital regions extending ventrally to the fusiform and lingual 
gyri, and dorsally to the precuneus and cuneus (table 2.3 figure 2.15). 
 
Figure 2.15. fMRI activations to Emotion outside the primary ROI network. Z coordinates are displayed in blue. Images are 
thresholded for visualisation at whole brain uncorrected p<0.005 
 
For the reverse contrast (neutral cues greater than emotional cues) there was bilateral 
activation in the ventral striatum, and in posterior hippocampal and adjacent parahippocampal 
regions (table 2.3 figure 2.16). Outside this primary ROI network there was activation in the 
anterior cingulate cortex, the right middle and inferior frontal gyrus, and in the right 





Figure 2.16. fMRI activations to Emotion <Neutral cues within the primary ROI network. Z coordinates are displayed in blue. 
Images are thresholded for visualisation at whole brain uncorrected p<0.005 
 
 
Figure 2.17. fMRI activations to Emotion <Neutral cues outside the primary ROI network. Z coordinates are displayed in blue. 
Images are thresholded for visualisation at whole brain uncorrected p<0.005 
 
2.6.2.4 Reward-x-Emotion-
There were interactional effects between reward and emotion in the right amygdala, in 
bilateral posterior hippocampi and adjacent parahippocampal gyri, and in bilateral lingual and 
occipital gyri (table 2.3 figure 2.18). Plots of main areas of interaction are provided in figure 
2.19. 
 
Figure 2.18. fMRI activations representing  areas of Reward x Emotion interactions in the whole brain. Z coordinates are 






Figure 2.19 - Reward x Emotion interactions for selected activation clusters. Amyg: Amygdala; Hipp/LG: 
hippocampus/Lingual Gyrus; FuG Fusiform Gyrus 
 
In the right amygdala-anterior hippocampus additional activation associated with rewarding 
stimuli was evident during emotional but not neutral trials, whereas in bilateral posterior 
hippocampal/PHG regions the reverse applied, with reward-related activation evident in 
neutral but not emotional trials. In the lingual/occipital regions the effects of emotion were 
greater in reward-predicting trials and vice versa. 
 
2.6.2.5 Novelty-x-Emotion-
There were interactional effects between novelty and emotion bilaterally in the ventral 
striatum, though these did not reach corrected significance levels. Outside the primary ROI 
network there were interactions in bilateral precuneus, frontal poles, the right DLPFC and in 
the occipital cortices including primary visual cortex (figure 2.20). In the ventral striatum and 




trials; similarly the activation associated with novelty in neutral trials was attenuated during 
emotional trials. In the occipital areas in the contrast the activation associated with emotion 
was enhanced with familiar trials (Figure 2.21). 
 
Figure 2.20 fMRI activations representing  areas of Novelty x Emotion interactions in the whole brain. Z coordinates are 
displayed in blue. Images are thresholded for visualisation at whole brain uncorrected p<0.005 
 
 
Figure 2.21 - Novelty x Emotion interaction plots for selected activation clusters. NAcc: Nucleus Accumbens, 






There was an interaction between activation associated with reward and novelty in an area 
centred in the anterior right hippocampus that extended to include the amygdala (figure 2.21), 
in a small area within the midbrain, and in the left mid-hippocampus. In these areas 
activations were additive (figure 2.22); positive responses to reward were present only in 
novel trials and vice versa. There were similar interactions in the fusiform gyri bilaterally and 
in the left orbitofrontal region. 
 
Figure 2.21 fMRI activations representing  areas of Reward x Novelty interactions in the whole brain. Z coordinates are 
displayed in blue. Images are thresholded for visualisation at whole brain uncorrected p<0.005 
 
 
Figure 2.22 - Novelty x Reward interaction plots for selected activation clusters. Amyg: 







In this study I measured behavioural and neurofunctional indices of healthy participants’ 
reactions to 3 putatively salient aspects of visual scenes: reward anticipation, novelty, and 
negatively valenced emotional arousal. I used 2 behavioural indicators of salience processing: 
reaction time comprising attention, orientation, response selection and motor function, and 
recognition memory, comprising incidental encoding and consolidation. Activation was used 
as a proxy of neural function in preselected candidate structures and in the whole brain. I 
hypothesised that there would be significant behavioural and/or neurofunctional responses to 
each individual element and interactions between elements, suggestive of integration of 
salience processing. 
I found behavioural and neurofunctional evidence for the contribution of each of the three 
factors, and for interactions between Reward and Emotion, and between Novelty and 
Emotion. I also found evidence for interactions between Reward and Novelty at a 
neurofunctional but not a behavioural level. These results support a broader conception of 
what constitutes salience and salience processing in the healthy brain. 
2.7.2 Reward,*Novelty*and*Emotion*interact*to*affect*behaviour**
Broadly conceived, salient stimuli are stimuli that stand out relative to their context, arouse 
behavioural and cognitive responses, and may lead to cognitive changes, such as learning and 
new memories (Kapur,( 2003;( Li,( 2002). Salience may be thus thought of as the ‘common 
currency’ amongst competing stimuli ‘bidding’ for limited cognitive resources (Redgrave, 




selecting response and action, and in learning, encoding and consolidating memories. My aim 
was to attempt to measure how much ‘currency’ reward, emotion and novelty had in a group 
of healthy control participants. 
The SIT indexed behavioural responses to visual scenes with varied reward-predicting, 
novelty and emotional characteristics firstly in terms of reaction times, reflecting attention, 
orientation, visual processing, action selection and motor response, and secondly through 
delayed recognition memory at 1hour, reflecting encoding, and at 24hours, reflecting 
consolidation. Changes in reaction times and memory formations likely reflected 
incidental/passive processes, as participants were not told to speed their responses nor that 
there were be a later memory test. Key ‘physical’ salience attributes of visual cues (size, 
colour, luminance) were equivalent across categories, and the factorial design of the SIT 
ensured robust examination of main effects and interactions. 
As hypothesized, there were significant deviations in both reaction time and delayed 
recognition to each tested element of salience, and significant 2 way interactions between 
elements. Participants were instructed to respond to all stimuli aside from the 2 ‘NoGo’ cues, 
and reward did not depend on speed of response. Nevertheless, responses were slower for 
novel stimuli and emotional stimuli, and faster to reward predicting stimuli (excluding those 
with emotional content). Speed of response may be affected by several cognitive and motor 
components. For reward predicting stimuli it is likely that the cues (which were indoor 
scenes) became conditioned stimuli predicting later reward, and thus became attributed with 
increased ‘incentive salience’ (Berridge, 1998), or more broadly, appetitive motivational 
salience. The motivational aspect here emphasizes the spur to action towards the stimulus, 
leading to an overall speeding of response, although in this case it may have also incorporated 
increased attention, orientation, visual processing or other mechanisms. For negatively 




of as similarly possessing motivational salience, but of opposite valence. Thus stimuli with 
aversive motivational salience similarly spur to action, but away from the stimulus, which 
may correspond to longer reaction times. It may also be that processing the emotional content 
required additional cognitive resources, leading to slowed responses. For novelty there was a 
slowing of response time, likely reflecting the speeding of the visual processing of scenes that 
had been seen before. Thus reaction time gives some important clues as to elements of salient 
stimuli, but is a composite measure (Posner, 2005).  
 These main effects were also evident when examining the impact of each element on 
recognition rates - emotion, familiarity and reward all boosted recognition hit rate and 
discrimination accuracy, supporting their salience in this respect. At 1hr reward also induced 
a large increase in false alarms that led to a reversal in the direction of hit rate effect on 
discrimination accuracy, rate whilst emotion reduced false alarm rates. At 24hours false 
alarms were reduced such that the discrimination accuracy was improved for reward, and 
further improved for emotion. Perhaps salient stimuli that increase both hit rate of memory 
but also false alarms, like reward, relate to the appetitive motivational salience of this 
category – participants want to remember these more, and so do, but often falsely. 
Conversely, scenes with aversive motivational salience (emotional scenes) had greater hit rate 
but reduced false alarms, and therefore greater discrimination accuracy. These remain 
speculative interpretations, and not easily testable in the current design. The need for pre-
familiaristion limits interpretations of novelty on recognition. 
Interestingly I found that emotion interacted with both reward and novelty on RT and 
recognition memory. Emotional scenes had a greater effect on slowing RT and boosting 
recognition hit rate and discrimination accuracy when familiar than when novel. In this 




responses. These interactions on recognition were also greater when tested at 24hr than at 1hr, 
further evidence of emotional responses evolving over time.  
Emotion also affected behavioural responses to reward. In neutral trials reward anticipation 
sped responses, whilst in emotional trials this was reversed. Here perhaps the overall 
motivational salience was increased (spur towards action of one sort or another), but the net 
valence is aversive, so the net effect was of greater slowing. Alternatively, independent 
emotional processing may interfere with reward related processing more than other processes. 
In contrast the recognition boosting effects of reward were reduced in emotional trials, and 
vice versa.  This may reflect the opposing motivational valence of these stimuli, but it also 
may reflect a performance ceiling reached in these doubly salient trials. Nevertheless there is 
consistent behavioural evidence of interaction of emotion with reward and with novelty, 
emphasizing the importance of affective context in salience processing. 
2.7.3 *Reward*Novelty*and*Emotion*activate*a*subcortical*limbic*network*
During fMRI scanning of the SIT there were clear main effects of each salient element in 
relevant structures within the primary ROI network derived from the Lisman and Grace 
model (Lisman( &( Grace,( 2005). This was particularly strong for emotion, which was 
associated with activation in the amygdalae, important in emotion processing (Costafreda, 
Brammer, David, & Fu, 2008), the hippocampi, relating to context and memory, and several 
areas within the midbrain. The latter were in both ventral regions approximating the SN/VTA, 
the major site of dopaminergic neurons, and also in more dorsal /caudal regions incorporating 
the locus coeruleus, a major site of noradrenergic neurons: previous work has demonstrated 
that both these transmitters are relevant for emotional responses in the human brain (Jabbi(et(al.,( 2012;( Sara,( 2009). The dorsal midbrain cluster also included the periaqueductal grey, 
which is responsive to aversive stimuli and has large inputs onto the SN/VTA, as well as the 




novelty and other aspects of salience (Redgrave, Gurney, & Reynolds, 2008). These also have 
direct inputs to the SN/VTA (Comoli et al., 2003). Conversely, The ventral striatum was more 
activated by neutral than emotional stimuli, suggesting that in this region these pictures may 
have represented unexpected aversive stimuli, consistent with prediction error accounts of 
ventral striatal function (Schultz,(2010;(Ungless,(Argilli,(&(Bonci,(2010).  
The exploratory whole brain analysis revealed additional activation in response to emotional 
stimuli in prefrontal areas such as the IFG/MFG, OFC and VMPFC. The DLPFC and ACC 
were activated in the reverse contrast, and are known to play an important role in regulating 
emotional experiences and in modifying subcortical responses (Banks,( Eddy,( Angstadt,(Nathan,( &( Phan,( 2007) while the IFG, OFC and mPFC are involved in the appraisal and 
expression of emotional experiences (Etkin,( Egner,( &( Kalisch,( 2011;( Jabbi( &( Keysers,(2008). 
Novelty led to activation in the middle and posterior regions of the hippocampus bilaterally, 
consistent with its established role in context related calculations (Lisman & Grace, 2005), 
whilst the reverse contrast led to activation in the precuneus, known for its role in recognition (Dörfel(et(al.,(2009). It is important to highlight that this was a true absolute ‘novelty’ effect 
as each stimulus was indeed new and different from the familiar stimuli, which themselves 
were different from one another. This is in contrast to similar effects sometimes conflated 
with novelty, such as ‘rareness’, ‘deviance’ or ‘targetness’ such as in oddball paradigms when 
contrasted against a repeated ‘standard’.  Unlike Bunzeck et al (2006) we did not see 
midbrain activation to absolute novelty, however this may reflect differences in task, MRI 
parameters and analysis, and there is a broad base of human and animal evidence of 
dopaminergic neurons’ response to stimulus novelty  (reviewed in Redgrave et al., 2008). 
Reward anticipation, formed by contrasting the reward - relevant outdoor-indoor setting of 




bilaterally. This network of activation suggested that these reward predicting cues were 
indeed serving as conditioned stimuli for the expected later monetary reward. Interestingly 
however activations were not detected in the ventral striatum.  This may be in part due to 
susceptibility artefact in this region adjacent to the nasal sinuses, which also would explain 
the somewhat lateralized orbitofrontal responses. We deliberately made the task responses 
irrelevant to reward, in order to avoid biasing towards this aspect of salience. It is likely that 
the reward probe is therefore weakened relative to paradigms that require accurate or speeded 
active responses to obtain reward (Zink, Pagnoni, Martin-Skurski, Chappelow, & Berns, 
2004). An absence of ventral striatal activation to reward may also relate to incomplete 
switching of responses from outcome to reward predicting cue. Participants were informed of 
the reward contingencies prior to the scanning session, and performed a practice session 
where they experienced the reward contingencies and were given the money earned directly 
in cash. However as participants were not explicitly asked for a response indicating each 
trial’s reward prediction it is not possible to accurately model this.  
2.7.4 Salience*responses*in*visual*sensory*cortices**
In the secondary visual areas there were large activations to reward predicting stimuli that 
were otherwise equivalent in terms of basic physical visual characteristics. This was not 
expected, but may relate to suggestions by Redgrave and colleagues (Redgrave & Gurney, 
2006), who point out that the short latency phasic dopamine signal (onset around 100ms) is 
too fast to  reflect calculation of a prediction error as shown by Schultz (Schultz, 1997), which 
would necessarily require a saccade towards the stimulus (taking at least 200-300ms). They 
suggest instead that reward related calculations are encoded in sensory pathways, which 
project onto dopaminergic areas via for example the superior colliculi (Comoli et al., 2003). 
There was also large secondary visual cortex activations for aversive emotional stimuli, 




timescales are too slow to investigate timing directly, but the findings in the visual cortices 
are nonetheless interesting in view of this model.  
2.7.5 Responses*to*Reward*in*the*Amygdala*and*Hippocampus*depend*on*Emotion*
Supporting the behavioural findings, there was evidence for interactions between reward, 
novelty and emotion that may suggest the neural location of these interactions. Interactions 
between reward and emotion were seen in the right amygdala and in the posterior 
hippocampus bilaterally. The anterior hippocampus and amygdala are intimately connected 
with other limbic structures, and hippocampal responses here are proposed to reflect the 
‘affective layering’ of place or circumstance (Grace,( 2010). Accordingly responses in this 
region to reward depended on emotional content and were absent in neutral trials. This 
interaction was similar in nature to that seen between reward and emotion at the behavioural 
level (on reaction time); perhaps this difference is in part due to greater amygdalar processing 
during rewarding emotional trials. In contrast, the posterior hippocampal region, which lacks 
limbic connections, responded to reward only in the absence of emotion; this interaction was 
again similar to that seen behaviourally for recognition, suggesting a role of this area in 
recognition. 
 In bilateral secondary visual areas we also found interactions between reward and emotion, 
which were additive, that is that reward responses here were increased for emotional scenes. 
This adds support to the speculation that salience may be represented here regardless of 
valence. 
2.7.6 Responses* to* Emotion* in* the* Ventral* Striatum* and* Prefrontal* Cortex* reduce* with*
familiarity*
In the ventral striatum there was relative deactivation for novel emotional stimuli that 




remembered that it did not meet corrected levels of significance. This supports the notion that 
this deactivation represents an unexpected aversive stimulus, consistent with a prediction 
error model of striatal signaling. A similar interaction was seen in the frontal poles and in the 
DLPFC, which may also reflect a mechanism of healthy emotional regulation with repeated 
presentation - familiar cues had been presented 3 times immediately prior to scanning.  
Connections from the prefrontal cortex are thought to play an important role in regulating 
limbic responses to emotion (Banks(et(al.,(2007;(Etkin(et(al.,(2011) and may also involve 
neuromodulation via dopamine in the ventral striatum and amygdala (Kienast( et( al.,( 2008;(Siessmeier( et( al.,( 2006). Notably however no such interaction was seen in the amygdala 
itself, which remained responsive for both novel and familiar emotional scenes. This 
habituation of responses contrasts with the behavioural sensitization seen to familiar 
emotional cues on both reaction time and recognition memory, and in the occipital cortex we 
see sensitization as well – activations to emotion seen here were present to familiar but not 
novel stimuli. 
2.7.7 Reward*and*Novelty*interact*synergistically*in*the*Amygdala*and*Hippocampus*
Finally there were additive effects of Reward and Novelty in the anterior hippocampus and 
adjacent amygdala, as well as trends for additive effects in the midbrain and the left 
orbitofrontal cortex. Positive activations to reward and novelty in these regions were 
synergistic, supporting the notion that the ‘novelty bonus’ (Dayan,(1996;(Kakade(&(Dayan,(2002) that motivates the search for additional rewards in new environments is instantiated in 
the hippocampus and its limbic connections, as well as in reward regions such as the midbrain 
and orbitofrontal cortex. Both reward and novelty are known to activate dopaminergic regions (Duzel(et(al.,(2009) which send projections to limbic structures such as the hippocampus and 
amygdala, and which may underlie a mutual reinforcement effect of Reward and Novelty, 




by GuitartCMasip et al (2010) who found a similar interaction in the ventral striatum and 
with other similar studies (Bunzeck, Doeller, Dolan, & Duzel, 2012; Krebs, Schott, Schutze, 
& Duzel, 2009b).  
2.7.8 Limitations*
Although the factorial event related design of the SIT allowed robust examination of the main 
and interactional effects of reward, novelty and emotion, it did so at some cost of power when 
compared to simpler block designs or single factor cognitive subtraction designs. This 
influenced the level of statistical significance and method of correction applied, and the 
interpretation of some of the findings therefore needs to be cautioned against the possibility of 
type I error. Set against this is the additional benefit that factorial designs offer against 
confounding effects and the flexibility of examining a range of interactions, which was 
important for testing the hypotheses about the interactions and integration of salient elements. 
The peak activations seen fell largely within the limited hypothesis driven network of primary 
ROIs from the Grace network model, or had well established roles in the respective effects 
examined. 
A further difficulty was in titrating ‘salience-equivalent’ levels of each of the probes of 
reward novelty and emotion. A disparity between these levels may have accounted for the 
behavioural and neurofunctional effects being strongest for emotional salience, and weakest 
for reward. In order to avoid over-complicating a complex task, I did not measure reward 
prediction on each trial, and outcome did not depend on performance; both may have reduced 
the relative effect of reward. However robust main effects and interactions were seen to each 





Salient stimuli ‘pull’ cognition and ‘push’ behaviour and are multifaceted. The salience of a 
stimulus in a particular context involves interactions between several factors related to its 
features, including reward, novelty and emotion. A diversity of cognitive processes and neural 
substrates may thus participate in salience processing, but the motivational ‘common 
currency’ involves a brain network comprising the midbrain, hippocampus, amygdala, ventral 
striatum, and the sensory cortices. The contribution of each dimension of salience and their 










The previous chapter investigated the contribution of Reward, Novelty and Emotion to 
salience processing in healthy subjects. This demonstrated that each type of salience modified 
behavior, in terms of reaction time and later recognition, and during fMRI scanning activated 
elements of a network centered on the midbrain and medial temporal lobe. It also 
demonstrated significant behavioural and neurofunctional interaction between these elements, 
particularly with emotion, and suggested that these pointed towards an integration of salient 
elements in producing the affective and motivationally valenced experience of salience; a 
common currency with which stimuli compete for cognitive resources. 
Alterations in salience processing are prominent in models of several neuropsychiatric 
disorders, including addiction, affective disorders and psychosis.  In addiction, seeking and 
using the substance becomes hypersalient, to the exclusion of all else; while tolerance may 
develop to physiological effects of the drug, the incentive salience of the drug and drug 
related cues becomes sensitized (Robinson(&(Berridge,(2008). In depression, the perceptual 
and experiential field is putatively hyposalient, such that nothing is motivationally relevant, 
while in mania the opposite applies - the world is vivid and full of promise and excitement (Gelder( &( Ibor,( 2000;( Gradin( et( al.,( 2011;( Kumar( et( al.,( 2008). In psychosis, salience 
processing is thought to be dysregulated, such that irrelevant stimuli catch attention and take 
on meaning to an extent that demands explanation, explanation that can take the form of 
bizarre delusions (Kapur,(2003).  While this account chimes well with patient and clinician 
phenomenological accounts of the early phases of psychosis (Bowers(&( Freedman,( 1966;(Mishara,( 2010), empirical studies are limited by their focus on reward salience (Heinz( &(Schlagenhauf,(2010), and by their inclusion of subjects who have already developed a frank 
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psychotic disorder and have been treated with antipsychotic medication. By this stage 
delusions and hallucinations are fully formed, following a prior period of delusional mood or 
‘trema’ (Mishara,( 2010) where ‘senses are sharpened, and the world takes on personal 
significance’ (Kapur,(2003). This period often occurs in late prodromal or At Risk Mental 
State (ARMS), prior to the onset of frank psychosis. Participants with an ARMS experience 
psychotic-like symptoms with a corresponding decrement in occupational and social function 
but are often unsure about their experiences and do not yet meet operational criteria for 
psychotic disorder (Yung( &( McGorry,( 1996). They are usually naïve to treatment with 
antipsychotic medication (Yung( et( al.,( 1996). The absence of the potentially confounding 
effects of treatment with drugs that block dopamine receptors is particularly helpful in studies 
of salience, as the latter is thought to be critically dependent on dopamine function. 
Reward salience studies in psychosis often demonstrate reductions in the reward-nonreward 
contrast in the ventral striatum, attributed either to a reduction in the response to reward, or an 
increase in the response to neutral stimuli (Heinz( &( Schlagenhauf,( 2010); the latter is 
interpreted as evidence of aberrant salience in psychosis. The extent to which salience 
processing is altered in the ARMS is unknown. While many brain and cognitive abnormalities 
in the ARMS are qualitatively similar to those in psychosis, such as an increase in levels of 
striatal presynaptic dopamine synthesis (Howes(et(al.,(2009) or a reduction in regional grey 
matter volumes (Mechelli et al., 2011), others such as an increase in pituitary volume (Yung,(Phillips,(et(al.,(2007b), show effects in the opposite direction, commensurate with a disease 
staging model that reflects dynamic changes with illness progression (L.( J.( Phillips( et( al.,(2006;(Wood,(Yung,(McGorry,(&(Pantelis,(2011). 
ARMS subjects, who are symptomatic, but not yet psychotic, may show intermediate levels 
of salience dysregulation, and a commensurate decrease in measures of salient-nonsalient 
contrasts. Alternatively they may show heightened responses to salient stimuli, prior to a later 
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dysregulation in psychosis. This possibility resonates with patient and physician descriptions 
accounts of salient stimuli becoming more vivid and compelling, before being overwhelmed 
by irrelevant stimuli (Bowers(&(Freedman,(1966). This may be to salience generally or be to 
particular aspects. We previously demonstrated interactions between emotional processing 
and reward and novelty in a group of healthy controls using behavioural measures and fMRI 
(Chapter 2), and interpreted this as evidence towards an integration of these influences in 
salience processing. Alterations may be evident both with behavioural measures of salience, 
reaction time and delayed recognition rate, and with fMRI, particularly in the network of 
regions of interest derived from the grace model described in chapter 1, which overlapped 
with the regions activated in this task in controls. 
Abnormalities in the reward domain are to be expected in this group, as these have 
consistently been evident in patients with psychosis. There may also be abnormalities in the 
emotional domain. Emotional processing is abnormal in psychosis and in the ARMS (Aleman(&(Kahn,(2005;(L.(K.(Phillips(&(Seidman,(2008) and emotional disorders such as anxiety and 
depression are common in this period (Rosen,( Miller,( D'Andrea,( Mcglashan,( &( Woods,(2006;( Yung,( Phillips,( Yuen,( &( McGorry,( 2004). Furthermore, the risk of transition to 
psychosis in high risk participants and community samples is increased if attenuated 
symptoms occur in the context of emotional dysfunction (Krabbendam & Germeys, 2005; 
Krabbendam & van Os, 2005; Yung, Buckby, et al., 2007a), and transition may be reduced by 
the active treatment of emotional disorders (Fusar-poli, Valmaggia, & McGuire, 2007). 
In reality most stimuli have multiple aspects of salience, and it is unlikely that these would 
operate in isolation, and so interactions are expected. Indeed, it could be that it is not 
sufficient for a reward salience alone to be perturbed – it only matters if say emotional 
salience processing is also abnormal. As the strongest interactions in healthy controls were 
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between reward and emotion, and between novelty and emotion, we anticipated these would 
be most altered in ARMS participants. 
I was also interested in a second network of regions that has recently been shown to respond 
to salient stimuli by facilitating a switch from default mode to central executive and task 
oriented modes (Seeley( et( al.,( 2007). In addition to the subcortical and limbic regions 
investigated so far, this network may also play an important role in salience processing. 
Alterations in this so-called ‘salience network’, comprising bilateral insulae and ACC, have 
recently been demonstrated in psychosis (White,(Joseph,(Francis,(&(Liddle,(2010), however 
this has not been investigated in ARMS participants. 
The aim of the work in this chapter was to use the SIT to test the Reward, Novelty and 
Emotional elements of salience processing in unmedicated subjects with an ARMS. I 
predicted that relative to matched controls, ARMS participants would show altered 
behavioural and neurofunctional markers of reward, novelty and emotional salience 
processing, and altered interactions with emotion, but was agnostic as to the direction of these 
alterations. I predicted that the regions most relevant for these alterations were firstly in the 
network that responded to salience in controls comprising the midbrain, hippocampal 
formation, amygdala and ventral striatum, and secondly in the insula and ACC bilaterally. 
3.2 Hypotheses-
1. ARMS participants will show altered behavioural measures (reaction time and delayed 
recognition rate) to reward, novelty and emotional visual stimuli relative to healthy controls. 
2. ARMS participants will show altered neurofunctional measures of reward, novelty and 
emotional salience processing relative to healthy controls in a network comprising the 
midbrain, ventral striatum/pallidum, amygdala and hippocampus. 
 97 
3. ARMS participants will show altered neurofunctional measures of Reward Novelty and 
Emotional salience processing relative to healthy controls in the salience network, comprising 




Participants were recruited from Outreach And Support in South London (Broome( et( al.,(2005), a specialist service for the treatment of young people at high risk of psychosis. They 
were referred to OASIS by primary and secondary healthcare centres, schools, families and 
individuals could also self-refer. At intake they were assessed by a psychiatrist using the 
Comprehensive Assessment of At Risk Mental States (CAARMS(Yung(et(al.,(2005). Referrals 
were then discussed at the multidisciplinary team intake meeting and participants who met 
CAARMS criteria for an At Risk Mental State for Psychosis were then taken on by the 
OASIS service for treatment and follow-up for 3 years. 
Following intake potential participants were asked by their clinical care coordinator if they 
would like to be contacted by the study researcher, who then made contact by telephone and 
described the procedures and aims of the study and provided written information sheets by 
post and/or email. Participants were given at least 48hours to consider their participation in 
the study, and it was stressed that a decision to participate would not affect ongoing treatment 
at OASIS.  Twenty-nine healthy control participants were recruited by local advertisement 
and by ‘word of mouth’ (ARMS and control participants were asked to refer friends/peers) 
from the same geographic area of south east London to be as closely age, education, gender 
and ethnicity matched as possible. Matching of HC participants was also to a concurrently 
recruited third arm of the study, that of First Episode Psychosis participants (FEP), an older 
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group. Recruitment of HC participants was largely by word of mouth from ARMS and other 
HC participants’ friends and social contacts, and in a minority of cases by local 
advertisement. 
Written informed consent was obtained, and the study protocol was approved by the 
Hammersmith Research Ethics Committee. 
 
3.3.2 Power,calculation,
Although the SIT fMRI paradigm has not been tested in subjects with an ARMS before, 
similar studies of reward, novelty and emotion have yielded significant results in healthy 
controls with group sizes of n=14 (Bunzeck( &( Duzel,( 2006) and n=24 (Krebs,( Schott,( &(Duzel,( 2009). When working memory tasks have been used in the ARMS differences in 
activation relative to controls have been evident in groups of n=17 (Broome( et( al.,( 2009) 
while reward anticipation paradigms in first episode psychosis subjects have detected group 
differences with samples of 10-13 (Juckel(et(al.,(2006;(Murray,(Lappin,(&(Di(Forti,(2008); in 
these a larger effect size may be anticipated than in ARMS participants. A different paradigm 
from the same group using ARMS subjects versus controls accessing subcortical structures 
yielded a mean group difference of 0.39, SD 0.45, giving an effect size of d=0.87 (Roiser, 
personal communication). Using power calculations based on these estimates (G*Power(3.1(Faul,(Erdfelder,(&(Lang,(2007) gives 90% power to detect a significant difference (p<0.05) 
with equal group sizes of 29 (figure 3.1a, 3.1b). 
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Figure 3.1a Power by total sample size for effect sizes 0.75-0.95 
 
Figure 3.1b critical t values for 2-tailed independent samples t-test at α=0.05,(β=0.1 
 
3.3.3 Clinical,measures,
All participants underwent a structured clinical interview with the same clinician (TWB) 
covering from which a number of scales were scored: the CAARMS-positive scale (Yung(et(al.,(2005), Hamilton-Anxiety scale (Hamilton, 1959), Hamilton-Depression scale (Hamilton,(1960) and Global Assessment of Function (GAF). Additionally participants filled in a 
number of self report questionnaires, the Temperament and Character Inventory (TCI 
Cloninger, 1994), Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire-Brief (SPQ`B( Raine( &( Benishay,(1995) and Peters Delusional Inventory (PDI(Peters,(Joseph,(Day,(&(Garety,(2004). 




















t tests - Means: Difference between two independent means (two groups)
Tail(s) = Two. α err prob = 0.05. Allocation ratio N2/N1 = 1
Total sample size










Methods for analyzing reaction time and recognition rate differences within the ARMS 
groups were as described in chapter 2.5.3.  In order to perform between group comparisons an 
additional factor of group was added as a between subject variable in the ANOVA performed 
in SPSS v 17. Group average differences were calculated in order to determine the direction 
and size of effect. 
3.3.5 fMRI,
Similarly, fMRI analyses were performed within the ARMS group as in chapter 2.5.4.  For 
between group comparisons, a 2-sample t-test was performed at the 2nd (group) level for each 
of the main effects and interactions of interest. As in chapter 2.5.3 we performed whole brain 
analyses at an uncorrected threshold of p<0.005 and applied Small Volume Correction for our 
pre-specified regions of interest. For visualization, fMRI activation maps display whole brain 
activations at p<0.005 uncorrected overlaid on average T1 weighted scans of all participants. I 
report both uncorrected and FWEROI corrected peak voxel significance and location, cluster 
volumes, and t and z values. Peak voxel location was determined using a probabilistic atlas 
tool (Tzourio`Mazoyer(et(al.,(2002) and confirmed manually using the reference atlas of Mai 
et al (2008; Mai, Paxinos, & Voss, 2008). 
3.4 Results-
3.4.1 Participants,
The demographic characteristics of ARMS participants and healthy controls are shown in 
table 3.1. There were no differences between ARMS participants and controls in premorbid 
IQ as estimated by the National Adult Reading Test (NART). ARMS subjects were on 




- ARMS-- HC- Statistic-(t/2)/Significance-(p)-
Number-of-participants- 29, 29, E,
Mean-Age-FMean(SD)- 21.2,(3.1), 23.7,(4.3), 2.68/,0.01*,
Gender-(F/M)- 16/13, 13/16, 0.621/,0.73,
Ethnicity-(BME/WB)- 13/16, 10/19, 0.648/0.592,
Years-Education-F-Mean(SD)- 11.9(1.2), 12.6(8.1), 2.7,/0.01*,
Premorbid-IQ-(NART)-FMean(SD)- 110(9.5), 114(11.4), 1.241/0.22,
Handedness-(R/L)- 25/4, 25/4, 0.056/0.812,
 
Table 3.1 - Demographic characteristics of ARMS and HC participants. BME: Black and Minority Ethnicity, WB: Any 
White background, IQ Intelligence Quotient, NART: National Adult Reading Test. 
 
3.4.2 Clinical,scales,
Clinical scale scores are presented in table 3.2. As expected ARMS subjects scored 
significantly higher on CAARMS positive scales, Hamilton-Anxiety (Ham-A) and Hamilton-
Depression (Ham-D) and Schizoptypyal Personality Brief Questionnaire (SPQ-B) scales, and 




Scale-- ARMS- HC- Statistic-(t)/Significance-(p)-
CAARMSFpos--mean(SD)- 7.8(3.8), 0.2,(0.6), 7.25/,<0.0001,
HamFA-F-mean(SD)- 13.9(2.1), 0.5,(0.8), 7.88/,<0.0001,
HamFD-F-mean(SD)- 15.0(7.4), 1.8,(2.4), 8.97/,<0.0001,
SPQFB-F-mean(SD)- 13.3(3.8), 4.6,(4.5), 7.43/,<0.0001,
PDI-F-mean(SD)- 71.1(41.2), 25.7,(24.5), 4.90/,<0.0001,
GAF-F-mean(SD)- 54.9(6.6), 81.9(10.7), 7.76/,<0.0001,
 
Table 3.2 - Clinical characteristics of ARMS and HC participants. CAARMS: Comprehensive Assessment of AT Risk  
Mental States; Ham-A: Hamilton Anxiety Rating Scale; Ham-D: Hamilton Depression Rating Scale; SPQ-B: Schizotypal 




Similar to control participants, ARMS participants complied well with the online SIT and 
delayed recognition tasks (table 3.3). During the practice SIT reward contingencies were 
explained and all participants completed 10 consecutive correct trials within 3 minutes and 
were given the money earned in cash. There were no significant differences between groups 
on task performance. In behavioural and fMRI analyses, error trials were excluded from 
analysis.  
Task-Compliance 
Task- ARMS-errors-(%)- HC-errors-(%)- Statistic-(t)/Significance-(p)-
SIT-F-Go-trials- 6.7,(12.5), 4.0,(5.9), 1.0,/,0.318,
SIT-F-NoGo-trials- 13.5,(17.6), 10.2,(10.3), 0.98/,0.333,
Recognition-1hr- 6.3,(5.2), 5.3,(4.2), 0.819/,0.417,
Recognition-24hr- 5.5,(7.0), 3.6,(3.8),, 1.355/,0.183,
 
         Table 3.3 - Task Compliance during SIT and Recognition tasks of ARMS and HC participants.  
 
3.4.4 Behavioural,group,comparison,
For group comparisons of reaction time and recognition at 1hour and at 24hours we 
conducted repeated measures ANOVAs with reward, novelty and emotion as within-subject 
variables, and group entered as a between subject variable. 
3.4.4.1 Reaction-Time-
The mean reaction time was 606.1ms; there was no difference overall between groups. ARMS 
participants had greater influences of reward, novelty and emotion on altering reaction time 
than controls, but these differences did not reach significance (figure 3.2). There were no 
significant group differences in reaction time related to 2-way interactions of these effects. 
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Figure 3.2 Reaction times to Main Effects of Reward Novelty and Emotion in ARMS and HC. Columns represent means, 




Overall group differences in recognition rates collapsed across conditions and sessions are 
presented in table 3.4. ARMS participants had significantly lower overall hit rates (% old cues 
correctly recognised as old, HR), which when adjusted for false alarms (% new cues falsely 
recognised as old, FA) gave discrimination accuracies (hit rate adjusted for false alarms, DA) 
that were not significantly different. There were no differences between groups in overall 
false alarm rates. 
 
Overall-Recognition-rates-!
- ARMS- HC- Statistic- (t)/- significance-
(p)-
Hit-Rate-%(SD)- 52.3,(14.7), 60.3(9.9), E2.424,/,0.019*,,









At 1hour the overall mean correct recognition hit rate was 62.6% (SD1.5). There was a trend 
towards an interaction of group and reward (F(1,56)=3.163, p=0.081); reward improved hit 
rates in both groups, but more so in controls (mean reward-nonreward group difference HC-
ARMS 4.1% figure 3.3a). However reward also induced a greater increase in false alarms in 
controls (F(1,56)=15.6 p<0.0001, figure 3.3c) such that there was a greater reduction in 1hr 
discrimination accuracy due to reward in this group (mean reward-nonreward group 
difference HC-ARMS 9.9% F(1,56)=7.936 p=0.007, figure 3.3b) and discrimination rates for 
reward –predicting cues were similar in both groups. There was also a trend to a greater effect 
of familiarity in improving discrimination accuracy in controls (F(1,56)=3.49 p=0.067 figure 
3.3b).  
At 24hours the overall mean hit rate was 48.2%. There was now no difference on the effect of 
reward between groups, but there was a greater effect of emotion in the ARMS group (mean 
emotion-neutral related group difference HC-ARMS -11.8% F(28,1)=2.84 p=0.003, figure 
3.3a), such that the hit rate for emotional cues was similar between groups (figure 3.3a). 
There was also a trend to a lesser effect of novelty in the ARMS group (mean familiar-novelty 
group difference HC-ARMS +5.2% F(1,28)=3.715 p=0.059).  False alarms to emotional cues 
were reduced to a greater extent in controls at 24hr (F(1,56)=7.936 p=0.007), and so changes 
in 24hr discrimination accuracy due to emotion were equivalent between groups. The only 
significant group difference was in the novelty-familiarity contrast on 24hr discrimination 













Mean (SD) A) recognition hit 
rate (HR), B) discrimination 
accuracy (DA) and C) false 
alarms (FA) for the main effects 
of Reward  Novelty  and  
Emotion, at 1hr and at 24hr in 
ARMS and HC groups. Dotted 
lines represent overall session 
mean rate, the slope of the line 
away from this horizontal mean 
reflects the influence of that 
factor on the specified outcome. 
Hit rate refers to % old cues 
correctly recognised as old, false 
alarms refers to % new cues 
falsely recognised as old, 
discrimination accuracy refers to 
hit rate adjusted for false alarm 





Group differences in 2way interactions were minimal. At 1hr there was a trend to an 
interaction on hit rate between group and the 2way interaction of reward and emotion 
(F(1,56)=3.45 p=0.068); in control subjects the effects of reward were greater in emotional 
trials than neutral trials whereas in ARMS this was not the case. At 24hr this trend persisted 
(F(1,28)=3.615 p=0.062), but when corrected for false alarms there was no significant group x 
2way discrimination accuracy interactions at either time point. There were no group 




Within the primary ROIs, ARMS participants showed greater activation to reward predicting 
cues than controls in bilateral clusters centered on the ventral pallidum bilaterally extending 
to included the left midbrain, and in the posterior right hippocampus (figure 3.7 table 3.5). 
 
Figure 3.7 fMRI activations to Reward in ARMS greater than HC within the primary ROI network. Z coordinates are displayed in blue. Images 
are thresholded for visualisation at whole brain uncorrected p<0.005 
 
These clusters of differential activation extended outside the primary ROI network into the 
left thalamus, and there was also activation in the right temporal pole bordering on the 
amygdala, in the posterior middle temporal gyrus, and in a small cluster in the left rectal gyrus 
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Figure 3.8 fMRI activations to Reward in ARMS greater than HC outside the primary ROI network. Z coordinates are displayed in blue. Images 
are thresholded for visualisation at whole brain uncorrected p<0.005 
 
3.4.5.2 Novelty-
Within the primary ROI network there were no group differences in activation related to 
novelty. However, outside these regions there were areas of greater activation in controls than 
ARMS participants in bilateral low midbrain clusters and adjacent midline clusters in the 
cerebellum and adjacent parahippocampal/lingual gyrus, and in the precuneus (table 3.6), 
though none of these differences reached corrected statistical significance. There were no 
areas where ARMS activated greater than control participants. 
 
3.4.5.3 Emotion-
There were no differences between groups in the primary ROIs (table 3.5). Outside these, 
ARMS participants showed greater activation than controls related to emotional cues in a 
small cluster of the left lingual gyrus and less activation than controls in a small cluster of the 
right post central gyrus and the left orbitofrontal gyrus (table 3.6), though none of these 
differences reached corrected statistical significance. 
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ARMS,v,HC,SIT,task,–,Primary,ROI,Analysis,
Contrast, +/E, cluster,size,k, p(FWE,WB), p(FWE,ROI), t, z, p(unc), x,y,z,(MNI), Location,
Reward, ARMS>HC, 31, 0.55, 0.044, 3.57, 3.37, <0.001, ,18,,E7,,E5,, ,R,vPallidum,
,, ,, 53, 0.633, 0.066, 3.47, 3.28, 0.001, E18,E13,,E8, ,L,vPallidum,
,, ,, 4, 0.936, ,0.054, 3.01, 2.88, 0.002, ,E15,E16,E11, L,Midbrain,
,, ,, 5, 0.959, ,0.275, 2.91, 2.79, 0.003, ,33,E34,,E2,, R,Hipp(CA),
,, ARMS<HC, NIL, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,,
Novelty, ARMS>HC, NIL, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,,
,, ARMS<HC, NIL, , , , , , ,, ,
Emotion, ARMS>HC, NIL, , , , , , , ,
,, ARMS<HC, ,NIL, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,,
RxE, ,, 10, 0.975, 0.276, 2.87, 2.76, 0.003, ,E6,E7,E5,, L,vPallidum,
,, ,, ,, ,, 0.241, 2.8, 2.7, 0.003, ,E9,,2,E5,, L,NAcc,
NxE, ,, NIL, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,,
RxN, ,, 28, 0.359, 0.095, 3.16, 3.02, 0.001, ,,0,E10,,E5,, Midbrain,
 
Table 3.5 List of fMRI BOLD associated activations to main effects and interactions in ARMS vs healthy controls within the primary 
ROI network. Amyg: Amygdala, Hipp: Hippocampus, CA Cornu Ammonis, Cb: cerebellum,  vPallidum: ventral pallidum, NAcc: 
Nucleus Accumbens 
ARMS,v,HC,SIT,task,–,Whole,brain,analysis,
Contrast, +/E, cluster,size,k, p(FWE,WB), t, z, p(unc), x,y,z,(MNI), Location,
Reward, ARMS>HC, 57, 0.449, 3.69, 3.47, <0.001, E18,E28,,E2, L,Thalamus,
,, ,, 58, 0.559, 3.55, 3.36, <0.001, ,39,,,5,E29,, R,Amyg,(LB),
,, ,, ,, 0.722, 3.36, 3.19, 0.001, ,48,,E4,E29,, R,MTG,
,, ,, ,, 0.953, 2.93, 2.82, 0.002, ,36,,E7,E26,, R,Hipp,
,, ,, 27, 0.616, 3.49, 3.3, <0.001, ,54,E58,,E5,, R,ITG,
,, ,, 38, 0.833, 3.2, 3.05, 0.001, ,57,,E7,E11,, R,STG,
,, ,, 3, 0.973, 2.84, 2.73, 0.003, ,E3,,41,E17,, L,Rectal,g,
,, ARMS<HC, NIL, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,,
Novelty, ARMS>HC, NIL, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,,
,, ARMS<HC, 39, 0.762, 3.37, 3.2, 0.001, ,,3,E73,,,4,, L,Lingual,g,
,, ,, ,, 0.975, 2.91, 2.8, 0.003, ,,0,E67,,13,, L,Calcarine,g,
,, ,, 104, 0.826, 3.28, 3.12, 0.001, ,,6,E40,E14,, Cb,vermis,
,, ,, ,, 0.94, 3.06, 2.92, 0.002, ,21,E43,E14,, R,Fusiform,g,
,, ,, ,, 0.943, 3.05, 2.91, 0.002, ,12,E43,,E5,, R,Lingual,g,
,, ,, 27, 0.847, 3.25, 3.1, 0.001, ,E9,E31,E26,, L,Midbrain,
,, ,, 12, 0.866, 3.22, 3.07, 0.001, ,12,E25,E26,, R,Midbrain,
,, ,, 5, 0.98, 2.88, 2.77, 0.003, ,30,E31,E20,, R,Fusiform,g,
Emotion, ARMS>HC, 17, 0.948, 3.16, 3.01,, ,0.001, E27,E49,E5, L,Lingual,g,
,, ARMS<HC, 11, 0.854, 3.36, 3.19, 0.001, ,51,E13,,28,, R,PoC,g,
,, ,, 3, 0.997, 2.79, 2.69, 0.004, E39,,50,,E8,, L,MOrb,g,
RxE, , 196, 0.471, 3.69, 3.47, <0.001, E36,E34,,25,, L,Insula,
,, , 133, 0.486, 3.68, 3.46, <0.001, ,,6,,32,,,7,, R,ACC,
,, , 120, 0.629, 3.51, 3.32, <0.001, E33,,14,,10,, L,Insula,
,, , 108, 0.791, 3.3, 3.14, 0.001, ,45,,E1,,,4,, R,Insula,
,, , 15, 0.825, 3.25, 3.1, 0.001, ,12,,59,,E2,, R,MOrb,g,
,, , 63, 0.893, 3.13, 2.99, 0.001, E30,E61,,,4,, L,Calcarine,g,
NxE, , 19, 0.662, 3.52, 3.33, <0.001, ,36,,14,,10,, R,Insula,
,, , 4, 0.99, 2.82, 2.72, 0.003, ,42,,,8,E32,, R,Temp,pole,
RxN, , 24, 0.958, 3.06, 2.93, 0.002, ,30,,32,,E8,, R,IFG,
 
Table 3.6 List of fMRI BOLD associated activations to main effects and interactions in ARMS vs healthy controls outside the 
primary ROI network. Amyg: Amygdala, Hipp: Hippocampus, MTG Middle temporal gyrus, ITG Superior Temporal Gyrus, STG, 
Superior Temporal Gyrus, Cb Cerebellum, PoCg Posterior Central gyrus 
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3.4.5.4 Reward-x-Emotion-
There was a difference between ARMS and control participants in the in the interaction 
between reward and emotion in the left ventral striatum though this did not reach corrected 
statistical significance (figure 3.12, 3.13, table 3.5). There was a similar interaction in regions 
bilateral insulae and ACC (figure 3.14). In these regions ARMS participants showed 
significantly greater activations for reward in the context of emotion (figure 3.13, 3.15).  
 
  
Figure 3.12 fMRI Interactions between Reward and Emotion in HC vARMS participants within the primary ROI network. Z coordinates are 









Figure 3.14 fMRI Interactions between Reward and Emotion in HC v ARMS participants outside the primary ROI network. Z coordinates are 




Figure 3.15 Reward x Emotion Interactions in R ACC (top) and L Insula (bottom) in HC (left) v ARMS (right). 




There were no significant group differences in the interaction of novelty and emotion in the 
primary ROI network, but group differences were evident outside these regions in the right 
insula and right temporal pole (figure 3.17). Here the interactions were similar to those seen 
with reward and emotion; activations in the right insula in ARMS subjects were most 





Figure 3.17 fMRI Interactions between Novelty and Emotion in HC v ARMS participants outside the primary ROI 




Figure 3.18 Novelty x Emotion interaction in right insula in HC (left) v ARMS (right). Columns 




There was a group difference in the interaction between reward and novelty in the midbrain, 
at trend level. In ARMS subjects, reward activations were greater in novel scenes (table 3.5 




Figure 3.19 fMRI Interactions between Novelty and Emotion in HC v ARMS participants outside the primary ROI 




Figure 3.20 Reward x Novelty interaction in the midbrain in HC (left) v ARMS (right). Columns show 










In this chapter I compared healthy participants and those with an At Risk Mental State for 
psychosis using fMRI with the Salience Integration Task (SIT), probing the relative influence 
and interactions of three salient aspects of otherwise similar visual scenes: reward 
anticipation, novelty and negatively valenced emotion. ARMS participants demonstrated 
differences from controls in delayed recognition and augmented activation to reward 
anticipation in bilateral regions of the ventral striatum/pallidum, There was also preliminary 
indicators of group differences in the interaction of emotion with reward in the left ventral 
striatum; in ARMS participants relative to controls this region was hypersensitive to negative 
emotional stimuli in an reward-relevant context. A difference in the reward-emotion 
interaction was also evident in the ACC and bilateral insulae, areas that have previously been 
implicated in salience processing in controls (Seeley( et( al.,( 2007;( Sridharan,( Levitin,( &(Menon,(2008).  A trend to a similar group difference was seen in the interactions of reward 
and novelty in the midbrain. Collectively, these results provide the first evidence that 
alterations in the processing of reward and emotional salience, at both the behavioural and the 
neural level, are evident prior to the onset of frank psychosis. 
 
3.5.2 Overactivation, to, reward, anticipation, in,ARMS,participants:, ‘hyper’E
salience,rather,than,‘dys’Esalience?,
While previous studies in psychosis have focused on reward related salience, my work sought 
to also investigate the roles of novelty and emotion. The design of my paradigm also allowed 
me to examine interactions between these different aspects of salience. The data from the 
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work using the SIT task in controls (chapter 2) indicated the particular importance of emotion 
in these interactions in normal salience processing.  
Previous work has demonstrated abnormalities in reward anticipation and reward prediction 
error in both medicated and medication -free participants with psychosis (Juckel(et(al.,(2006;(Murray(et(al.,(2008). In these studies, the main finding has been of reduced striatal activation 
in patients for the salient  - neutral contrast (see table 1.1 chapter 1). As these are contrasts 
between two conditions, a net reduction in activation can be interpreted either in terms of 
increased activation in patients to the neutral stimulus (taken as evidence of aberrant 
salience), and/or of reduced activation in patients to the salient stimulus (taken as evidence of 
reduction in salience). These findings have been largely supported by within-patient group 
correlations between these reductions in activation with negative symptoms (Juckel( et( al.,(2006), and also recently with positive symptom scores (Nielsen(et(al.,(2012).   
To date there have been no published studies of salience processing in clinical or genetic high 
risk psychosis samples, and the extent to which salience abnormalities precede the onset of 
psychosis is thus unclear. The model of aberrant salience in psychosis emphasizes the phase-
specificity of the relationship between altered salience processing, dopamine dysfunction, and 
the formation of psychotic symptoms (Kapur, 2003). In the current study, application of the 
SIT paradigm in ARMS subjects revealed hyperactivation to reward anticipation, with the 
maximal group difference in the ventral pallidum, a major projection target of the accumbens 
in the outflow path from the striatum (Lisman & Grace, 2005). This raises the possibility of a 
‘hypersalient’ period prior to the onset of frank psychosis (Kapur,(2003). This resonates with 
phenomenological accounts of the prodromal period, which describe heightened vividness 
and increased salience and meaning from sensory stimuli that would usually be detected as 
salient, just less so.   
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"…my senses were sharpened, sounds were more intense and I could see with 
greater clarity, everything seemed very clear to me. Even my sense of taste seemed 
more acute....”(Bowers & Freedman, 1966) 
 
Altered activation during salience processing in the ARMS is consistent with evidence from 
PET studies that striatal presynaptic dopamine availability is increased in this group (Howes(et(al.,(2009). In fMRI studies, the signal related to reward anticipation is likely to be at least 
partly related to dopamine signaling (da(Silva(Alves(et(al.,(2011;(Knutson(&(Gibbs,(2007;(Schott(et(al.,(2008), so it is not surprising that reward processing may be abnormal in ARMS 
participants. Presynaptic dopamine levels, which probably relate more to ‘tonic’ than ‘phasic’ 
dopamine neuron firing, may increase the gain of phasic dopamine release, for example, as 
during reward anticipation. A moderate elevation in presynaptic dopamine levels in the 
ARMS could first increase normal salience. With high elevations salience processing could 
become uncoupled from salient stimuli, leading to the experience of aberrant or ‘dys’salience. 
This is consistent with descriptions of the experience of intoxication with illicit dopaminergic 
drugs such as amphetamine, leading to energisation, hypervigilance and a vivid sensorium, 
and taken in larger and more sustained doses, psychosis (http://www.merckmanuals.com). 
People with an ARMS may be experiencing something analogous to what Grace and 
colleagues describe as an ‘activating context’, whereby behaviourally salient stimuli elicit 
increased activation in salience processing networks, and moderately increased striatal 




Figure 3.20 Participants experiencing attenuated psychotic symptoms at high 
clinical risk for psychosis may be as if in a constantly ‘activating context’, 
whereby behaviourally salient stimuli lead to greater activation. 
 
At this stage activation contrasts between salient and non-salient stimuli are increased. In 
psychosis, both salient and non-salient stimuli lead to maximal activation (figure 3.20C), and 
the contrast between them is reduced – hence most studies in psychosis find reduced 
activation relative to controls (eg Juckel et al 2006, see table 1.1 chapter 1). 
There are a number of important caveats to this interpretation.  The majority of the ARMS 
participants will not make a transition to psychosis, and at this stage we are not able to 
distinguish those that will. There are other reasons why the results may have been different in 
ARMS and psychosis – including different tasks and methods of analysis. Many earlier 
studies included participants on medication with smaller group sizes. This is an advantage of 
the current sample, as even one dose of an antipsychotic significantly alters striatal function 
(Handley et al., 2012) and structure (Tost et al., 2010). The best way to address the issue is to 
do a longitudinal study, re-scanning participants on the same task after a follow up period.  
The effects of stimulus novelty have not been previously examined in subjects with psychosis 
or an ARMS, despite novelty processing being influenced by dopamine function, and 
constituting a significant component of normal salience processing. In the present study, there 
were no significant differences between groups for the main effect of novelty at either the 
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behavioural or the neural level. This may be in part related to a relative lack of power for this 
particular contrast relative to the other. Similarly, there were no significant group differences 
for the main effect of emotion. In this case, the absence of group differences is not attributable 
to a lack of power for this contrast, as when studied in healthy controls, it was associated with 
the most significant effects (Chapter 2.6.2). Nevertheless, the lack of differences is surprising, 
given the prominence of emotional processing abnormalities in the ARMS, and the relatively 
high levels of anxiety and depression symptoms in this group (Aleman & Kahn, 2005; 
Seiferth et al., 2008). 
 
3.5.3 ARMS,participants, show,sensitivity,of, reward,processing, to,emotion,
in,the,ventral,striatum,and,‘salience,network‘,
Although there were no main effects of emotional salience on activation, there was evidence 
that ARMS subjects may show increased sensitivity to aversive emotional stimuli when these 
are encountered in a motivationally relevant context. Emotion augmented reward related 
activation in the ventral striatum in ARMS subjects relative to controls, although this did not 
reach corrected significance. This resonates with suggestions from cognitive psychological 
research that the involvement of emotion in psychotic symptoms such as delusions and 
hallucinations distinguishes clinical psychosis with its attendant distress and functional 
impairment from psychotic like experiences in otherwise healthy individuals (Freeman( &(Garety,(2003).   
A similar group difference in the interaction of emotion and reward was evident in the ACC 
and the insula bilaterally, areas that appear to form a network that facilitates salience-driven 
switching between default mode and central executive networks (Sridharan( et( al.,( 2008). 
Abnormalities in the structure, function and connectivity of these areas are evident in patients 
schizophrenia and in subjects with an ARMS (Broome et al., 2009; Crossley et al., 2009; 
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Mechelli et al., 2011; Palaniyappan, Mallikarjun, Joseph, White, & Liddle, 2011; White et al., 
2010). The ACC is also involved in both reward processing and emotional regulation (Bush(&(Luu,(2000), while the anterior insula plays a prominent role in interoceptive awareness and 
has prominent limbic connections, particularly with the amygdala (Nagai(&(Kishi,(2007).  
These results suggest that ARMS subjects may be sensitive to the effects of aversive emotion 
when these occur in a reward-relevant or incentivized context, and that this is related to 
functional alterations in brain regions implicated in the processing of reward, emotion and 
overall salience.  
 
3.5.4 ARMS, participants, demonstrate, differences, in, delayed, recognition,
related,to,reward,and,emotion,,
The behavioural correlates of these fMRI differences were more difficult to interpret. There 
were no significant group differences in reaction time; suggesting that the group differences 
in activation were not attributable to differences in processing speed. Recognition hit rate 
differences were evident between groups to reward at 1hr (ARMS showing a reduced 
difference) and emotion at 24hr (ARMS showing a greater difference), perhaps reflecting 
differences in the way these stimuli were encoded or consolidated in ARMS participants. 
However there were also differences in false alarm rates, such that discrimination accuracies 
were largely similar between groups. It is not clear which of these measures of memory is the 
more relevant; increased salience of a particular stimulus may relate to increased recognition 
hit rate or discrimination accuracy but also to either increases or decreases in false alarms; for 
example ARMS subjects had reduced reward related difference in hit rate and discrimination 
accuracy but also a reduced false alarm elevation. There were also baseline group differences, 
further confounding any interpretation of differences; despite the group difference on reward 
for discrimination accuracy, the rate of accurate discrimination of reward cues was the same 
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in both groups. Novelty effects on later recognition are confounded by the effects of pre-
familiaristion. Relating these in detail to the fMRI data is also complex, and may be mediated 
by a number of unmeasured factors; fMRI and recognition rate are proxies for the underlying 
neural and cognitive processes of interest. Taken together the behavioural data can provide 
only broad support for alterations in reward and emotional aspects of salience in the period 
prior to psychosis. 
 
3.5.5 Limitations,
As in the previous chapter, the factorial event related design of the SIT allowed examination 
of the main and interactional effects of reward, novelty and emotion, but did so at some cost 
to power when compared to single factor cognitive subtraction and block designs. For the 
interactional effects in the ventral striatum robust correction for multiple comparisons was not 
possible, and the interaction findings in this region should therefore be considered 
preliminary. Behavioural differences were not clearly interpretable in terms of the fMRI 
results although group differences were evident in each aspect of salience examined, whether 
in terms of recognition hit rate, false alarms rate or recognition accuracy. 
 
3.5.6 Conclusions,
These results suggest that the ARMS is associated with heightened salience, especially with 
respect to reward and emotional aspects of salience. These effects were particularly linked to 
altered activation in the ventral striatum/pallidum. The results are consistent with data from 
studies of reward salience in patients with psychosis, in that they implicate the striatum, but 
ARMS subjects showed greater, rather than reduced activation. This may reflect 
methodological differences between the studies in the two patient groups, particularly the 
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confounding effects of antipsychotic medication in previous studies. However, it is also 
possible that salience processing is altered in different ways at different stages of psychosis: 
this issue could be addressed in longitudinal studies.  Further work could also examine the 












4. The( role( of( presynaptic( dopamine( in( salience( processing( in(
individuals(at(risk(of(psychosis(
4.1 Background.
Having considered 3 dimensions of salience processing from behavioural and neurofunctional 
points of view, first in health and then compared to the early stages of psychotic illness, we 
were interested in the neurochemical basis of altered salience processing.  There is evidence 
that dopamine may be involved in salience processing whether conceived in terms of reward (Flagel' et' al.,' 2011;' Schultz,' Tobler,' &' Fiorillo,' 2005;' Wittmann' et' al.,' 2005), novelty (Bunzeck' &' Duzel,' 2006;' Redgrave' &' Gurney,' 2006) or emotion (Jabbi' et' al.,' 2012;'Kienast'et'al.,'2008;'Siessmeier'et'al.,'2006), and that brain dopamine levels are abnormal 
from the early stages of psychosis (Howes'et'al.,'2009) and influence its subsequent course (Howes'et' al.,' 2012;'Howes,'Bose,'Turkheimer,'Valli,'Egerton,' Stahl,' et' al.,' 2011b). We 
were therefore interested in testing whether dopamine levels might relate to altered salience 
processing, as measured by the Salience Integration Task. Subjects with psychosis show 
modestly elevated striatal dopamine levels relative to controls measured in terms of dopamine 
release (Laruelle'&'AbiSDargham,'1996) and baseline D2 receptor binding (Laruelle'et'al.,'1997), and large and significant elevations in presynaptic dopamine synthesis using the PET 
radiotracer 18F-DOPA (reviewed'in'Howes'et'al.,'2012). Studies of subjects with an At Risk 
Mental State show elevated baseline levels of presynaptic dopamine synthesis relative to 
controls (Howes' et' al.,' 2009), which is driven at baseline by those who go on to later 
transition to psychosis (Howes,'Bose,'Turkheimer,'Valli,'Egerton,'Valmaggia,'et'al.,'2011a) 
who also show a further increase with transition (Howes,'Bose,'Turkheimer,'Valli,'Egerton,'Stahl,'et'al.,'2011b).  
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Dopamine D2 receptor blockade is the hallmark of effective antipsychotic medication (Kapur'&'Mamo,' 2003) however such treatment ,whilst effective at dampening positive psychotic 
symptoms does not cure, and leads to unwanted side effects related to dopamine blockade 
elsewhere, such as in the nigrostriatal pathway leading to parkinsonism  and the 
tuberoinfundibular pathway leading to hyperprolactinemia (Kapur'&'Mamo,'2003). Several 
commentators have therefore suggested that the primary abnormality may lie several synapses  
‘upstream’, via dysfunctional NMDA or GABA receptors on inhibitory interneurons to 
glutamatergic projections to midbrain dopamine cells(Grace,' 2011;' Olney,' Newcomer,' &'Farber,' 1999). One proposed site of such a primary abnormality is the hippocampus, and 
Grace and colleagues demonstrate in mice that hippocampal outputs drive midbrain dopamine 
output; blockade of the ventral subiculum of the hippocampus leads to a reduction in midbrain 
dopamine cell firing (Lisman'&'Grace,'2005).  
Using a neurodevelopmental lesion model of schizophrenia in mice they then demonstrate 
that overactivity in the ventral subiculum drives increased midbrain dopamine cell activity (Lodge'&'Grace,'2008;'2009). In humans the hippocampus is a key site of abnormality in 
schizophrenia; structural and functional abnormalities are evident here from the earliest stages (Tamminga,' Stan,'&'Wagner,'2010;'Velakoulis' et' al.,' 2006;'Wood,'Kennedy,'Phillips,'&'Seal,'2010) thought to result from the effects of neurodevelopmental insults and early stress 
and mediated by cortisol and glutamate excitotoxicity. However a decrease in function and 
structure does not necessarily imply a decrease in activity, and there is increasing evidence 
that there is increased activity in hippocampal subfields at rest in schizophrenia, that 
correlates with psychotic symptoms (Schobel'et'al.,'2009). 
Dopamine cells exist into two distinct states, exhibiting burst or phasic firing only when in a 
tonically active state (Grace'&'Bunney,'1984). Hippocampal input is thought to regulate tone 
- the number of dopamine cells which are available to fire in a phasic manner when stimulated 
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- thus regulating the ‘gain’ of the system according to context (Floresco,'West,'Ash,'Moore,'&'Grace,'2003;'Lodge'&'Grace,'2006). It is not yet clear how these tonic and phasic states of 
activity relate to measures from neurochemical imaging. However, measures of presynaptic 
dopamine synthesis such as 18F-Dopa uptake, which reflect the overall availability of 
dopamine for release into the synapse may relate best to tonic control of dopamine firing, 
while measures of dopamine release, such as displacement of 11-C-Raclopride binding may 
relate to burst firing. If so, according to the Grace model, 18F-Dopa measures should reflect 
the extent to which dopamine tone is being subject to hippocampal drive. This may be most 
evident in in the striatum where dopamine axons terminate onto post-synaptic receptors. 18F-
Dopa measures from the Substantia Nigra/VTA, the site of the dopamine cell bodies, would 
reflect release onto auto-receptors (Grace, Floresco, Goto, & Lodge, 2007). 
In my previous work on salience processing in healthy participants, there was hippocampal 
activation to novelty, emotion and in the interaction of both of these with reward. The first 
aim of the work in the present chapter was to examine the relationship between these 
hippocampal responses and measures of dopamine synthesis in the striatum.  
The second objective was to investigate whether these relationships would be altered in 
people with an ARMS. In my earlier fMRI study (Chapter 3), ARMS subjects showed greater 
ventral striatal activation than controls when processing reward. In addition, reward 
augmented striatal responses to emotion in ARMS participants but not in controls.  
I hypothesized that dopamine output from the midbrain, as indexed by presynaptic synthesis 
capacity measured by 18F-DOPA influx rate (Ki) in the striatum, would relate to hippocampal 
BOLD related activation by salient reward, emotion and novelty related visual stimuli, and 
that for reward and emotion this relationship would be significantly altered in ARMS subjects 
relative to controls.  
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However, because the putative relationship between hippocampal activation and striatal 
dopamine output may be mediated through the midbrain, I also assessed the relationship 
between activation to salient stimuli in the midbrain and striatal dopamine output. I 
hypothesized that presynaptic striatal dopamine synthesis capacity measured by 18-FDOPA 
Ki would relate to midbrain activation to reward, novelty and emotion related visual stimuli, 





The PET acquisition protocol and parameters were as described in Howes et al (2009). 
Briefly, PET data acquisition was performed using an imaging system (ECAT/EXACT3D; 
Siemens/CTI, Knoxville, Tennessee) that has a mean (SD) spatial resolution of 4.8 (0.2) mm 
and a sensitivity of 69 cps/Bq/mL. High-resolution images of the whole brain were 
reconstructed from 95 planes with a section spacing of 2.425 mm. Subjects received 
carbidopa (150 mg) and entacapone (400 mg) orally 1 hour before imaging (Sawle, Burn, 
Morrish, & Lammertsma, 1994) to reduce the formation of radiolabeled 18F-DOPA 
metabolites (Cumming, Léger, & Kuwabara, 1993). Data were acquired on an ECAT HR+ 
962 PET scanner (CTI/Seimens) in 3D mode, with an axial field of view of 15.5cm. Head 
position was marked and monitored via laser crosshairs and a camera and minimized using a 
light head-strap. A 10-minute transmission scan was performed prior to radiotracer injection 
to correct for attenuation and scatter.  
Approximately 180 MBq of 18F-DOPA was administered by bolus intravenous injection 30 
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seconds after the start of the PET imaging. Emission data were acquired in list mode for 95 
minutes, rebinned into 26 time-frames (comprising a 30-second background frame, four 60-
second frames, three 120-second frames, three 180-second frames, and fifteen 300-second 
frames.  
To correct for head movement during the scan, nonattenuation corrected dynamic images 
were denoised using a level 2, order 64 Battle-Lemarie wavelet filter (Turkheimer, Aston, 
Asselin, & Hinz, 2006) and individual frames were realigned to a single frame acquired 5 
minutes after 18F-DOPA injection using a mutual information algorithm (Studholme, Hill, & 
Hawkes, 1996). The transformation parameters were then applied to the corresponding 
attenuation-corrected frames, and the realigned frames were combined to create a movement-
corrected dynamic image (from 6 to 95 minutes following 18F-DOPA administration) for 
analysis.  
In Montreal Neurologic Institute (MNI) space, standardized volumes of interest (VOI) were 
defined bilaterally in the limbic (ventral), associative (precommisural dorsal caudate, 
precommisural dorsal putamen and postcommisural caudate), and sensorimotor 
(postcommisural putamen) subdivisions of the whole striatal VOI as previously described 
(Martinez et al., 2003). The cerebellar reference region was defined using a probabilistic atlas 
(Hammers et al., 2003). An 18F-DOPA template was normalized together with the VOI map to 
each individual PET summation image using the statistical parametric mapping suite SPM5 
(http://fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). This procedure allowed VOIs to be placed automatically on 
individual 18F-DOPA PET images without observer bias. As I was interested in dopamine 
output relevant to cognitive and emotional processing rather than motor function I focused on 
Ki values from the whole striatum and its limbic and associative subdivisions.  
18F-DOPA utilization, relative to the cerebellar reference tissue (Ki), was calculated for each 
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18F-DOPA utilization, relative to the cerebellar reference tissue (Ki), was calculated for each 
VOI both uni- and bilaterally using graphical analysis, adapted for a reference tissue input 
function (Hartvig et al., 1991; Hoshi et al., 1993; Patlak & Blasberg, 1985). 
4.2.2 Integration(of(PET(and(fMRI(data(
FDOPA Ki values were entered in as covariates of interest into the fMRI analysis in SPM8 at 
the 2nd (group) level.  Left and right values were combined. A 1-sample t-test at the 2nd level 
was performed for the within group contrast, and a 2-sample t-test for between group 
comparisons. In the first analysis I was primarily interested in the relationship between 
Hippocampal activation to salient visual cues and dopamine output, and restricted the SPM 
analysis to this region. I formed a mask consisting of bilateral Hippocampal and 
parahippocampal regions from the Automated Anatomical Labeling Atlas (TzourioSMazoyer'et' al.,' 2002). I thresholded significant results at Family Wise Error corrected p=0.05 for 
multiple comparisons, minimum contiguous voxels per cluster =3.   
For the second analysis of midbrain activation relating to striatal fDOPA Ki I used a midbrain 
mask drawn on the average T1 image of the subjects used in the study covering the region of 
the combined Substantia Nigra (SN) and the Ventral Tegmental Area (VTA figure 4.1B).  
  
A. AAL Hippocampus/PHG  B. SN/VTA 
 
Figure 4.1 ROI Masks used in analysis superimposed on the averaged T1 of all subjects  
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I conducted a final exploratory whole brain analysis using the same method, thresholded at 
p=0.005 uncorrected, reported in supplementary results.  For illustrative purposes all figures 
display fMRI activations thresholded at p<0.005 uncorrected. Scatter plots show mean ROI 
18-FDOPA Ki values against SPM parameter estimates taken from the peak voxel of the 
specified contrast.  
4.2.3 Participants(
Approximately half of the participants who underwent fMRI scanning also participated in the 
PET scanning session. Sixteen participants with an At Risk Mental State for Psychosis 
(mean(SD) age=21.9 (5.0), 7 males, 9 BME, 15 right handed) and 16 healthy controls (mean 
(SD) age=24.9(3.4), 7 males, 7 BME, 13 right handed) provided written consent to undergo 
PET scanning. The study was approved by the Hammersmith Research Ethics Committee. 
PET scanning was not completed in one ARMS participant due to failure to meet radiotracer 
quality control standards, and the data from 1 further ARMS participant and 2 healthy 
controls was not included as the time between carbidopa /entacapone dosing and scanning 
was less than 1 hour, leading to possible uptake of FDOPA outside the brain. Data from 14 




There were no significant differences in 18F-DOPA Ki between participants with an ARMS 
and matched controls, either in the whole striatum or its subdivisions, or in the midbrain.  
These subjects formed part of a larger sample that showed elevated presynaptic dopamine 
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There were no significant relationships between Reward predicting cue related hippocampal 
activation and FDOPA Ki in the whole striatum, or in its limbic or associative subdivisions. 
Similarly there were no significant relationships between midbrain activation and Ki in these 
areas. In the exploratory whole brain analysis there were no other areas of relationship 
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striatum# +/?# k# t# z# p(unc)# p(FWE#WB)# p(FWE#ROI)#
MNI##
x,y,z#{mm}# Location#
Reward## Whole# +/?# NIL# ## ## ## ## ## ## ##
## Limbic# +/?# NIL# ## ## ## ## ## ## ##
## Associative# +/?# NIL# ## ## ## ## ## ## ##
Novelty# Whole# pos# NIL# ## ## ## ## ## ## ##
## ## neg# NIL# ## ## ## ## ## ## ##
## Limbic# pos# 17# 5.07# 3.64# <0.001# 0.826# 0.075# ?24#?22#?11# L#Hippocampus#(subic)#
## ## ## 5# 3.41# 2.79# 0.003# 0.995# #0.475# #27#?25#?23## R#PHG#
## ## ## 4# 3.39# 2.78# 0.003# 0.995# #0.484# #21##?7#?29## R#Hippocampus#(EC/subic)#
## ## neg# NIL# ## ## ## ## ## ## ##
## Associative# pos# NIL# ## ## ## ## ## ## ##
## ## neg# NIL# ## ## ## ## ## ## ##
Emotion# Whole# pos# NIL# ## ## ## ## ## ## ##
## ## neg# 243# 6.8# 4.28# <0.001# 0.219# 0.009# ?24#?40#?11# L#Hippocampus#(subic)#
## ## ## ## 6.76# 4.26# <0.001# 0.227# 0.009# ?30#?25#?20# L#Hippocampus#(subic)/PHG#
## ## ## ## 5.45# 3.79# <0.001# 0.643# 0.008# ##6#?22#?20## R#Midbrain#
## Limbic# pos# NIL# ## ## ## ## ## ## ##
## ## neg# NIL# ## ## ## ## ## ## ##
## Associative# pos# NIL# ## ## ## ## ## ## ##
## ## neg# 240# 5.4# 3.78# <0.001# 0.648# 0.045# ?30#?25#?20# L#Hippocampus#(subic)/PHG#
## ## ## 16# 3.74# 2.99# 0.001# 0.999# 0.055# ?12#?13#?11# L#Midbrain#




ARMSvHC#ROI#analyses# ## size# peak# ## ## ## ## ## ##
fMRI#contrast#
PET# ROI#
striatum# k# t# z# p(unc)# p(FWE#WB)# p(FWE#ROI)#
MNI#
x,y,z#{mm}# Location#
Reward## Whole# NIL# ## ## ## ## ## ## ##
## Limbic# 35# 5.09# 4.15# <0.001# 0.081# 0.019# ?15#?22#?23# L#Hippocampus#(subic)#
## Associative# NIL# ## ## ## ## ## ## ##
Novelty# Whole# 23# 3.83# 3.35# <0.001# 0.819# 0.119# ?15#?25#?20# L#Hippocampus#(subic)#
## Limbic# 5# 3.16# 2.86# 0.002# 0.988# 0.384# ?18#?28#?26# L#PHG#
## Associative# 19# 3.54# 3.15# 0.001# 0.924# 0.181# ?15#?25#?20# L#Hippocampus#(subic)#
Emotion# Whole# 61# 4.46# 3.77# <0.001# 0.411# 0.005# ##6#?25#?20## R#Midbrain#(SN/VTA)#
## ## ## 4.08# 3.52# <0.001# 0.665# 0.015# #?3#?25#?26## L#Midbrain#(SN/VTA)#
## ## 50# 4.01# 3.47# <0.001# 0.711# 0.092# ?27#?28#?23# L#Hippocampus#(subic)/PHG#
## Limbic# NIL# ## ## ## ## ## ## ##
## Associative# 9# 3.41# 3.05# 0.001# 0.97# 0.296# ?27#?28#?23# L#Hippocampus#(subic)/PHG#
## ## 4# 3.26# 2.94# 0.002# 0.988# 0.059# ##9#?28#?20## R#Midbrain#(SN/VTA)#
## ## 5# 3.2# 2.89# 0.002# 0.992# 0.067# #?3#?28#?23## L#Midbrain#(SN/VTA)#
Table 4.2 Interactions between hippocampal/midbrain fMRI activation to Reward, Novelty and Emotional salience and Striatal 18-FDOPA Ki values between 




There was a significant difference between participants with an ARMS and healthy controls 
in the relationship between reward cue related activation in the left hippocampal subiculum 
(15, -22, -23) and 18-FDOPA Ki in the limbic striatum (pFWE= 0.019, figure 4.2, table 4.2): in 
ARMS participants, greater hippocampal activation was directly related to greater 18-FDOPA 




Figure 4.2 Difference between ARMS and controls in the relationship between left Hippocampal 
subiculum activation to reward cues and limbic striatal 18-FDOPA Ki.  
 
This difference was specific to dopamine function in the limbic subdivision of the striatum. 
(table 4.2), and to hippocampal activation. There was no relationship with dopamine function 
in the whole striatum or its associative division, or with activation in the midbrain or any 




In controls, there was a trend for increased activation in the left hippocampus subiculum (-24, 
-22, -11) to cue novelty to be correlated with increased 18-F-DOPA Ki in the limbic 
subdivision of the striatum (pFWE= 0.075, figure 4.4 table 4.1).  
 
  
Figure 4.4 Trend towards increased activation in bilateral anterior hippocampus to novelty correlating with 
increased FDOPA Ki in the Limbic striatum in controls  
 
This was specific to hippocampal activation and to the limbic striatum; there was no 
significant relationship between hippocampal activation with whole or associative striatal 18-F-
DOPA Ki, or between midbrain activation and limbic striatal Ki.  
In the exploratory whole brain analysis, increased activation in the left putamen and reduced 
activation in the left insula related to increased 18-FDOPA Ki measured in the associative 
striatum (Supplementary table 1). 
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4.5.1 Novelty&Salience&and&Striatal&187F7DOPA&in&ARMS&vs&Healthy&controls&
There was a trend for a group difference in the relationship between novelty associated 
hippocampal activation and 18-FDOPA Ki values in the whole striatum, and  in the associative 
striatal subdivision (Figure 4.4, table 4.1).  Novelty associated hippocampal activation was 
correlated with limbic striatal 18-FDOPA Ki in controls, but with associative striatal 18-FDOPA 
Ki in ARMS participants. There was no such difference for novelty associated activation in 
the midbrain, and no significant other areas of difference in the whole brain analysis. 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Non significant difference in relationship of L Hippocampal activation to novelty with 
















































Activation elicited by negatively valenced emotional cues in the hippocampus correlated 
negatively with 18-FDOPA Ki in both the whole striatum and its associative subdivision 
(figure 4.5, Table 4.1). A similar relationship was evident between activation in the midbrain 




Figure 4.5 Hippocampal and midbrain activation to emotion in controls correlates negatively 
with pre-synaptic dopamine synthesis capacity in the whole striatum (top) and its associative 
subdivision (bottom)  
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In the whole brain analysis increased activation to emotional cues in a cluster in the right 
Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex was also related to increased 18-FDOPA Ki measured in the 
whole striatum and both limbic and associative subdivisions (table 4.2).  
4.6.2 Emotional&Salience&and&Striatal&187F7DOPA&in&ARMS&vs&Healthy&controls&
There was a trend towards a difference between ARMS and control participants in the 
relationship between Emotion related left hippocampal activation and 18-FDOPA Ki in the 
whole striatum (pFWE = 0.092, figure 4.6, 4.7 table 4.2).  While in healthy controls there was a 
strong relationship between increased hippocampal activation to aversive emotional cues and 
reduced striatal presynaptic dopamine availability, this relationship was absent in ARMS. 
This difference was also evident with 18-FDOPA Ki measured in the associative striatum, but 
not the limbic striatum (table 4.2). 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Group difference in relationship between pre-
synaptic dopamine synthesis capacity in the whole 




Figure 4.7 Hippocampal (left) and midbrain (right) activation to emotion 
in controls (top) correlates negatively with pre-synaptic dopamine 
synthesis capacity in the whole striatum but not in ARMS participants 
(bottom). 
 
There was also a significant between group difference in the relationship of emotional cue 
elicited activation in the midbrain and 18-FDOPA Ki measured in the whole striatum (pFWE 
=0.005 figure 4.6, 4.7, table 4.2); in controls, but not in ARMS, increasing midbrain 
activation to emotional cues was related to decreased 18-FDOPA Ki in the whole striatum. 
This difference was also evident as a trend with FDOPA Ki in both the associative and the 
limbic striatal subdivisions  (table 4.2). 
In the exploratory whole brain analysis there were also different relationships between ARMS 
and controls with limbic striatal 18-FDOPA Ki and activation in bilateral ACC, insulae, 
precuneus and occipital regions (figure 4.8). In these regions, increasing activation to 
emotional cues correlated positively with limbic striatal 18-FDOPA Ki in the ARMS group, 
but not in controls. 
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Figure 4.8 whole brain analysis of group differences in relationship between activation to 











In this study I combined 18-FDOPA PET imaging with fMRI to explore the relationship 
between hippocampal and midbrain activation to salient visual stimuli and presynaptic 
dopamine synthesis capacity in the striatum of participants with an ARMS and controls. 
Following the predictions of the MAM animal model of schizophrenia (Lodge' &' Grace,'2009), I first tested the hypothesis that in healthy controls, hippocampal activation by salient 
stimuli would be directly related to dopamine function in the striatum. I then tested the 
hypothesis that this relationship would be altered in participants with an ARMS. I expected 
that reward and emotion would be the aspects of salience most associated with group 
differences in the relationship with dopamine function, as the most significant group 
differences in activation were seen with reward and emotion salience. 18-FDOPA PET 
scanning was used to measure pre-synaptic dopamine function, as this aspect of dopamine 
transmission is thought to index ‘tonic’ dopamine activity, which is the type influenced by 
descending outputs from the hippocampus'(Lisman'&'Grace,'2005).'
The first hypothesis was partially supported; in control participants, there were trends for 
activation to both emotion and novelty salience in the hippocampus to be related to dopamine 
synthesis capacity in the striatum. However, there was no relationship between hippocampal 
reward salience activation and striatal dopamine function. 
 
My second hypothesis was more clearly supported; the relationship between hippocampal 
activation by salient stimuli and striatal dopamine function was altered in ARMS subjects, 
particularly in the reward and emotional dimensions, as anticipated. ARMS subjects showed a 
positive relationship between the level of striatal dopamine synthesis and the level of 
hippocampal activation to reward, but this relationship was not evident in controls.  
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Conversely, there was a negative relationship between hippocampal activation to emotion and 
striatal dopamine function that was not evident in ARMS participants. Both ARMS and 
control subjects showed positive relationships between hippocampal activation to novelty 
salience and striatal dopamine function, but these were evident in relation to different striatal 
subdivisions.  
In the wider, uncorrected, whole brain analysis ARMS participants also showed positive 
relationships between striatal 18-DOPA Ki and emotion elicited fMRI activations in the ACC 
and insula bilaterally, regions that have been collectively termed the ‘salience network’ (Seeley'et'al.,'2007). These relationships were not evident in controls.  
In healthy controls, striatal dopamine function was related to hippocampal activation to some 
aspects of salience, but not others. There were trends for novel visual cues, regardless of 
reward relevance or emotional content, to elicit hippocampal activation in the anterior left 
subiculum that was correlated positively with limbic striatal 18-FDOPA Ki. This is consistent 
with the model of Lisman and Grace (2005): novelty signals, generated in the hippocampal 
subiculum by comparing new perceptual inputs via hippocampal subfield CA1 with 
predictions from CA3 then go on via multiple synaptic connections to drive midbrain 
dopamine output to striatal, frontal and recurrent hippocampal targets, the latter reinforcing 
memory via dopamine mediated long term potentiation (Lisman'&'Grace,'2005). In ARMS 
participants we found a similar relationship, although this was strongest with dopamine 
function in the associative rather than the limbic subdivision, and was evident at an 
uncorrected level only.  
In healthy controls hippocampal activation to emotional cues, again centered on the anterior 
left subiculum, regardless of novelty or reward relevance, was negatively correlated with Ki 
values in the whole striatum, and in its associative subdivision. This was also true for 
activation in the midbrain, centred on the right substantia nigra/VTA. These relationships 
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were highly significant, and are in line with a similar recent finding from another group of 
activation to emotional salience (in this case dynamic emotional facial expressions) relating 
negatively to midbrain dopamine function measured by 18-FDOPA PET in control participants (Jabbi' et' al.,' 2012). Jabbi et al however combine positive and negative emotional valence, 
and find midbrain 18-FDOPA relationships with activation in a network of regions including 
the hippocampus, but also in the amygdala, insula, medial-frontal/orbitofrontal and cingulate 
cortices. They do not however report striatal 18-FDOPA Ki values, which may provide greater 
reliability and signal to noise ratios than midbrain measures (Egerton,'Demjaha,'McGuire,'Mehta,' &' Howes,' 2010), and may be more interpretable in terms of midbrain dopamine 
output from axon terminals to projection target regions rather than local feedback to 
autoreceptors.  Siessmeier et al (2006) did examine striatal presynaptic dopamine synthesis 
and found a  relationship between ventral striatal 18-FDOPA Ki and activation to positive 
emotional stimuli in the left ACC and right insula, and with dorsal striatal  18-FDOPA Ki  and 
activation to both positive and negative emotional stimuli in the left DLPFC. Using only 
negatively valenced emotional stimuli we replicated the DLPFC finding with 18-FDOPA Ki 
measured in the whole striatum and both limbic and striatal subdivisions, but found no 
relationship with activation in ACC or insulae to negative emotional stimuli, suggesting a 
specificity for positive affect in these regions in health, while the DLPFC may respond to 
emotion regardless of valence. 
Dopamine also modulates emotional processing more widely - Kienast et al (2008) find that 
dopamine tone in the amygdala measured using 18F-DOPA correlates positively to fMRI 
activations to fearful stimuli in the amygdala, and in the ACC.  We did not measure amygdala 
18F-DOPA Ki and are unable to make direct comparisons with these data. 
Relationships between dopamine neurotransmission and emotional processing have not to our 
knowledge been previously examined in subjects with at high clinical risk of psychosis. In my 
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sample of ARMS participants, who were experiencing attenuated psychotic symptoms, I 
found an alteration in the relationship between activation and striatal 18-FDOPA Ki, 
suggesting that dopamine mediated processing of negative emotional stimuli was significantly 
altered. Firstly, the strong relationship between hippocampal activation to negative emotional 
stimuli and 18-FDOPA Ki in the whole and associative striatum that was evident in controls 
was absent in ARMS participants. That this was more specific to the associative rather than 
the limbic striatum may reflect the importance of fronto-striatal connections in the healthy 
processing of emotional stimuli, and suggests that this crucial process may be disturbed in 
those with attenuated psychotic symptoms.  
Emotion dysregulation is a core feature of psychotic illness and these findings suggest that 
dopamine dysregulation may play a role in this aspect of the illness. The accompaniment of 
particularly aversive or threatening emotional aspects to psychotic-like experiences may be 
central in their development and maintenance (Freeman'&'Garety,'2003). The work in the 
previous chapter indicated that the presence of negative emotion selectively augmented 
ventral striatal, ACC and insula responses to reward in ARMS participants (chapter 3). In the 
present chapter, in a whole brain analysis, and at uncorrected statistical threshold, negative 
emotion elicited activation in the ACC and insulae was related to limbic striatal Ki in ARMS 
participants, but not controls. This relates to the finding by Siessmeier et al discussed above (Siessmeier'et'al.,'2006), who found that positive but not negative emotional stimuli elicited 
activations in the ACC and insula were related to limbic striatal Ki. In ARMS subjects this 
relationship was evident with negative emotional stimuli, but we were unable to test the effect 
of positive stimuli. 
Limbic striatal dopamine is known to play a role in reward anticipation (Schott'et'al.,'2008) 
and we found that in ARMS participants, negative emotional content further augmented 
elevated reward related responses in both the limbic striatum and in the ACC and insulae. In 
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those experiencing attenuated psychotic symptoms it may be that frontal-dorsal striatal 
moderation of responses to negative emotional stimuli is diminished, which therefore drive 
increased ventral striatal responses, to for example, reward. 
Reward processing was the aspect of salience that most differentiated the ARMS and control 
groups in terms of activation during the salience integration task (chapter 3). ARMS 
participants showed greater activation than controls to reward predicting visual cues in ventral 
striatal regions bilaterally (chapter 3). The work in this chapter shows that in ARMS there is 
an abnormal relationship between reward related activation in the hippocampus and a direct 
measure of dopamine in the striatum, as predicted by the Grace MAM model (Grace,'2011). 
In ARMS, but not in control participants, hippocampal activation, centered on the left 
subiculum, correlated positively with 18-FDOPA Ki in the limbic striatum. This was specific to 
activation in the subiculum and to 18-FDOPA Ki in the limbic striatal subdivision. This is 
consistent with the notion that alterations in reward-related salience processing mediate the 
link between altered dopamine transmission and psychotic symptoms, as proposed by the 
aberrant salience hypothesis (Kapur, 2003). It also adds support to the concept that abnormal 
hippocampal overdrive of an essentially intact dopamine system leads to striatal 
hyperdopaminergia, rather than abnormalities lying within the dopamine system itself (Grace, 
2011). 
Using a voxelwise approach I found that the hippocampal region demonstrating relationships 
with activations to reward, novel and emotional stimuli with striatal dopamine synthesis 
capacity was consistently centered on the left anterior subiculum. Peak voxel locations were 
determined using an automated probabilistic atlas (TzourioNMazoyer' et' al.,' 2002) and 
confirmed manually (Mai, Paxinos, & Voss, 2008). The anterior hippocampus is the more 
‘limbic’ portion of this structure, with multiple connections with the amygdala and related 
structures, has a clear role in context dependent fear learning (Maren & Fanselow, 1995), and 
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may more broadly reflect the affective context of stimuli (Grace,'2011).  The subiculum is 
the area of major hippocampal outflow, and the anterior part is the human equivalent of the 
ventral region in mice (due to the different shape of hippocampus in humans). This region is a 
major site of lesions in animal neurodevelopmental lesion models of psychosis (Jones,'Watson,'&'Fone,'2011), and the site of NMDA infusions to stimulate and TTX injections to 
disrupt increases in midbrain dopamine tone by altering the population of active dopamine 
neurons in the midbrain (Lodge' &' Grace,' 2006). The current study therefore provides 
tentative support for the predictions of the MAM model of schizophrenia, in particular that 
overdrive of midbrain dopamine output results leading to psychotic symptoms from increased 
output from the ventral subiculum. This model suggests that this results from dysfunctional 
interneuron function within the ventral subiculum, resulting from underactive alpha-5 GABA 
receptors.  
 
An alternate site of dysfunction is glutamatergic NMDA receptors on hippocampal 
interneurons (Olney'et'al.,'1999), a proposal given support by the demonstration of an altered 
relationship in ARMS participants between hippocampal glutamate levels measured by 
magnetic resonance spectroscopy and striatal dopamine 18-FDOPA uptake (Stone' et' al.,'2010). Exploring these alternative sites of potential interneuron dysfunction is important 
future work, and has the potential to lead to new treatment targets (Stone'&'Pilowsky,'2007). 
 
Group differences in the relationship between medial temporal activation by a verbal memory 
task and striatal 18-FDOPA PET have previously been demonstrated in a group of ARMS 
participants (Allen' et' al.,' 2011). The present findings support and extend these to include 
aspects of reward and emotional processing, both potentially relevant within an aberrant 
salience model of psychosis.  
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Overall this work provides tentative human in vivo evidence to support the predictions of the 
MAM animal model in the early stages prior to the onset of psychosis. Further work should 
extend this into samples with established psychosis, and include neurochemical work to 













Figure 5.1 The Aberrant Salience Model of psychosis links brain and mind level explanations of psychosis 
 
The aberrant salience model (Heinz, 2002; Kapur, 2003), simplified above, provides a link 
between the neurobiological and clinical aspects of psychosis (figure 5.1). It is influential 
amongst cognitive neuropsychiatric models of psychosis because it can provide a plausible 
account of symptom development and manifestations (especially delusions) and also because 
it can link these cognitive and psychological accounts to dopamine dysfunction (step 1 of 
model in figure 5.1).  However, while salience has been a useful “heuristic” in bridging this 
gap – the original authors (Heinz, 2002; Kapur, 2003)) and subsequent users of this term have 
not operationalized it with any precision.   
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Figure 5.2 Expanded Aberrant salience model: function must be understood before dysfunction 
This was the first question addressed in this thesis, and an important grounding for 
experimental testing of a model invoking aberrant salience (figure 5.2).  
At the moment “salience” is a broad term commonly used in a number of fields.  In trying to 
address this different authors have used different operationalizations of salience, for example 
reward prediction (Juckel et al., 2006), prediction error (Murray, Lappin, & Di Forti, 2008), 
explicit salience attributions for reward prediction (Roiser, Stephan, Ouden, Friston, & Joyce, 
2010) or emotional content (Holt et al., 2006). It seems that each has picked up one element 
of salience as reflected in their paradigm rather than coming at it with a broader consideration 
of what constitutes salience overall in humans and therefore how best to capture its 
multidimensional nature, and how this may be altered in psychosis.  
I consider by way of analogy the more developed and defined concept of salience in the field 
of vision research and robotics (chapter 1 p24), and note that it is integrative of a number of 
different visual features (colour, brightness, contrast, motion, spatial complexity) and 
representable as an overall ‘map’. This map combines these features into a single salience 
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dimension, proportionate to brightness on the saliency map. More advanced are semantic-
saliency maps being developed in robotics attempt to combine higher features with visual 
saliency to facilitate appropriate resource allocation and response selection (Meger, Forssén, 
Lai, & Helmer, 2008). 
 However there are as yet are no such ‘higher feature’ maps to satisfactorily model salience in 
humans. From the original concept as developed in the animal literature and as adapted in 
subsequent writings to the clinical situation (Heinz, 2002; Kapur, 2003) it seems that salient 
stimuli often 1) capture attention, thought and alter behaviour and 2) the ability of the stimuli 
to do so is mediated or moderated, in part, by dopamine.  
 
 
Figure 5.3. Salient stimuli in humans are multifaceted 
 
Rewarding, Novel and Emotional stimuli meet both sets of criteria – they are known to 
capture attention and alter behaviour and they are influenced by dopamine function.  To the 
extent that these criteria accurately reflect the construct of salience then manipulations of 
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reward, novelty and emotion are likely to be manipulations of salience. Their interactions and 
relative contributions towards salience for particular individuals or groups is unknown, and a 
key question of this thesis. 
However as discussed these criteria are far from complete or established, and as salience is 
necessarily subjective, it is difficult to access experimentally. In order to move this state of 
affairs forward I constructed a paradigm that allows comparison and interaction of these 3 
stimulus dimensions on 3 simple measures, reaction time, recognition memory and neural 
activation in a pre-specified brain network that was derived from a relevant animal model. 
Within the context of the experiment these served as proxies of the behavioural, cognitive and 
neural aspects of salience processing. I considered that the greater the modulation of 
behaviour, cognition and neural activation by a specific dimension or interaction of 
dimensions, the more likely that stimulus was salient for the subject in question.  Similar to 
previous attempts at capturing the phenomenon of salience, these criteria are necessarily 
another operationalization, with limitations.  
For example if one uses the above criteria (changes in RT, memory and brain activation) it is 
very conceivable that subconscious priming may be able to alter these without the 
reward/novelty/emotion aspects of the stimulus being consciously accessible to the individual. 
There are numerous instances and reports of where these priming stimuli capture attention 
and change behaviour of the individual – though usually they do not actively engage 
conscious thought (Sheeran, Gollwitzer, & Bargh, 2013). While we concede that unconscious 
stimuli can also, under certain circumstances, achieve similar effects to consciously salient 
stimuli, that was not the focus of our experiments. In the current experiment attention and 
conscious visual processing of each stimulus was ensured by requiring a button press to all 
scenes aside from 2 NoGo control scenes, similar to the other scenes apart from detailed scene 
content. Errors in this aspect of task performance were less than 10%. 
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The more interesting question this raises is whether alterations in implicit priming, rather than 
explicit reward, novelty and emotion may give rise to psychotic phenomenon. It has to be 
kept in mind that delusions and hallucinations are consciously accessible subjective 
phenomenon. Patients may not have insight into their illness or its consequences but they are 
consciously aware of their thoughts and experiences. From that point of view while alterations 
via subconscious priming may initiate the process of making some stimuli more salient than 
others – it would become a clinical psychotic experience only in the context of a consciously 
owned experience. 
Thus for the current experiments we considered that salient stimuli are those that pull 
cognition – particularly including attention, but also orientation, sensory processing and 
higher processing – and push behaviour – response selection, motor planning monitoring and 
execution. It was notable that in none of our findings was there a single common brain region 
or behavioural feature common to all ‘salience’. To expect that it would be so is perhaps 
naïve given the complexity of interacting cognitive processes and brain regions involved.  
A neurocognitive system for facilitating the selection of which stimuli to notice and to 
respond to would be expected to involve all these elements and be able to compare different 
types of stimuli inputs to coordinate central output processes from attention through to action. 
Redgrave and colleagues call this a ‘Selection Problem’ (Prescott,	 Montes	 González,	Gurney,	Humphries,	&	Redgrave,	2006). Such a problem is likely to be solved by a system 
that is phylogenetically old, widely connected, and modulated by signals relevant to learning 
and context. They locate this system the basal ganglia, in functionally segregated, parallel, re-
entrant cortico-striato-nigro-thalamo-cortical loops (described in chapter 1(Redgrave, 
Prescott, & Gurney, 1999). According to their model, competition occurs between stimuli 
represented through such loops to facilitate allocation of cognitive and behavioural resources, 
in a ‘winner takes all’ computation. Competition is on the basis of their relative saliency to 
 150 
the organism in the current context; salience is therefore the common currency used in this 
competition, the selection criteria for determining which stimuli ‘win’ (Redgrave	 et	 al.,	1999). This process may also therefore best fit with what is termed broadly thought as 
‘salience processing’. 
In the SIT I attempted to weigh the relative saliencies of different stimuli with fMRI in brain 
regions thought to be critical to psychosis (Lisman & Grace, 2005), and by measuring 2 
simple behavioural outputs – reaction time and recognition memory. Both are compound 
measures of multiple processes, and interpretation in terms of relative stimulus saliencies is 
not simple. Similarly BOLD related fMRI activation is a surrogate measure of neural activity 
that may better represent inputs to a region than its spiking output (Logothetis	&	Wandell,	2004). 
The first prediction was that each of the features tested, Reward Novelty and Emotion would 
elicit behavioural cognitive and neural reactions consistent with salience as conceived of 
above. A lack of such reactions would weaken support for that feature being salient for the 
subject being tested. The second prediction was that there would be evidence of interaction 
between these features – and similarly a lack of interactions would weaken support for 
salience being multidimensional. The experiment in normal controls was designed to identify 
the nature and magnitude of these interactions. Finally, the ARMS sample was included to 
explore whether there was a correlation between these neural changes and clinically expressed 
symptoms.  If no group difference was found then support for the aberrant salience 
hypothesis, where salience consisted of the features tested, would be weakened for the 
subjects tested, those at high clinical risk for psychosis.  
In fact I found behavioural and neural evidence that each of three aspects of salience –reward, 
novelty and emotion - modified behaviour and led to significant BOLD related fMRI 
activation in regions that may in part subserve salience related computations. There were also 
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a number of significant interactions between these aspects at behavioural and neural levels, 
suggestive of crosstalk and of integration of these aspects of stimuli, as a unified calculation 
of relative saliencies would require. Thus salience is not limited to any one element: most 
salient stimuli are multifaceted, and depend on motivational, affective and novelty context. 
More specifically, I found that in healthy participants, emotion slowed reaction times to 
reward predicting stimuli that would otherwise have elicited a rapid response, and that 
emotion also reduced subsequent recognition memory for reward-predicting cues. Such 
interactions may reflect the opposed motivational valence of these cues: reward predicting 
stimuli have appetitive motivational value, while negative emotional stimuli have aversive 
motivational value. However, they may also reflect the integration of distinct signals for 
emotion and reward, coded in separate regions. The fMRI data revealed that there were 
differences in the nature of reward x emotion interactions in the amygdala and in the posterior 
hippocampus. In the amygdala, emotion elicited activation to reward-predicting cues but not 
non-reward cues, whereas in the posterior hippocampus reward related activation was evident 
for neutral, but not emotional cues.  
Interactions between reward and novelty in healthy participants were evident at the neural but 
not the behavioural level. Reward related activation was greater for novel than for familiar 
cues in the hippocampus- amygdala, medial and lateral OFC, and midbrain suggesting that 
these regions may code a ‘novelty bonus’ for novelty exploration (Kakade & Dayan, 2002).  
This over-valuing of novel rewards found through exploration of new environments - is well 
characterised and is thought evolutionally to incentivise the search for new sources of food or 
mates (Dayan, 1996). A similar interaction has previously been demonstrated in mesolimbic 
regions, where it also enhanced memory, but only when the reward related dimension was 
attended (Bunzeck, Doeller, Dolan, & Duzel, 2012; Krebs, Schott, Schutze, & Duzel, 2009b). 
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There were also behavioural and neural interactions between emotion and novelty. Healthy 
subjects responded faster to familiar than to novel scenes, but not when they were also 
emotional. Emotion also boosted the recognition memory effects of familiarisation. At the 
neural level, interactions were evident both in the ventral striatum, where deactivations to 
novel (aversive) emotional stimuli resolved with familiarity. Similar effects on deactivation 
were evident in the dorsolateral prefrontal and frontopolar cortex. The prefrontal cortex has an 
important role in the moderation of subcortical emotional responses, which may be through 
reducing amygdala responsivity (Diekhof, Geier, Falkai, & Gruber, 2011), fronto-amygdalar 
connectivity (Banks, Eddy, Angstadt, Nathan, & Phan, 2007), or via dopaminergic 
neuromodulation (Kienast et al., 2008). Perhaps here we are seeing this moderation occurring 
over repeated emotional stimulus presentation, as occurs in fear extinction and with cognitive 
reappraisal (Smits, Julian, Rosenfield, & Powers, 2012). 
Thus in addressing the first question of the study – essentially, what is salience? - I examined 
responses to three key aspects, and demonstrated that each of these, reward novelty and 
emotion, altered behaviour and brain activation in a manner that may in part reflect salience 
processing, and interacted with one another in doing so. However as outlined above, and as 
will remain until the neurocognition and neuroanatomy of salience processing is resolved, 
these measures are indirect and serve as approximations for conceptual purposes. 
Nevertheless I argue that they are approximations that are useful and relevant for systematic 
testing of aberrant salience hypothesis of psychosis. 
 
5.2 Alterations	in	salience	processing	in	people	at	high	risk	of	psychosis		
The second phase of this thesis involved the application of this salience framework to people 
who were experiencing attenuated psychotic symptoms. These symptoms are thought be 
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related to dopamine driven variations in a salience processing mechanism (Kapur, 2003). This 
is the first time to my knowledge that different aspects of salience have been systematically 
studied in an ARMS population, or indeed any group with psychotic symptoms. At present, 
the published literature is mainly limited to studies of reward salience (alone) in patients with 
an established psychotic disorder. 
In contrast to previous findings in patients with psychosis, which have usually reported 
reductions in activation during reward paradigms (table 1.1, chapter 1), there was evidence of 
greater activation during salience processing in subjects with an ARMS than in controls. 
These hyperactivations were specific to reward anticipation and to the interaction between 
reward and emotion; there were no clear group differences related to novelty. As reward 
anticipation activates dopamine neurons (Schultz, 1997) and psychosis is linked to dopamine 
dysfunction, differences between groups in relation to reward may therefore be unsurprising. 
Moreover, although the direction of the difference may be different, a differential response in 
relation to reward is consistent with the findings in patients with psychosis (see chapter 1 
table 1.1).  
This may reflect a state of ‘hyper’-salience during the ARMS, accompanied by moderately 
elevated striatal dopamine tone (Howes et al., 2009). This may be analogous to an ‘activating 
context’ in health, such as when searching for food, or in dangerous situations, where even 
small stimuli are likely to be important to survival, and have large behavioural contingencies 
(Grace, 2010). In this situation contextual information is provided by the hippocampus, itself 
receiving inputs relating to spatial location, novelty, stress and goal relevance. Ventral 
hippocampal outputs signalling this context release dopamine neurons in the SN/VTA from 
tonic inhibition by the ventral pallidum, such that salient stimuli can engage larger numbers of 




Figure 5.5 Contextual information from the hippocampus incorporate 
multiple inputs and regulates dopamine tone to alter the overall burst 
firing output to salient stimuli (from Grace, 2010) 
In the ARMS it may be that hippocampal drive to the SN/VTA is similarly altered, so salient 
stimuli such as visual cues predicting monetary reward lead to greater brain activations. If this 
process were to progress, the output from the hippocampus may become maximal, to the 
extent that all of the SN/VTA neurons are active. Under these conditions, even minimally or 
non-salient stimuli will lead to maximal dopamine burst firing. At this point contrasts 
measured in behavioural or brain activation terms between salient and non-salient stimuli 
would be reduced. This would then be equivalent to aberrant salience, as putatively occurs in 
full-blown psychosis. One could speculate that the transition from the ARMS to frank 
psychosis might involve a progression as described above, with a change from 
hyperactivation to salient stimuli, to a reduced response, as described in previous 
neuroimaging studies. This possibility could be tested by a longitudinal extension of the 
present study, with the re-scanning of subjects who subsequently develop psychosis. 
An important aspect of context is that of aversive emotion or threat, signalled by inputs from 
structures such as the amgydala and the locus coeruleus (figure 5.5). I found strong 
activations in both these regions to negative emotional stimuli in both groups. There were also 
interactions between emotion and reward in the hippocampus and amygdala in both groups, 
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suggesting that these structures may contribute distinct signals for integration of this 
contextual information. Such integration would be important in salience calculations to 
stimuli in different contexts. 
Interestingly there was a group difference in this interaction in the ventral striatum, albeit at 
uncorrected statistical significance. In the ARMS group aversive emotion greatly augmented 
reward-related activation in the nucleus accumbens. This may reflect a wide range of possible 
influences on input, including GABAergic projections from the hippocampus, dopaminergic 
projections from the SN/VTA and output, largely from glutamatergic medium spiny neurons. 
In controls the augmentation was incremental. This pattern was also seen in the ACC and 
bilateral insulae, areas that have also been implicated in salience processing (Seeley et al., 
2007). That ARMS participants show particular sensitivity to aversive emotion is itself not 
surprising: emotional disturbances, anxiety and affective disorders are common in the 
psychosis prodrome (Yung & McGorry, 1996). What is interesting is that such sensitivity was 
uncovered in aversive emotion augmenting reward related responses; for neutral cues the 
increased activation to reward cues was incremental, and similar to controls (figure 3.13, 
3.14).  
This may relate to a connection in people with an ARMS between neurotic symptoms and 
psychotic symptoms. It also resonates with recent cognitive models of psychosis which have 
questioned the historical divide between neurotic and psychotic disorders, pointing out that 
emotional disorders usually precede, and often accompany psychotic symptoms (see Freeman 
& Garety, 2003). Emotional sensitivity is the hallmark of neurosis; in our sample ARMS 
participants, who had elevated scores on anxiety and depression scales, but who also were 
experiencing attenuated psychotic symptoms, did show sensitivity to emotional scenes that in 
our task had motivational relevance (ie were reward predicting), but not those that did not. A 
distinction these models do make is that psychotic symptoms unaccompanied by emotional 
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disturbance may be less functionally disturbing, and less often to clinical ‘caseness’ or need 
for care (Krabbendam & Os, 2005). Testing such a sample of those experiencing non-clinical 
psychotic symptoms would be an interesting extension of the current study. Conversely those 
with emotional disorders without psychotic symptoms also show sensitivity to emotional 




Having attempted to address the first questions- what is salience, how is it processed in the 
healthy brain and how is this altered in at risk states for psychosis- we come to a final 
question. What is the role of dopamine in all this? Dopamine is clearly important in 
motivational and reward-related processes (Berridge & Robinson, 1998; Schultz, 1997), and 
also in psychosis (Howes & Kapur, 2009), and yet the total role of dopamine modulation even 
in the healthy brain is far from clear, and complicated by comparisons between measurements 
of varying temporal and spatial precision of midbrain dopamine neuron firing versus 
dopamine release in different target regions, in rodents, primates and, using less direct 
measures, in humans (Heinz, Grace, & Beck, 2009; eg Redgrave, Gurney, & Reynolds, 2008; 
Ungless, 2004) .  
The final part of the thesis examined the relationship of dopamine neurotransmission to 
normal and abnormal salience processing, by combining PET and fMRI, and informed by the 
predictions of the Grace lab model of recurrent hippocampal-VTA signalling (Lisman & 
Grace, 2005) and its alteration as seen in the MAM rodent model of schizophrenia (Lodge & 
Grace, 2009). 
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In controls, in the subiculum of the left anterior hippocampus, human analogue of the rodent 
ventral subiculum, novelty related activation was positively correlated with striatal 18F-DOPA 
Ki, albeit at trend level, but as would be predicted by the animal model. According to the 
MAM model, contextual novelty signals generated in the hippocampus increase the 
proportion of dopaminergic SN/VTA neurons that are in a tonically active state, which 
increases the ‘gain’ of dopamine burst firing (Lisman & Grace, 2005). The present data 
indicated that in humans in vivo, novel cues elicited strong hippocampal activation in both 
groups, but that there were differences in the relationship between this activation and the level 
of striatal presynaptic dopamine synthesis capacity, which is most likely a surrogate of 
dopamine tone. In the ARMS group this was most evident in the associative striatum, in 
controls the limbic striatum, but this subregion difference did not reach corrected significance. 
Also correlation is not causation; in rodents the directionality of the Hippocampal-VTA 
relationship was established through a series of stimulation, blockade and lesion experiments 
not possible in humans in vivo. It may be for example that levels of dopamine tone in the 
striatum also reflect dopamine tone in the hippocampus, and boost phasic novelty signals.  
Previous studies have shown relationships between questionnaire derived sensation seeking 
scores and D2/3 receptor density and availability in the midbrain (Zald et al., 2008) and 
striatum (Gjedde, Kumakura, Cumming, Linnet, & Møller, 2010), and with fMRI novelty-
reward interactions in the midbrain and striatum (Guitart-Masip, Bunzeck, Stephan, Dolan, & 
Düzel, 2010; Krebs, Heipertz, Schuetze, & Duzel, 2011; Krebs, Schott, & Duzel, 2009a). The 
present data provide the first direct evidence from humans that novelty signalling in the 
hippocampus is linked to dopamine function in the striatum. Further work will explore this 
relationship with regard to variation in novelty seeking and sensation seeking personality 
traits.  
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 Secondly, in controls, in the same subregion of the left anterior hippocampus, activation to 
negatively valenced emotional cues was negatively correlated with striatal 18F-DOPA Ki. This 
reflects other findings suggestive of the wider role of dopamine in emotional processing: 
activations to emotional stimuli correlate with 18F-DOPA measured in the midbrain (Jabbi et 
al., 2012), ventral striatum (Siessmeier et al., 2006) and the amygdala itself (Kienast et al., 
2008). In the hippocampal ROI used in this thesis, and also in the SN/VTA ROI, higher 
striatal dopamine tone was related to lower activation to aversive emotional stimuli. In these 
regions dopamine modulation may have an important role in moderating responsiveness to 
negative emotional cues. In contrast, in the right DLPFC, there were positive correlations 
between emotion elicited activation and striatal 8F-DOPA Ki. Variation in this dopamine 
mediated meso-cortico-striatal signalling may help explain inter-individual variation in 
emotional sensitivity; variations in anxiety and neuroticism scores will be related to fMRI-
PET measures in future work. 
In ARMS participants however there was no relationship between hippocampal or midbrain 
activation to emotion and striatal 8F-DOPA Ki, suggesting that the normal coupling between 
these regions was lost. On the other hand, emotion related activation in the ACC and insulae 
correlated positively with striatal 8F-DOPA Ki. In these regions, emotion also greatly 
augmented activation in response to reward in the ARMS group. The ACC and insula are 
normally involved in the emotional regulation of limbic responses (Etkin, Egner, & Kalisch, 
2011) such as during reappraisal (Banks et al., 2007), and also are though to act together as 
part of a ‘salience network’ that facilitates switching between default mode and central 
executive networks (Seeley et al., 2007; Sridharan, Levitin, & Menon, 2008). Understanding 
the influence of dopamine in these networked operations and their alteration in greater detail 
requires connectivity analyses; Kienast et al for example found that dopamine function in the 
amygdala modulated ACC-Amygdalar coupling during negative emotional processing 
(Kienast et al., 2008). I plan to assess the influence of dopamine on connectivity in the present 
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data as part of future work. However the current results suggest that ARMS subjects, who 
have high levels of emotional disorders alongside attenuated psychotic symptoms, and altered 
interactions between reward and emotional processing, also show alterations in the normal 
dopamine dependent mechanisms of emotional processing in cortical and limbic regions.  
 Interestingly there was no relationship in control participants between activation to reward 
predicting cues in either the hippocampus or the midbrain and striatal 18F-DOPA Ki values. 
This is in contrast to a wide literature previously discussed relating reward related phenomena 
to dopamine neuron activity and striatal dopamine release (recently reviewed in Egerton et al., 
2011). Similarly there was no evidence of strong ventral striatal activation in controls to 
reward predicting cues. This may relate to susceptibility artifact in this region, or reduced 
ratio of signal to noise, but it could also reflect that the reward probe in the SIT is relatively 
weak – it is a passive reward task, in which outcomes are not dependent on correct choices or 
timing. This is likely to have a major effect on the strength of reward related mesolimbic 
fMRI responses (Zink, Pagnoni, Martin-Skurski, Chappelow, & Berns, 2004), and so active 
timed reward relevant responses are usually a part of reward-only tasks such as the Monetary 
Incentive Delay Task (Knutson, Adams, Fong, & Hommer, 2001). In the SIT, in which I 
attempted to compare responses to emotional, reward and novelty aspects of salience, I 
deliberately made the required response unrelated to any of these 3 aspects. The only task 
participants faced on each trial was a simple Go-NoGo choice that required detecting whether 
each scene matched a prior exposed NoGo scene – this ensured attendance to the visual 
content of each cue. Differential brain and behavioural responses as seen were in this sense 
passive, and although I attempted to provide ‘salience-matched’ levels of each aspect, this 
proved difficult (discussed further below). Nevertheless reward-predicting cues did activate 
midbrain structures, speed reaction times and improve recognition rates. If a stronger probe of 
reward had been used a relationship between reward related hippocampal and / or midbrain 
activation with striatal dopamine measures in controls may have been more evident. 
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However, these reward-predicting cues, which were presented identically in both groups, led 
to greater activation in ARMS subjects than in controls. Furthermore, in ARMS participants 
left anterior hippocampus activation to reward-predicting cues correlated positively with 
striatal 18-FDOPA Ki values, particularly from the limbic subdivision, a relationship that was 
not seen in controls. This may relate both to the overactivation seen to reward in ARMS 
subjects, and the elevated striatal dopamine levels that have been evident in larger ARMS 
samples studied with F-Dopa PET (Howes et al., 2009).  
Again neither the causal direction of this relationship nor the path of influence can be 
determined from the current analysis. Hippocampal inputs to the striatum may affect striatal 
presynaptic dopamine synthesis via the multi synaptic pathway onto SN/VTA dopamine 
neurons, as suggested by Grace and colleagues (Lisman & Grace, 2005), or via a number of 
alternative routes. Other animal models (e.g. Kellendonk et al., 2006) propose that striatal 
dopamine dysfunction is primary, and drive positive symptoms of psychosis, and 
frontocortical dysfunction. The Grace model applied in their MAM treated rodents (Lodge & 
Grace, 2009) suggests that hippocampal overdrive through this pathway is what drives 
increased dopamine tone leading to the symptoms of psychosis. The present findings relate 
hippocampal activation to reward-predicting stimuli with an in vivo measure of dopamine 
synthesis availability, and in so doing provide limited support for extension of this model to 
psychotic illness in humans.  
Some caveats apply: there were no differences in reward activation in the hippocampus 
between groups; it is not ‘overdrive’ in this sense. Similarly dopamine levels were not 
‘overdriven’ - in the subsample that underwent both PET and fMRI scanning there was no 
group difference in striatal dopamine levels. However, this may have been due to limited 
statistical power: the samples were not large, and the reward probe used in the SIT was 
relatively weak. Nevertheless, differences in the relationship of dopamine tone with 
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hippocampal activation to salient probes may reflect disease mechanisms and herald later 
changes; in the instance of emotion, the loss of a possibly moderating influence, in the 
instance of reward the gain of a possibly pathological one.  
5.4 Limitations		
5.4.1 The	nature	of	the	concept	of	‘Salience’	
As discussed above, the concept of salience is widely applied across different fields and is 
often used as an umbrella term referring to the subjective importance, or prominence of a 
stimulus relative to the context in which it is embedded. Outside vision research, where 
summing the physically salient characteristics leads to a definable concept of a “salience 
map”, the concept is widely and variably used.  Similarly there is no neural system 
established for normal salience processing, although the concepts of Redgrave and Grace 
referenced above may provide a useful neural heuristic framework. The SIT, in constructing a 
simple behavioural and neural set measure of salience, ie altered reaction, recognition 
memory and neural activation, is an attempt to advance this position, but has limitations as I 
readily acknowledge. The design did enable a systematic comparison of 3 key aspects of 
visual stimuli that have been previously described as salient, and which on testing met the 
operationalized salience criteria. I was then able to compare healthy reactions to these aspects 
with a group of subjects experiencing psychotic symptoms, and link these to dopamine 
function. In doing so I was able to test both of the key steps proposed by the aberrant salience 
hypothesis (figure 5.1).  To my knowledge this is the first time such a multidimensional and 
systematic examination of the features of normal salience has been attempted to guide testing 
of the aberrant salience hypothesis in psychosis. It is also the first time such testing has 
incorporated direct neurochemical measurements of dopamine function. 
 162 
5.4.2 The	utility	of	the	concept	of	‘Aberrant	Salience’	for	psychosis	
A relevant question that arises is to what extent the construct of salience adds to our 
understanding of the link between dopamine and psychosis. Might it not be more precise for 
example to simply say that altered dopamine alters reward processing, emotion processing or 
novelty processing (individually or through several interactions) and this leads to psychosis? 




Indeed there are many studies that demonstrate single dimension abnormalities in all of these 
elements, and more (see for example table 1.1). The difficulty comes in trying to reconcile 
these findings with one another, and to find a plausible model that integrates and links these 
to the formation of psychotic symptoms. Moreover the evidence preceding the current 
experiment, testing each element in isolation does not permit comparison of the different 
elements, or the testing of interactions between them. 
We could have found some common brain regions across the reward, novelty and emotional 
paradigms – thereby providing some neurobiological grounding for a common salience 
network. While these experiments were not designed specifically to address this question – 
they did have the possibility of identifying such regions. We did not find such a network. This 
diminishes the appeal of the concept of salience as a unifying concept, because in the absence 
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of such a common network it becomes an umbrella term which encompasses several 
processes which share some behavioural features (e.g. enhanced attention, reaction time etc.) 
and that are mediated/moderated by dopamine.  
That being the case, the experiments herein move our understanding forward by providing a 
simultaneous comparison of these difference aspects, and their interactions. We found that for 
those at risk of psychosis, the interactions are important, particularly for reward and emotion. 
This resonates with cognitive models and evidence regarding emotion and emotional distress 
of aberrant phenomena as critical in driving psychosis (Freeman & Garety, 2003). 
5.4.3 Nature	of	the	Salience	Integration	Task	
One limitation of the factorial event related design of the SIT was an apparent loss of power, 
relative to simpler designs.  While facilitating a robust examination of main effects and 
interactional analyses that were central to my hypotheses, this meant that some of the 
findings, such as those relating to group differences in novelty and PET, were not optimally 
corrected for multiple comparisons. Set against this was the focussed anatomical location of 
the hypotheses, which were informed by the circuits prescribed by the MAM model and the 
‘salience network’, considerably reducing the chances of alpha error. Despite the low to 
moderate power of some of the analyses, the findings were largely within the expected 
regions of interest, the hippocampus, amygdala, midbrain and striatum, and in the ACC and 
insulae. Outside these regions the only other key regions that were sites of activation to both 
reward and emotion were visual areas, presumably related to the visual nature of the stimuli. 
This is itself of note, particularly as I was careful to control rigorously for basic visual 
features of the stimuli such as luminance, colour, movement, contrast, size, and pixel count. 
This suggests that salient visual stimuli elicit greater occipital activations, particularly in 
secondary visual areas, supporting findings by Redgrave and colleagues, who point out that 
dopamine neuron response latencies to such salient stimuli are too fast to code a prediction 
 164 
error, which would necessarily involve gaze shifting at the very least (Redgrave & Gurney, 
2006). Group differences in these areas were not seen however. 
A further difficulty with the SIT was the ‘titration’ of salient-equivalent levels of each aspect 
studied, as previously discussed. This is necessary in order to reliably compare the 
behavioural and neural contribution of reward, novelty and emotion to salience processing. 
However there are no ‘chlorpromazine-equivalent’ dose conversions for salience. As such the 
emotional stimuli provided by the IAPS pictures elicited a wider and more powerful range of 
brain activations that either the reward or novel stimuli. Similarly it was not possible to utilise 
aspects of reward tasks that ensure more robust responses such as speeded and differential 
response choices, as this would confound comparisons between reward and other aspects. I 
could not explicitly model trial by trial expectation or prediction error. However all 3 aspects 
studied did elicit behavioural and neural differences, and furthermore were the same stimuli 
for all control and ARMS participants. I was also able to improve the validity of the 
emotional stimuli by asking each participant to individually rate the emotional arousal caused 
by each picture, which echoed the ratings of the IAPS reference data. 
A final potential criticism of the reward aspect of the SIT could be the absence of ventral 
striatal activation in controls to the reward predicting cue. This may relate to large signal 
dropout due to susceptibility artefact in this region, particularly more anteriorly (Vargas, 
Delavelle, Kohler, Becker, & Lovblad, 2009). It could also reflect an incomplete transfer of 
reward related activation from the outcome to the cue resulting from the partial reinforcement 
schedule. The most likely explanation, as discussed above, is the passive nature of the reward 
aspect of the task, necessary to ensure equivalent attention was given to each of the three 
aspects of salience studied. 
Lastly, the behavioural indices of the SIT whilst simple were compound measures of multiple 
cognitive processes and did not readily lend themselves to detailed interpretation, particularly 
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with respect to brain level fMRI and PET findings. Although there were group differences in 
behaviour, and these were strongest for the reward and emotion aspects studied, the direction 
of these differences was sometimes opposite to fMRI findings, and I did not directly relate 
behavioural measure to fMRI or PET. 
5.4.4 	Ultra	High	Risk	population	
One common difficulty with studying mechanisms of the onset of any disease of low 
incidence is finding enriched samples that yield high transition rates. The clinical ultra high 
risk for psychosis strategy is one of the most successful strategies for psychosis but still yields 
a minority of transitions to psychosis over a limited follow-up time period, particularly when 
patients are being treated to actively prevent such a transition (McGorry et al., 2009; Yung et 
al., 2007).  One criticism of this strategy is therefore that most of the population studied will 
in fact not go on to develop full psychotic disorder. This has clear implications for power in 
the study, as the ‘disease’ group is being effectively diluted by participants who will turn out 
to be in a sense false positives.  Any group related difference between ARMS and control 
samples is therefore likely to either reflect a large effect in the subgroup who go onto develop 
psychosis, or be related to factors other than those specifically linked to transition, such as 
disease susceptibility, or general factors such as functional impairment, distress and so on. Set 
against this is one key attribute of the clinical high risk strategy, which is that patients are 
mostly recruited on the basis of active attenuated psychotic symptoms of a minimum severity, 
frequency and duration. These symptoms, though not reaching the level seen in frank 
psychosis, cause marked distress and lead sufferers to seek clinical help. The mechanisms 
underlying these symptoms are likely to be similar to those that underlie full-blown psychotic 
symptoms, as they are pheonomenologically similar, and studying ‘attenuated’ psychotic 
symptoms in and of themselves is therefore of great interest (Wood et al., 2004). Following 
up the ARMS sample to determine their clinical outcomes is of course central to the broader 
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study and will be a part of ongoing work. Testing the SIT in a further sample of first episode 
psychosis patients will also help validate the findings.  
5.4.5 PET	study		
Two separate samples have confirmed that ARMS participants show elevations in striatal 
18FDOPA Ki that are intermediate between healthy controls and participants with a first 
episode of psychosis (Egerton et al., 2012; Howes et al., 2009). In the current sample there 
was not a significant group difference in striatal FDOPA ki. However, this may be due to the 
relatively small number of subjects who had a PET scan (and a lack of sufficient statistical 
power). As Ki values in ARMS subjects who later develop psychosis are higher than in those 
who do not (Howes et al, 2011), another possibility is that the proportion of the present 
sample that is destined to become psychotic is relatively small. This issue will be addressed 
through clinical follow-up.  
5.5 Possible	Mechanisms	
An important finding of this thesis is the confirmation in the healthy controls of a relationship 
between anterior hippocampal activations to novelty and emotion and striatal dopamine 
levels. This is largely as predicted by the Grace model (Howes et al., 2012; Lisman & Grace, 
2005). Similarly I found significant departures from these relationships in participants at high 
clinical risk for psychosis, experiencing attenuated psychotic symptoms. There was both 
overactivation to reward in the striatum, and a positive relationship between hippocampal 
signalling to reward and striatal presynaptic dopamine levels, that was not present in controls. 
This is some of the first evidence from humans that abnormal hippocampal drive of midbrain 
dopamine output may underlie the striatal hyperdopamergia thought to lead to positive 
psychotic symptoms, that was proposed on the basis of animal models (Grace, 2011). The 
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findings also suggest that this abnormal hippocampal drive may be associated with altered 
reward salience processing. 
What could be the neurochemical mechanism underlying hippocampal overdrive?  
Interneuron dysfunction has been proposed as one such mechanism, leading to a loss of tonic 
inhibition of glutamatergic projections from the hippocampus through the striatum and on to 
the midbrain. This could result from hypofunctional NMDA receptors located on inhibitory 
GABAergic interneurons, as proposed by Olner and Faber (1999; Stone, Morrison, & 
Pilowsky, 2007). This was originally thought to involve glutamatergic projections from the 
prefrontal cortex and thalamus, but the present data implicate projections from within the 
hippocampus, as proposed more recently by Grace and colleagues (2011).  
 
Figure 5.4 - Relationship of hippocampal interneuron dysfunction to increased 
striatal dopamine activity  
 
An alternative mechanism involves GABA receptors in the hippocampus. GABA receptors 
are of several subtypes, distributed widely throughout the brain. The alpha 5 subtype is 
mainly located within the hippocampus and connected limbic cortex.  Grace et al suggest that 
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this particular receptor may be the site of the hippocampal abnormality, based on a series of 
stimulation and blockade experiments showing that hippocampal outputs drive midbrain 
dopamine neurons, and evidence that there are reductions in hippocampal parvalbumin 
containing GABA interneurons in schizophrenia (G. P. Reynolds, Abdul-Monim, Neill, & 
Zhang, 2004). 
The role of GABA in this model could be assessed directly by measuring hippocampal 
GABA levels in vivo using neuroimaging. However, there are technical challenges involved 
in this work - MRS signalling in the medial temporal cortex is noisy due to high susceptibility 
artefact and PET GABA ligands are non receptor subtype specific. One study using a 
relatively GABA-Alpha5 selective ligand, 11C-Ro-15 4513 found no difference in 
hippocampal GABA levels between participants with schizophrenia and controls (Asai et al., 
2008), but did identify a relationship between symptoms and GABA levels in the prefrontal 
cortex. More recent developments in analysis of pharmacokinetic profiling may facilitate 
extraction of the alpha 5 subtype located within the limbic cortex with greater specificity 
(Lingford-Hughes et al., 2002). 
Consideration of brainwide abnormalities has been largely outside the scope of this thesis.  
However the finding of reward-emotion interaction group differences in the regions 
corresponding to the Salience network (ACC and bilateral insulae) prompts some interesting 
speculation and further questions. White et al examined functional network connectivity 
between the salience network and other networks identified during a somatosensory task, and 
found reduced connectivity between the ACC and insula, and between this network and the 
default mode network (White 2010). The present findings link to these in locating different 
reward-emotion interactions in those at risk of psychosis in this network, with altered 
relationships with striatal dopamine levels. Further work will elucidate the relationship of this 
network dysfunction to the wider brain network. 
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5.6 Implications	and	Future	Work	
There are a number of important extensions of this work that will further validate and extend 
the main findings leading to possible translational benefit. 
5.6.1 Follow-up	of	UHR	subjects			
All ARMS participants will be followed up clinically for a minimum of 3 years. This period is 
the most timeframe for transition to psychosis following the detection of an ARMS , in 
previous larger samples with long-term follow-up 20-40% of subjects had transitioned within 
this period (figure 5.5 Fusar-poli et al., 2012). Baseline comparisons of those who later 
transitioned will be made on behavioural, fMRI and PET measures, particularly with regard to 
hippocampal -dopamine relationships.  
 
 
Figure 5.5 Survival curve for transition to psychosis from a recent 
OASIS cohort. Figure adapted from (Demjaha, Valmaggia, Stahl, 




Prompted by the finding of differences during the interaction of reward an emotional 
processing in the ARMS, I plan to extend the analysis of whole brain network connectivity. 
Resting state scans in all participants will be used to identify key brain networks, and examine 
the relationship of these networks to the salience network during rest and during the SIT task. 
I also plan seed based connectivity analyses of components of salience processing identified 
during our task. 
5.6.3 Testing	of	SIT	in	First	Episode	Psychosis	subjects		
Similarly, a 3rd experimental group with a First Episode for Psychosis will be recruited and 
tested with the SIT. This will provide an important cross sectional comparison group for the 
findings between ARMS and control participants. In particular I will be interested in testing 
whether first episode patients display aberrant salience, as opposed to the hypersalience that 
was evident in the ARMS sample.  
5.6.4 Glutamate	MRS		
Also of value would be the collection MRS data in all of the participants in this thesis from 
several areas of interest, the ACC, DLPFC, Hippocampus and Thalamus. These will be 
analysed in relation to Salience order to further elucidate the underlying mechanisms and help 
determine whether GABA or NMDA Glutamate receptor dysfunction drives the abnormalities 
in ARMS participants. 
 
5.6.5 Alpha-5	GABA	imaging	using	MRS	and	PET		
Although quantifying GABA levels has proved difficult using MRS (Edden & Barker 2007) I 
plan to test GABA function in the hippocampus using two methods. First is the recently 
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developed MEGAPRESS sequence that has been validated in healthy controls (Edden & 
Barker 2007). This has the disadvantage of being non receptor selective. Therefore I will also 
use the 11C Ro-15 GABA PET ligand which is relatively selectively for the Alpha5 subunit, 
located primarily in the hippocampus (Momosaki, Hosoi, Abe, & Inoue, 2010; Myers et al., 
2012). Although one study has shown a lack of difference between participants with 
schizophrenia and controls (Asai et al, 2008), novel pharmacokinetic modelling techniques 
that allow more reliable separation of alpha 5 and alpha 1 signals will be employed. 
5.6.6 Towards	novel	treatment	targets	for	schizophrenia	
The rationale for work understanding disease mechanism, both from a cognitive and a 
neuropathophysiological point of view is to improve treatments and outcomes for those with 
psychosis, which remain poor (van Os & Kapur, 2009). Evidence of the staged development 
of alterations in salience processing particularly in motivational and emotional systems may 
help further inform cognitive therapeutic approaches to psychosis treatment and prevention, 
that are stage specific (McGorry et al., 2009). They may similarly aid understanding of the 
origin and development of psychotic symptoms for carers of those suffering from psychosis, 
and for the wider public (van Os, 2009). 
Specific work relating to the neurofunctional and neurochemical bases of altered salience 
processing and psychosis may help provide new pharmacological treatment targets. The 
current study provides support for the predictions of a recent influential rodent model of 
psychosis highlighting the relationship of disordered hippocampal signalling relating to 
altered striatal dopamine. Specifically these data supports the idea that dopamine dysfunction 
is secondary to a primary problem ‘upstream’ in the hippocampus. This may explain why 
dopamine blockade is only partially effective. It may be beneficial to develop drugs that target 
the hippocampal dysfunction, and these may be GABA or Glutamatergic. Most current drug 




Selecting which stimuli to attend and respond to requires a ‘common currency’: salience. 
Salient stimuli pull cognition and push behaviour, are multifaceted, motivationally and 
affectively valenced. During the development of psychotic symptoms, a period of 
‘hyper’salience may precede later aberrant salience and full blown psychosis, particularly 
through an increased sensitivity to reward and aversive emotion. Salience processing occurs 
in a subcortical network involving the medial temporal lobe, midbrain and basal ganglia.  
Hippocampal signals of salient emotional and novel stimuli relate to striatal dopamine 
signalling in health, which become dysregulated and driven by reward during the 
development of psychotic symptoms. These data support the predictions of both the aberrant 
salience model of psychosis and also the MAM model, that dopamine dysfunction relates to 
abnormalities upstream in the hippocampus. This has implications for understanding 












fMRI#contrast# Striatum# +/9# k# t# z# p(unc)#
p(FWE#
WB)# x,y,z#(mm)# Location#
Reward#cue# Whole# +/9# NIL# ## ## ## ## ## ##
## Limbic# +/9# NIL# ## ## ## ## ## ##
## Associative# +/9# NIL# ## ## ## ## ## ##
Reward#
outcome# Whole# +/9# NIL# ## ## ## ## ## ##
## Limbic# +/9# NIL# ## ## ## ## ## ##
## Associative# +/9# NIL# ## ## ## ## ## ##
Novelty# Whole# pos# NIL# ## ## ## ## ## ##
## ## neg# NIL# ## ## ## ## ## ##
## Limbic# pos# 27# 5.57# 3.84# <0.0001# 0.634# #42#940##61## R#Parietal##
## ## ## 78# 5.12# 3.66# <0.0001# 0.808# 930#910##98# L#Ventral#Putamen#
## ## ## 27# 4.36# 3.31# <0.0001# 0.979# #33##35##43## R#DLPFC#
## ## ## 15# 4.03# 3.14# 0.001# 0.996# #33##26#920## R#IFG#
## ## ## 28# 3.89# 3.07# 0.001# 0.998# 912#967##49## L#Precuneus#
## ## ## 9# 3.87# 3.06# 0.001# 0.999# #42##17##95## R#Insula#
## ## neg# 37# 4.88# 3.55# <0.0001# 0.885# 948#922##22## L#Insula#
## Associative# pos# ## ## ## ## ## ## ##
## ## neg# 5# 4.07# 3.16# 0.001# 0.995# 954#922#22# L#MTG#
## ## ## 22# 3.97# 3.11# 0.001# 0.997# 96#50#22## L#MFPC#
Emotion# Whole# pos# 15# 3.77# 3# 0.001# 0.999# 42#44#19## R#DLPFC#
## ## neg# 31# 4.8# 3.52# <0.0001# 0.879# 951#955##22## LSTG#
## ## ## 4# 4.11# 3.19# 0.001# 0.989# 921#982##98# ##
## Limbic# pos# 29# 5.83# 3.94# <0.0001# 0.496# 36#41#34## R#DLPFC#
## ## neg# 773# 7.16# 4.39# <0.0001# 0.161# #18#937#914## Cerebellum#
## Associative# pos# 7# 3.61# 2.91# 0.002# 1# 39##44#22# R#DLPFC#
## ## neg# 68# 5.08# 3.64# <0.0001# 0.775# #45#949##16## ITG#
## ## ## 42# 4.55# 3.4# <0.0001# 0.933# 954##97#917# L#MTG#
## ## ## 35# 5.93# 3.98# <0.0001# 0.447# #51##94#917## R#MTG#
## ## ## 17# 3.51# 2.85# 0.002# 1# 927#982#911# L#Occipital#gyrus#
Supplementary table 4.1 Whole brain interactions between fMRI activations to Reward, Novelty and Emotional 





Brain#Analysis# ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ##
fMRI#contrast#
PET# striatal#
ROI# k# t# z# p(unc)#
p(FWE#
WB)# x,y,z#{mm}# Location#
Reward## Whole# 57# 3.93# 3.42# <0.001# 0.564# 42##91#935## R#temp#pole#
## Limbic# NIL# ## ## ## ## ## ##
## Associative# 32# 3.73# 3.28# 0.001# 0.703# #33###2#935## R#temp#pole#
Novelty# Whole# 7# 3.46# 3.09# 0.001# 0.961# ##9#934#932## low#MB#
## ## 6# 3.18# 2.88# 0.002# 0.994# #96##56##34## DMPFC#
## ## 3# 3.08# 2.8# 0.003# 0.997# ##6##53##40# DMPFC#
## ## 12# 3.54# 3.14# 0.001# 0.942# 960#943##16## STG#
## ## 17# 3.2# 2.89# 0.002# 0.993# 924#910##92# L#Pallidum/Putamen#
## Limbic# NIL# ## ## ## ## ## ##
## Associative# 6# 3.63# 3.21# 0.001# 0.889# ##9#934#932## low#midbrain#
## ## 10# 3.22# 2.9# 0.002# 0.988# #96##56##34# DMPFC#
Emotion# Whole# NIL# ## ## ## ## ## ##
## Limbic# 357# 4.19# 3.59# <0.001# 0.579# ##3#973##40## R#Precuneus#
## ## ## 4.17# 3.58# <0.001# 0.589# #93#970##28## L#Precuneus#
## ## 129# 3.96# 3.44# <0.001# 0.73# ##6##38###7## R#ACC#
## ## 10# 3.76# 3.3# <0.001# 0.847# #33##17##52## R#DLPFC#
## ## 80# 3.69# 3.25# 0.001# 0.882# #48#931##19##
Insula/Parietal#
Operculum#
## ## 29# 3.48# 3.1# 0.001# 0.954# 924##50##19## L#MFG#
## Associative# 20# 3.76# 3.3# <0.001# 0.852# #93#934#911## L#Midbrain#(PAG)#
Supplementary table 4.2 ARMS v HC whole brain interactions between fMRI activations to Reward, Novelty and 
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